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Abstract 
This thesis focuses on four major topics in banking: corporate governance mechanisms, 
financial flexibility, risk-taking and risk management effectiveness of banks. It enhances 
understanding of how differences in corporate governance structures between Islamic and 
Conventional banks might affect their decision-making process regarding their corporate 
financial and risk management policies. Employing a sample of 28 Islamic banks and 37 
conventional banks operated in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region over the 
period 2009–2015, the thesis comprises three main objectives. Firstly, a comparison study 
between Islamic (IBs) and Conventional banks (CBs) is conducted to investigate the impacts 
of the board of directors structure, the existence of dedicated risk committee, and the Shari’ah 
supervisory board (SSB) on banks financial flexibility. The results indicate a positive 
relationship between board size and financial flexibility for Conventional banks. Intriguingly, 
this relationship turns to be negative for Islamic banks. Furthermore, it also shows that the 
existence of a dedicated risk committee enhances the financial flexibility of both CBs and IBs 
in general. In the context of Islamic bank per se, the evidence is obtained such that SSBs size 
and percentage of members who have multi-membership have a positive association with the 
IBs financial flexibility. The second objective of this thesis is to investigate the effects of the 
new risk governance framework (i.e. a dedicated risk committee (RC) and a Chief Risk 
Officer (CRO)) on the bank risk-taking behaviour for both conventional and Islamic banking 
systems. In extending the literature (which is quite scarce) concerning the relationship 
between risk governance and risk-taking, this study investigates five main risk aspects: 
market, credit, operational, liquidity, and insolvency risks. Furthermore, this study is the first 
to be conducted in Islamic Banks. The findings indicate a negative association between risk 
governance index and risk perspectives across both CBs and IBs— except as regards credit 
risk since that is only applicable to CBs.  Last but not least, the third objective of this thesis is 
to investigate how risk governance influences the effectiveness of banks in managing their 
risks. The study finds that CBs performance is more positively associated with risk-taking for 
banks with stronger risk governance. In other words, these risk governance mechanisms 
significantly improve the effectiveness of risk management within CBs but do not influence 
the risk management effectiveness of IBs. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Corporate governance plays an important role in ensuring that the frameworks of corporations 
are held in place, and hence that they survive and succeed. Particularly in the 1990s, 
following a number of firm failures in developed countries such as America and Britain, the 
prominence of corporate governance issues increased significantly, drawing greater attention 
from academics and regulators (Daily and Dalton, 1994; Dalton et al., 1998). As a result, 
corporate governance topics have been investigated in many different fields such as 
accounting, finance, management and law (Denis, 2001; Solomon, 2010). Despite such 
extensive research on the topic, corporate governance still revealed that it had many 
weaknesses in the financial crisis of 2007. Academic research places the blame on these 
weaknesses for the crisis. Specifically, previous studies (e.g. Kirkpatrick, 2009; Pathan, 2009; 
Minton et al., 2014) argued that the failure of the internal corporate governance system to 
manage risk-taking may be the key reason for the financial crisis. 
Among many different aspects of corporate governance, academics and practitioners put 
major blame on the weaknesses of boards of directors, the body responsible for all of a firm’s 
strategic decisions, in performing their responsibilities (Andres and Vallelado, 2008; Erkens 
et al., 2012). Erkens et al. (2012) mentioned that the board of directors is the ultimate body 
responsible for failing to protect the shareholders’ interests and for not concentrating on the 
long-term objectives of firms. As a result, most of the countries around the world 
acknowledge the importance of improving corporate governance codes, specifically regarding 
the board of directors’ role in managing risks and ensuring financial soundness and stability. 
Additionally, countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) have also recognised 
the importance of enhancing their corporate governance codes. Thus, regulatory bodies and 
policy makers in the MENA region have begun to improve and develop their corporate 
governance guidelines (Shehata, 2015). 
In addition to the board of directors, its sub-committees started attracting the attention of 
academics and practitioners regarding their risk management roles. The regulatory pressure 
motivates financial firms to adopt more advanced enterprise risk management systems. That is 
to enhance risk management-related to corporate governance mechanisms (risk governance), 
specifically, forming a dedicated risk committee and assigning a chief risk officer (CRO) 
(Lundqvist, 2015). Previously, audit committees were responsible for overseeing firms’ risks. 
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Nevertheless, corporate governance codes around the world started to emphasise the 
importance of having a dedicated board level committee (i.e. the Risk Committee) that is 
responsible for the comprehensive risk of the firm. This is because the audit committee might 
not able to meet their responsibilities due to the complexity of the risks faced by financial 
firms and other obligations that the audit committee might have (e.g. processing financial 
reporting).  
The investigation in this thesis is conducted in the banking context specifically. There is a 
paucity of studies in this sector, despite its importance in financial systems. Furthermore, 
financial institutions have different characteristics to non-financial firms. For example, 
financial institutions are highly leveraged and highly regulated. Furthermore, within this 
industry, another type of banking system, which had previously been relatively ignored, 
started coming to the fore as a surprisingly resilient system during the financial crisis – the 
Islamic banking system. Islamic banks (IBs) have recently become a phenomenon of interest 
to researchers given their unique characteristics compared to conventional banks (CBs). In 
general, IBs have to comply with Shari’ah principles, which assure the satisfaction of the 
banks’ clients.1 Moreover, IBs have a different internal corporate governance mechanism, 
which is called multi-layer governance (Mollah and Zaman, 2015). Therefore, it is also 
expected that corporate governance mechanisms will have a different effect on IBs’ corporate 
outcomes compared to those of CBs. 
Given the important exposure of these corporate governance mechanisms in today’s market, 
the main theme of this thesis is about corporate governance mechanisms, focusing on the 
board of directors and risk governance in both conventional and Islamic banking systems, and 
the Shari’ah supervisory board (SSB), which is the additional layer unique to IBs. The next 
section will introduce in more detail the motivations, objectives and contributions of this 
thesis. 
1.2 Objectives of the study 
The main aim of the thesis is to investigate how corporate governance mechanisms influence 
banks’ financial flexibility, risk-taking behaviour, and risk management effectiveness in 
MENA region. In addition, the thesis aims to investigate how these influences are different 
between Islamic and Conventional banks. The study’s general motivations are summarised in 
                                                     
1 See section 2.3 in Chapter 2 for more explanations about Shari’ah principles and IBs’ characteristics. 
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Figure 1.1, which contains three main objectives of this thesis. Therefore, the next section will 
provide detailed information about these aims and objectives. 
 
 
Figure 1.1. General objectives of the thesis 
 
1.2.1 Objective 1 
As depicted in Figure 1.2, the first objective of this thesis is to investigate the effects of board 
of directors’ structures and its sub-committee (specifically the risk committee) on the 
financial flexibility of conventional and Islamic banks. Furthermore, as IBs are a main subject 
of the study, their additional governance layer, the SSB, is also studied. 
 
 
Figure 1.2 Objective 1 – Effects of Board of Directors (BOD), Risk Committee and Shari’ah Supervisory 
Board (SSB) on Financial Flexibility 
 
The significance of investigating the board of directors’ structure is derived from its critical 
monitoring and advisory roles within banks (Adams and Ferreira, 2007; Boone et al., 2007; 
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Coles et al., 2008; Adams and Mehran, 2012). Thus, the board’s effectiveness can be derived 
from the structure of the board. This thesis focuses on two components of the board structure: 
board size and independence. The majority of previous literature (e.g. Adams and Ferreira, 
2007; Coles et al., 2008; Adams et al., 2010; Wintoki et al., 2012) investigates these two 
components, which show how important it is to consider their effectiveness on the firm’s 
decision-making process. However, Cheng (2008) and Nakano and Nguyen (2012) argue that 
previous literature has obtained mixed findings about the relationship between board 
structures (size and independence) and corporate outcomes (e.g. financial performances and 
firm value)2. This inconclusive conclusion motivates this study to investigate their influences 
on banks’ financial flexibility. 
In the comparison study between IBs and CBs, differences in their governance structures are 
taken into account. Specifically, IBs have an additional governance layer (SSB) that monitors 
the management’s and board’s activities. It plays an important role in earning the IB’s clients’ 
trust in the bank’s compliance with Shari’ah Law. Therefore, this thesis also investigates the 
influence of three important characteristics of SSBs (SSB size, member qualifications, and 
member multi-membership) on IBs’ financial flexibility. 
Recently, the regulators and agency authorities have urged the establishment of a dedicated 
committee that is explicitly responsible for overseeing and monitoring the risk of banks. This 
responsible body is the risk committee. Klein (2002) argues that as board committees have 
independent and more frequent meetings than the full board, they are more effective in 
achieving their goals. Applying this view, it is expected that risk committees could play an 
effective role in the decision-making process, which in turn affects financial flexibility. 
 
1.2.2 Objective 2 
As depicted in Figure 1.3, the second objective of this thesis is to investigate the effects of 
risk governance on the risk-taking behaviour of conventional and Islamic banks. The risk 
governance covered in this study comprises the characteristics of the risk committee and 
CRO. 
                                                     
2 For example, while several studies (i.e. Yermack, 1996; Eisenberg et al., 1998) show that smaller board is more effective in 
increasing the firm value, others (i.e. Coles et al., 2008; linck et al., 2008) reveal that a larger board size is more effective in 
enhancing the firm value for large and complex firms. The non-executive director (independent member) has to be 
independent from the firm management (Hart, 1995), and provide strong monitoring of the management’s actions to protect 
the shareholders’ interests (Lim et al., 2007). Nevertheless, it is hard to observe whether this type of member is really 
independent form the management or not. Thus, Hermalin and Weisbach, (2003) discuss how the unclear relationship 
between independent director and the management might lead to mixed results in their relationship with corporate outcomes. 
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Figure 1.3 Objective 2 – Effects of Risk Governance on Risk-taking Behaviour 
 
More than just the existence of a risk committee within a board, but also its characteristics 
(i.e. size, independence, number of meetings, multi-membership, and financial qualifications) 
should be investigated. These characteristics of risk committees might determine how the risk 
committee effectively manage corporate risk-taking behaviour. Recently, firms have started to 
assign full responsibility for a firm’s comprehensive risk management to one individual – the 
leader of the independent risk management department, the CRO. As the CRO evidently 
holds critical roles related to firms’ risk management, firms’ risk-taking behaviour is likely to 
be affected by the CRO. This study measures the importance of the CRO’s role by 
considering the following aspects: the presence of a CRO, CROs in executive management, 
CRO as a member of risk committees, and the CRO’s direct report to the board of directors. 
These nine investigated characteristics of risk committees and CROs are conceptualised into 
one risk governance index. 
Regarding the risk-taking behaviour of banks, regulators recommend that banks improve their 
corporate governance mechanisms, not to manage any particular type of risk, but to place 
more emphasis on all risk aspects of banks. In other words, they are concerned about the 
comprehensive risk level of banks. Therefore, this study examines the five most common risk 
aspects that banks are exposed to: market risk, credit risk, operational risk, liquidity risk and 
insolvency risk.3 
 
                                                     
3 Previous banking literature, The Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), and the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision classify these types of risks as the major risk that banks need to face and manage 
effectively (BCBS, 2001; IFSB, 2005; BCBS, 2008; Sun and Chang, 2011; Acharya and Mora, 2015). 
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1.2.3 Objective 3 
As depicted in Figure 1.4, the third objective of this thesis is to investigate the effects of risk 
governance on the effectiveness of risk management in conventional and Islamic banks. 
 
 
Figure 1.4 Objective 3 – Effects of Risk Governance on Risk Management Effectiveness 
 
According to the risk-return trade-off principle, if higher risk-taking can lead to a potentially 
higher return, then the risk-taking decision can be deemed to be appropriate as long as it 
matches the risk attitudes of the decision makers or stakeholders. However, it is sensible to 
say in general that regulators encourage the improvement of risk governance mechanisms to 
help the risk management process to be more effective. In other words, improving banks’ risk 
management effectiveness is the key goal of any amendment in risk governance. 
 
To meet these objectives, this thesis will try to answer the following research questions:  
1) Are there associations between board structure and financial flexibility across conventional 
and Islamic banks in the MENA region? If there are, do these associations differ between the 
two bank systems? 
2) Are there associations between the existence of a dedicated risk committee and financial 
flexibility across conventional and Islamic banks in the MENA region? If there are, do these 
associations differ between the two bank systems? 
3) Are there associations between Shari’ah supervisory board effectiveness and the financial 
flexibility of Islamic banks in the MENA region? 
4) Are there associations between the risk governance mechanisms and bank risk-taking 
behaviours across conventional and Islamic banks in the MENA region? If there are, do these 
associations differ between the two bank systems? 
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5) Do risk governance mechanisms influence the risk management effectiveness (the positive 
association between banks’ risk-taking and performance) of conventional and Islamic banks 
in the MENA region? If they do, does this influence differ between the two bank systems? 
Chapter 3 addresses the first three research questions 1-3, following by Chapter 4 which 
addresses the other two questions 4-5. 
1.3 Motivation and rational of the study 
It is noticeable that academic researchers and practitioners tend to focus extensively on the 
financial performances of firms as this is of the utmost interest and concern to 
investors/shareholders. However, the on-going underlying processes, which make a 
significant contribution to that ultimate financial outcome of firms, as well as to their 
survivability, are relatively understudied. These include firms’ financial flexibility, risk-taking 
behaviour, and risk management effectiveness. In corporate governance literature, this 
discrepancy in academic focus is more evident. In fact, in the banking context, it is crucial to 
achieve a sustainable and healthy development, rather than short-term success. The reason for 
this is that banks are the key financial institutions that safeguard the whole financial and 
economic system of a country. To achieve sustainability and healthy finance, banks should be 
financially flexible and possess an effective risk management policy. 
Indeed, academic and market participants have started paying more attention to the concept of 
financial flexibility. This important financial notion has been acknowledged and discussed 
previously; however, there is a lack of sufficient empirical investigations on the topic in 
banking. Basically, financial flexibility is defined as the firm’s ability to access funds to 
finance positive net present value projects and to withstand financial risk (Bonaimé et al., 
2013; Ferrando et al., 2017). The International Risk Governance Council (IRGC, 2005) 
suggests a governance framework that defines the financial resilience/flexibility as a goal 
that need to be achieved by the risk management system. This goal helps to react and 
respond to a surprised events. On other word, the financial resilience goal is seen as a risk-
absorbing system to withstand stress and respond to a crisis situation. There is evidence that 
financially flexible firms are more likely to survive in periods of economic stress (DeAngelo 
and DeAngelo, 2007; Gamba and Triantis, 2008; Mittoo et al., 2011; Meier et al., 2013). 
Financial flexibility plays a crucial role in firms’ financial policy decisions. For instance, 
Graham and Harvey (2001) argue that financial flexibility is the most important component of 
a firm’s capital structure. An additional interest in this context is risk-taking strategies, which 
influence the decision-making process in banks. Kim and Buchanan (2008) state that risk-
taking is an important factor that affects the managerial decision-making process. 
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Consequently, both financial flexibility and risk-taking could be considered significant tools 
that affect the success of a firm. 
After reviewing the literature of corporate governance in general, and for conventional and 
Islamic banks in particular, it can be seen that most of the literature investigates the 
relationship between corporate governance issues and firm performance (see for example, 
(Yermack, 1996; Coles et al., 2008; Aebi et al., 2012; Mollah and Zaman, 2015). Despite the 
importance of financial flexibility and risk-taking, both concepts have tended to be ignored. 
Even though a few studies consider the risk-taking aspects when examining corporate 
governance issues, most of them have conducted their studies on non-financial firms (e.g. 
Adams et al., 2005; Nakano and Nguyen, 2012). Most of the corporate governance literature 
has excluded financial firms from their samples (Erkens et al., 2012). However, it is more 
important to investigate corporate governance issues in financial institutions as the latter 
provide access to the funding system, play an important role in economic financial stability, 
and generate liquidity (Arun and Turner, 2004; Levine, 2004; Staikouras et al., 2007; Andres 
and Vallelado, 2008). The financial sector is exposed to the “cascading effect” concept, which 
is that financial institutions can fail because of the failure of another financial institution in the 
sector (Gordon and Muller, 2011). Adams and Mehran (2003) argue that corporate 
governance studies should consider the special characteristics of financial institutions. Andres 
and Vallelado (2008) state that corporate governance mechanisms might operate in different 
ways because of the special characteristics of the financial sector. Those characteristics 
include heavy regulations (Levine, 2004), having greater information asymmetry (Adams and 
Mehran, 2003), having more agency problem issues (Andres and Vallelado, 2008), and 
working in a risky environment. 
Moreover, most previous empirical studies have taken place in developed countries such as 
the USA and the UK. Nevertheless, it is hard to generalise these studies’ findings to 
developing countries such as countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. 
Countries in the MENA region have special contextual characteristics that might raise some 
concerns about whether the effective corporate governance mechanisms of developed 
countries would be effective in these developing countries. The MENA countries are 
characterised by having a strong social structure, strong individual relationships, concentrated 
ownership, and following the Shari’ah Law legal system (Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), 2005; Tricker, 2009; Shehata, 2015). Thus, differences 
in the regulations, disclosure and financial reporting requirements, and governance codes are 
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expected to exist. Also, most of the MENA countries do not have strict corporate governance 
codes but have voluntary corporate governance codes (e.g. Omani CG code 2002, Egyptian 
CG code 2005, Saudi CG code 2006 and Jordanian CG code 2007). As a result, there are 
expected to be differences in the corporate outcomes of firms complying with corporate 
governance codes in developing countries and firms complying with corporate governance 
codes in developed countries. Most of the banking sector in MENA countries is characterised 
by a dual banking system (Islamic and conventional), which helps the comparison study of 
this thesis in terms of the sample distribution of the two bank types. 
As aforementioned, the thesis centres around the corporate governance theme. One of the 
most important internal corporate governance mechanisms is the board of directors. Even 
though the MENA countries’ corporate governance codes and recommendations regarding the 
board of directors’ effectiveness are derived from developed countries’ corporate governance 
codes (i.e. 1992 UK Cadbury and Anglo-American models) (Hussain and Mallin, 2002; 
Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009; Piesse et al., 2012), there are several differences worth 
mentioning. For example, in the MENA region, the boards of directors are dominated by 
controlling shareholders, friends, and relatives. Furthermore, there is a lack of independent 
members on the board, and most firms have one person as both CEO and board chairman 
(Saïdi, 2004). 
Taken together, it is noticeable that there are a number of differences existing between 1) non-
financial and financial firms; 2) developed and developing countries; and 3) Islamic and 
conventional banks. Thus, it is important to examine the board of directors’ structure of both 
Islamic and conventional banks in terms of financial flexibility and corporate risk-taking in 
the context of the developing dual banking system of the MENA region. 
As the board of directors manages the firm’s risk through their sub-committees, the thesis is 
motivated to cover the sub-committee that is explicitly responsible for monitoring and 
managing risk – that is, the risk committee. Specialist sub-committees for managing risks 
received more attention after the recent financial crisis. More interestingly, researchers argue 
that audit committees might not be effective in managing firm risks, especially for financial 
firms, since the financial sector is exposed to many complicated risks that need specialist 
members in risk management. Therefore, the study is motivated to conduct a thorough 
investigation into the relationship between the existence of a risk committee and a bank’s 
financial flexibility, and how that impact is different between Islamic and conventional banks. 
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Furthermore, another special corporate governance mechanism, i.e. SSBs, needs to be 
investigated in IBs. IBs have to follow Shari’ah principles in order to earn their clients’ trust, 
and one way to assure the latter is through having an effective SSB, which monitors the 
banks’ transactions and financial instruments. Thus, this study also examines the relationship 
between SSBs and IBs’ financial flexibility. To the best of my knowledge, no existing studies 
have investigated this relationship in IBs. 
As mentioned, the thesis also studies banks’ risk-taking behaviour in addition to their 
financial flexibility. In this regard, the study evaluates the risk governance of banks, which 
includes characteristics of both the risk committee and the CRO. Recent regulators bodies in 
the MENA countries (e.g. The Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (2014, Principle 4, Article 
78), Kuwait Capital Market Authority (2013, Principle 5.1), The Qatar Central Bank (2015, 
Principle 4), The Central Bank of Jordan (2016, Article 10), and The Central Bank of Egypt 
(2016, Principle 5, article 5.2.30), (BSBC)) emphasise the important roles of the risk 
committee and CRO in managing and monitoring comprehensive firm risk. Lastly, the thesis 
attempts to study the risk management effectiveness of banks. In practice, the main purposes 
of improving risk governance, either by creating a specialist risk committee or assigning a 
CRO, are to enhance the effectiveness of risk management, not to reduce/increase risk-taking. 
The reason for this is that a reduction/increase in risk cannot indicate risk management 
effectiveness. Therefore, this study is also motivated to examine whether this purpose of 
improving risk governance has been achieved. 
 
1.4 Contribution of the study 
The contributions of this thesis are explored in more detail throughout Chapters Three and 
Four. Chapter Three presents the findings for the first objective, whilst Chapter Four presents 
the findings for the second and third objectives. 
Generally, this study contributes to the literature by extending the existing literature (e.g. 
Cihak and Hesse, 2010; Abedifar et al., 2013; Beck et al., 2013; Mollah and Zaman, 2015; 
Mollah et al., 2017a) on corporate governance and the financial health of firms in several 
ways. Firstly, to our knowledge, this study is the first to examine the relationship between 
corporate governance and financial flexibility in the context of the banking industry and to 
compare the findings between CBs and IBs. Secondly, the study also methodologically 
contributes through its measure of banks’ financial flexibility. In spite of the theoretical and 
empirical research on IBs’ financial strength, no study has empirically investigated IBs’ 
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conservative risk strategies for developing funding structures and liquidity policies. 
Therefore, the study examines the impact of the board of directors, the existence of a risk 
committee and the SSB on banks’ financial flexibility by using a single index consisting of 
more than one perspective (i.e. funding structure, liquidity, and insolvency risks). This index 
was constructed by developing a mechanism that helps to assign scores to banks’ level of 
financial flexibility. 
Thirdly, the contribution of the thesis is related to the risk governance mechanisms’ influence 
on corporate risk-taking. In more detail, the second objective contributes to the previous 
literature by studying the two most debated risk governance mechanisms (risk committee 
(RC) and CRO). Previous studies (e.g. Pathan, 2009; Erkens et al., 2012; Minton et al., 2014) 
investigated only board structures and its charactristics impact on bank risk-taking. However, 
this study employs a risk governance index consisting of two risk governance mechansims 
(RC and CRO) in investigating banks’ risk-taking behaviour. The growig literature on the role 
of risk governance (e.g. (Aebi et al., 2012; Baxter et al., 2013; Al‐Hadi et al., 2016; Nahar et 
al., 2016; Ames et al., 2018) investigate its impact on firm’s performance, risk disclosure, and 
financial strength rating. Only a few studies have considered the influence of these risk 
governance mechansims on corporate risk-taking (Lingel and Sheedy, 2012; Ellul and 
Yerramilli, 2013; Hines and Peters, 2015). However, these studies consider some specific 
perspectives of risks (e.g. market and credit risks), whereas this empirical study takes into 
consideration five risk perspectives separately, as well as considering them in one single 
index (i.e. market, credit, operational, liquidity, and insolvency risks). Furthermore, this thesis 
is the first to consider the topic for two different types of banking system (Islamic and 
conventional). To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study to take into consideration 
the relationship between risk governance and risk-taking for both CBs and IBs.  
Additionally, the thesis provides another significant contribution by evaluating the effect of 
risk governance on risk management effectiveness, and by drawing conclusions for both 
conventional and Islamic banks. Previous literature studied the relationship between risk 
governance and financial performance (Aebi et al., 2012; Nahar et al., 2016) and others 
studied the relationship between risk governance and risk-taking, as mentioned above. 
However, these links were investigated separately. This study distinctively examines the 
effect of risk governance on the association between risk-taking and financial performance 
(i.e. risk management effectiveness). 
 
  
12 
 
Lastly, the study covers the MENA region as the sample being investigation. This region 
consists of emerging countries where investors have less legal protection, which has led to an 
increase in asymmetrical information and contracting problems. These problems may affect 
corporate financial and investment decisions negatively (La Porta et al., 1997). Furthermore, 
as the MENA region is considered to be an emerging region, its ability to access external 
financing markets is low because of its highly volatile capital flows (Guo and Stepanyan, 
2011; Agosin and Huaita, 2012). As a result, financial flexibility and effective risk-taking 
strategies in these countries are more desirable. Klapper and Love (2004) also state that the 
quality of corporate governance is more important in countries with weak legal environments. 
Therefore, investigating the MENA milieu might help us to understand how corporate 
governance mechanisms can mitigate banks’ agency problems. 
1.5 The Structure of the thesis: 
The structure of the thesis is organised as follows: Chapter 2 provides an overview of the 
Islamic finance and banking systems. In this chapter, a discussion on the Shari’ah principles 
and a comparison between the characteristics of Islamic and conventional banks are provided. 
The chapter also presents definitions, theories, models, and types of corporate governance and 
risk management practices for the two banking systems. For coherency purposes, the three 
main empirical objectives of the thesis will be presented in two chapters. Chapter 3 presents 
the first empirical objective (Section 1.2.1) including a thorough literature review, hypothesis 
development, methodology, empirical results and discussion, and conclusion. Chapter 4 
reports the second and third empirical objectives (Sections 1.2.2 and 1.2.3). Similar to 
Chapter 3, this chapter is also composed of a literature review, hypothesis development, 
methodology, empirical results and discussion, and conclusion. Lastly, Chapter 5 provides a 
conclusion to the whole thesis by summarising the main contributions and findings. This 
chapter also discusses the practical implications of the study and recommends a window for 
further research. 
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Chapter 2. ISLAMIC FINANCE - CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND 
RISK MANAGEMENT ACROSS CONVENTIONAL AND ISLAMIC 
BANKING SYSTEMS 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores three key aspects of this thesis. These are: the development of the 
Islamic banking system, corporate governance and risk management. The first aspect 
discusses the development and importance of Islamic banking in developing and developed 
economics. Furthermore, Islamic banks’ (IBs) characteristics will be discussed to provide 
more knowledge about Islamic financial systems, along with an introduction to Shari’ah 
principles. In addition, there is a discussion about the differences between Islamic and 
conventional banks’ characteristics, followed by details of bank’s regulations. 
In the second aspect, thorough information related to corporate governance, including its 
definitions and concepts, and its relevance in the banking sector, will be discussed in detail. 
Furthermore, this chapter introduces different corporate governance models, emphasising the 
unique Islamic governance model. The third aspect is divided into four sections. It starts with 
an introduction to the definitions and concepts of risk management, followed by different 
types of risk and discussions about their management. Subsequently, Section 2.5.3 presents 
the key participants in the risk management process. Moving on to Section 2.5.4, risk 
management from an Islamic perspective is illustrated. 
 
2.2 Development of Islamic Banks 
Islamic finance covers all the transaction types of financial intermediations (e.g. Islamic 
banking) and capital markets. The term ‘Islamic finance’ first came into use in the mid-1980s. 
Previously, it was called “interest-free”. In the early 1960s, fully fledged interest-free banks 
were established in Malaysia and Egypt. Allegedly, those banks marked the birth of the 
Islamic banking system. Indeed, commercial banks only started to operate in the Middle East 
region in the early 1970s. 
 
Table 2.1 summarises the historic development of IBs over time. In 1974, the Islamic 
Development Bank (IDB) was founded by the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC). The 
goal of this bank was to enhance the economies in Muslim countries and support the 
development of banks that aimed to comply with Shari’ah. Following this period, the first 
commercial Islamic Bank, the Dubai Islamic Bank (DIB), was founded in Dubai in 1975 
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(Abdel Karim and Archer, 2002). Subsequently, several other IBs were also founded such as 
the Faisal Islamic Bank (Sudan), the Kuwait Finance House (Kuwait), Bahrain Islamic Banks 
(Bahrain) and Al-Rajhi Banks (Saudi Arabia). The early monopoly position of these banks 
provided them with comparative advantages throughout the development stage of the Islamic 
banking system. Responding to the great success of IBs, regulators started to encourage its 
expansion by providing new licences in this sector. For illustration, the Bahrain Central Bank 
posited a new framework to support Islamic institutions. This framework provided coverage 
for a number of areas, including capital adequacy, risk management and reporting issues. 
Furthermore, a number of organisations were established in Bahrain to support IBs’ 
development, such the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial 
Institutions (AAOFIFIs) and the Islamic International Rating Agency (IIRA) (Central Bank of 
Bahrain Report, 2010). Archer and Karim (2002) argued that IBs are a creative and efficient 
alternative banking system that can operate the financial intermediation between economic 
surplus and deficit. 
The sharp increase in oil prices in the early 1980s significantly boosted the accumulated 
wealth of the Middle East and supported the spread of IBs. During this period, some countries 
even converted their entire system to a fully Islamic banking system. For example, Iran and 
Sudan transformed their banking systems to an Islamic banking system in 1983 and 1984, 
respectively. Despite this period of development for IBs, they still suffered from poor 
investment opportunities (Cerović et al., 2017). Acknowledging the matter, CBs from the 
West took advantage of the funds available to IBs at that time and helped IBs to invest the 
money and carry out trade-related activities. Western banks detected the development of IBs 
and started to provide products that were compliant with Shari’ah principles through a 
separate department called the Islamic window.4 
During the period between 2003 and 2009, this newly established banking system started to 
be accepted more widely by global market participants and some regulatory authorities, such 
as the Financial Services Authority (El Tiby, 2011). Subsequently, the Islamic financial 
system spread internationally to other countries such as Japan and Switzerland. Particularly in 
Japan, an Islamic portfolio for Mudariba was established by industrial banks. Also, a number 
of Japanese government banks such as the Bank of Japan joined the Islamic Financial 
                                                     
4 The Islamic window is a department of conventional banks that provides products and services compliant with 
Shari’ah principles. Banks took that step due to the high demand for Shari’ah products and to maintain their 
clients. Banks in other countries such as the Middle East and other regions started to provide Islamic windows as 
well. 
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Services Board as an observer. Furthermore, during the same period, three IBs were granted 
authority by the FSA to operate in the UK. These banks were: the Islamic Bank of Britain 
(2004), the European Islamic Investment Banks (2006), and the Banks of London and the 
Middle East (2007). 
 
The Period Dates Characteristics 
Establishment  1965-1976 
Major activities across the Muslim world in the area of 
research in all fields concern Muslims’ daily lives. The 
establishment of a Muslim organisation to promote 
cooperation and support among Muslim countries. The 
establishment of several Islamic banks across the Muslim 
world.  
The spread  1977-2002 
Fuelled by the sharp increase in oil prices and the huge 
wealth in the Middle East, hundreds of Islamic banks 
were established across the globe. The transformation of 
the financial system to a complete Islamic banking system 
in Iran, Sudan and Pakistan.  
International 
recognition  
2003-2009 
The global acceptance of Islamic banks by the Western 
and Recognition American regulators. The growing 
interest of international banks in Western Europe, the 
United States, and Japan in Islamic Finance.  
The Evaluation  2009- Present  
The large, healthy gross value of Islamic assets compared 
to the large decline in conventional banks’ assets during 
the global crisis. Islamic banks were the least affected by 
the global crisis.  
Table 2.1 The development of the Islamic banking system from 1965 to the present 
Source: (El Tiby, 2011) 
 
During the recent financial crisis in 2007, special attention was paid to IBs by global bankers, 
supervisors and regulators due to their surprisingly resilient performance. They stated that IBs 
were not seriously affected by the crisis compared to their conventional counterparts due to 
their real assets contract base (El Tiby, 2011). Therefore, at the end of 2009, IBs had 
dramatically grown in the global world – total asset values for the top 500 Islamic financial 
organisations significantly increased from US$639 billion in 2008 to US$822 billion in 2009, 
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representing an increase of 28.6%. The last decade could be considered as the global growth 
period for IBs. They showed the ability to grow across 75 countries from Africa, Asia and 
Europe to North America, even during the greatest financial tsunami (Khan and Bhatti, 2008). 
In particular, IBs’ assets in the MENA region increased by 72% per year on average for the 
period from 2002 to 2008 (Ali, 2011). 
The fast growth in Islamic banking proves the successful achievements of this system. By the 
end of 2011, the size of IBs had doubled compared to 2006, reaching the value of US$900 
billion, accounting for more than 1% of the global banking sector (Financial Times, 2011). 
The Islamic banking growth continues and their asset value reached US$1.9 trillion in the 
early half of 2014 (World Bank and Islamic Development Bank Report, 2015). This fast 
growing industry was created by IBs’ ability to add more ethical, competitive, flexible and 
diversified tools and systems to the global financial markets. Moreover, the different 
mechanisms of IBs make them directly involved with the borrowers’ investments rather than 
being pure intermediates of financial capital. This motivates IBs to investigate borrowers’ 
projects with high-standard tools since the bank is sharing the risk with its customers. Hasan 
and Dridi (2010) discuss a number of factors that contributed to the solid growth of Islamic 
institutions. These are: (1) the need in some Muslim countries for Shari’ah-compliant 
products; (2) the regulatory adoption of the Islamic finance system to cover the demand for 
Islamic products; (3) CBs’ growing demand for Islamic products to provide diversified 
products for clients from different religious backgrounds; and (4) the need to develop new 
financial instruments to cover all the demand from investors (including both corporations and 
individuals). 
2.3 Differences between Islamic and Conventional Banks 
The banking sector is one of the most important financial sectors that can affect the economy 
domestically and internationally. The sector primarily comprises IBs and CBs. The main 
difference between the two bank types is that IBs have a different operational system and 
follow Shari’ah principles in processing their financial transactions and contracts. Shari’ah 
principles are the main law and moral values that Islam mandates to Muslims. Muslims 
interact with and apply these principles in their daily lives. Shari’ah not only consists of faith, 
but it also includes practices, including worship and individual attitudes and conducts. 
Shari’ah also extends its reach to dealing with laws and social norms, such as politics, crime, 
economics and many different matters related to family and individuals. Muslims extract the 
Shari’ah principles from two main sources: the holy book “Quran”, which was given by god, 
and the Sunnah, explained by Prophet Muhammad (Elasrag, 2014). Furthermore, some 
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ambiguous cases are usually explained by Islamic jurisprudence, which is the process of 
interpretation of the law by humans. This is usually called Fiqh, Ijmah (consensus), and 
Quays (analogy reasoning). Given the growing significance of IBs, it is useful to describe 
some of the basic natures and characteristics of IBs and how these are different to those of 
CBs. As previously mentioned, IBs build their operations on Shari’ah principles. 
2.3.1 Shari’ah principles 
There are five main principles determined by Islamic law. (1) Contracts should be based on 
Profit and loss sharing (PLS) concept (equity-based contracts) where banks (the lenders) and 
investors (the borrowers) share the business risks and returns of funded projects (Greuning 
and Iqbal, 2008; Kettell, 2011). This principle enforces Islamic banks to solely base on 
financing instruments (contracts) that allow for “risk-sharing” rather than “risk-shifting” as 
being derived from the conventional debt financing instruments (Al-Suhaibani and Naifar, 
2014). However, these contracts could also be provided on the liability side of a bank’s 
balance sheet. One of the most important funding sources that is based on PLS is the profit-
sharing investment account (PSIA). Archer and Karim (2006) explicate that IBs provide two 
different types of PSIA contracts: restricted and unrestricted. In the restricted PSIA, IBs do 
not account for the losses with investors, they just share the profits with them. In this PSIA 
type investors can choose the type of investment, and IB only provides administrative 
services. Nevertheless, if the PSIA is unrestricted, IBs invest the PSIA fund in the bank’s 
assets pool and share both profits and losses, and investors have no right to choose the 
investment type. (2) Interest on loans and deposits is prohibited (Riba) (Greuning and Iqbal, 
2008; Kettell, 2011), therefore deposits are free of interest. Social justice views are the 
underlying reasons for the prohibition of interest, which obliges both borrowers and lenders to 
share the profits and risks of a targeted business in an equivalent manner (Iqbal and Mirakhor, 
2013). (3) All transactions should be made with real economically tangible assets. (4) Qharar 
(excessive uncertainty) and mayser (gambling) are prohibited (Obaidullah, 2005; Čihák and 
Hesse, 2010). (5) Some business types are prohibited in Islam such as companies involving 
alcohol, gambling and pork stores. Thus, Islamic banks are barred from trading in any 
financial transaction that involving those prohibited activities (Vogel and Hayes, 1998; Čihák 
and Hesse, 2010).  
As Sharia’s principles are considered as the core elements of the Islamic finance system, their 
implications on corporate governance structures and practices are imperative. Specifically, 
IBs governance practices have additional responsibilities such that all financial transactions 
and activities of the banks have to be compliant with shari’ah principles (Al-Suhaibani and 
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Naifar, 2014). In other words, the shari’ah principles might place some restrictions on banks 
operations, which would restrain the board of director from involving in a number of 
transaction and risk-taking activities (Mollah and zaman, 2015). Furthermore, corporate 
governance structures in Islamic banks are different from those of the conventional banks as 
they operate a multi-layer governance structure to monitor and oversee the Islamic banks’ 
Shari’ah compliances. Particularly, Islamic banks must have an additional governance layer, 
i.e. the Shari’ah supervisory committee. The key role of this committee is to certify that the 
bank strictly complies with Shari’ah principles. Accordingly, the board members of this 
committee must acquire certain Islamic qualifications such as certificates in Fiqh and some 
finance-related degrees. 
2.3.2 Other different characteristics of Islamic banks 
Unlike CBs, IBs do not provide interest on deposits. They only provide demand deposit 
accounts and other Islamic bank products combining equity-based and debt-based contracts. 
Furthermore,  Khediri et al. (2015) stated that “Islamic banks collect funds through demand 
deposits (guaranteed and yield no return) and investment deposits (similar to mutual fund 
shares and not guaranteed a fixed return). Islamic banks have developed interest-free 
financing products based on profit and loss sharing (PLS) and mark-up principles” (p.76). The 
financial contracts that IBs provide can be classified as either a liability (when they need 
funds) or an asset (when they invest funds) .These financial services include: (1) Mudharabah 
(profit sharing), (2) Musharaka (joint venture), (3) Murabaha (commercial funding with a 
profit margin), (4) Ijar (leasing), (5) Wadeea’a (safekeeping), (6) Gard Hassan (interest-free 
loans), and (7) Sukuk (Islamic bonds). 4F5 
The differences between IBs and CBs are not limited to the products they provide, but also 
management responsibilities and other factors. Unlike CBs, IBs have to consider many moral 
and ethical dimensions that are set by Shari’ah principles. Furthermore, the main purpose of 
CBs is to maximise shareholder wealth, the structure of risk management in CBs is highly 
                                                     
5 (1) Mudharabah (profit sharing) is a financial contract that contains two parties (the fund provider and the investor), sharing 
the profits based on a fixed and agreed percentage. This type of contract allows only the fund providers to bear the potential 
losses of the investments. (2) Musharaka (joint venture) is a financial contract that allows parties to participate using equity. 
Those parties finance a project in agreed percentage of cash or any other kinds of funding sources. They both agree to share a 
proportion of the return and risk of the investment. (3) Mourabaha (commercial funding with profit margin) is a sales contract 
that includes the price of goods and the agreed profit margin between parties. This type of contract is close to the traditional 
capital gain that happens in sales markets, where the lenders ask to pay back the price of the good that the borrower wants 
plus the profit margin, which could be either cash or instalments. (4) Ijar (leasing) is a lease contract between two parties to 
use the fixed assets or services of certain goods for a specific period and price. Some of this type have the features to own the 
good the end of the contract. (5) Wadeea’a (safekeeping) is an account to save money for a certain period just like savings 
accounts but with no interest on the money. (6) Gardh Hassan (interest-free loans) is a completely interest-free loan contract. 
However, issuers of this type of services may charge a certain amount of money for the loan processing. (7) Sukuk (Islamic 
bonds) is a financial certificate confirming that one of the parties has the right to the investment capital and the profit. 
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developed and a number of advanced risk management models are put to use. In the case of 
IBs, IBs’ risk management practices are still primitive with a lack of advanced models. 
Another different factor between IBs and CBs is deposit insurance, as IBs do not set insurance 
on the customers’ deposits as this is against Islamic Law, whereas insurance deposits are 
mandatory for CBs. Similar concepts applied to insurance and hedging activities are also 
prohibited in IBs. Also, a well-structured money market is available for CBs, but the access 
for IBs is limited due to the Islamic restrictions. To summarise the differences between CBs 
and IBs, Table 2.2 presents the differences between these two types of banks. 
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Conventional finance Islamic finance 
Primarily based on Interest rate Interest is prohibited 
Facilitate financial activities 
Facilitate social, economic and financial 
activities 
Structured and formalised Unstructured and still informal in many ways 
Stress on financial efficiency Stress on social, ethical and financial efficiency 
Restricted moral dimension Strong moral dimension 
Highly systematised in terms of risk 
management, accounting and other 
standards 
Standards for risk management, management, 
accounting and other activities are still 
developing 
Existing set of legislations to deal with 
legal issues 
Legal support still in development with several 
legal areas under doubt 
 
Highly developed banking and financial 
product market 
Developing banking and financial product 
market 
 
Existence of conventional money market 
Non-existence of significant Islamic money 
market 
Availability of inter-bank funds Non-availability of inter-bank funds 
Strong and developed secondary market 
for securities 
Non-existing secondary market for securities 
 
Existence of short-term money market 
Non-existence of short-term money market 
Table 2.2 Differences between Islamic and Conventional banks  
Sources: ( Akkizidis and Khandelwal, 2008)  
2.3.3 Regulations for Conventional and Islamic banks 
Bank regulations are a form of government guidelines that expose banks to specific 
requirements and restrictions. The regulation is mainly designed by central banks. However, a 
number of central banks require banks to comply with new regulations that are released by the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The aim of regulation is to ensure market 
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transparency between banks and other market participants and to eliminate any possible 
market failures and hence prevent economic crises. Beck et al. (2006) argue that tight 
regulation and supervision improve bank capital allocation, enhance competition, boost the 
performance and efficiency of banks, and reduce corruption. The banking regulations cover a 
number of aspects including capital adequacy, official supervisory power, market discipline, 
deposit insurance schemes and restrictions on bank activities. 
Most countries’ central banks adopt the international regulations released by BCBS in 
general, and they provide more specific regulations suitable for the conditions of the country. 
However, these regulations are mostly suitable for the conventional banks in these countries. 
It is challenging for IBs to comply with regulations set internationally by BCBS due to their 
different operating systems. However, as has been discussed in Section 2.2, a number of 
organisation have been established to enhance IBs’ development, such as the Accounting and 
Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institution (AAOFIFIs) and the Islamic 
International Rating Agency (IIRA) in Bahrain. Some IBs follow the regulations of 
AAOFIFIs, whereas others follow the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), which is 
based in Malaysia. The main roles of these regulatory agencies are to ensure the soundness 
and stability of the Islamic financial services industry. Furthermore, they enhance the Islamic 
financial industry by introducing international standards that comply with Shari’ah principles. 
These regulators and supervisory agencies complement the work of the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervisory, the International Organization of Securities Commissions and the 
International Association of Insurance Supervisors. These organisations are also responsible 
for developing other aspects such as accounting, auditing, governance and ethics. 
2.4 Corporate Governance in the Banking Sectors 
Management plays a crucial role in achieving business goals, and the most important business 
objective is to maximise the wealth of shareholders. As there is a separation between the 
business owners (e.g. shareholders) and agents (e.g. managers), the owner’s wealth 
maximisation goal may not be achieved as managers may act against the shareholders’ 
interests. Such interest-conflicting behaviours of managers might damage the shareholders’ 
confidence in the executive’s management. Finance literature refers to this well-known 
phenomenon as the agency problem. Previously, a number of business have collapsed as a 
result of conflicts in management behaviour, for example Enron and the Bank of Credit and 
Commerce (Schwarcz, 2009). Therefore, a heated debate has arisen over the optimal methods 
to arrange the shareholder and management relationship and to guarantee the appropriate 
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usage by management of wealth and resources. As a result, the corporate governance and risk 
management concepts have been recognised as one of the best practices to solve this problem. 
The corporate governance concept started to attract researchers and practitioners after firms’ 
failures due to weak corporate governance. Furthermore, the concept will no doubt hold a 
more essential position within the banking industry as any bank failure can have serious 
adverse consequences for the whole region or worse, the global economy (Anderson and 
Campbell, 2004).6 Iqbal and Mirakhor (2004) argue that corporate governance has received 
more attention due to the weaknesses of assigning an effective shareholder model of corporate 
governance, the growth of institutional growth, the shifting from a shareholder value model to 
a stakeholder model, and the globalisation effect on the financial markets. 
2.4.1 Corporate governance conceptual definitions 
Since the corporate governance leap in the 1980s, the corporate governance definitions have 
been delivered from a number of sources such as academics, economists, theorists etc. 
Turnbull (1997) argues that differences in culture contexts and the interests of scholars 
contribute to the various views on corporate governance. Therefore, corporate governance 
definitions can be seen from the point of view of different disciplines. In the sense of 
investment, Wójcik (2002) recognises corporate governance as how the incentives impact the 
management. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) recognise corporate governance from a narrower 
sense, which states that “corporate governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of 
finance to corporations assure themselves return on their investment” (p.738). From the board 
perspective, O'Sullivan (2000) views corporate governance as “concerned with the institutions 
that influence how business corporations allocate resources and returns. Specifically, a system 
of corporate governance shapes who makes investment decisions in corporations, what types 
of investments they make, and how returns from investments are distributed” (p.394). The 
Cadbury Committee (1992) and Monks and Minow (1996) also view corporate governance as 
a system of control, with the board of directors at the centre of the CG concept. The Cadbury 
Committee (1992) sees corporate governance as a mechanism to balance social and economic 
goals while at the same time it is a structure to enhance efficiency and accountability. 
Therefore, the obligation and decision-making structures of the firm can be considered as the 
                                                     
6 A number of scandals and financial firm failures have occurred during the last 20 years, which in turn affected 
the region and the global economy. Examples of corporate failures are Barings banks in 1995, Credit Lyonnais in 
1998, Northern Rock in 2007, and Madoff Securities and Lehman Brothers in 2008.    
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corporate governance mechanisms that form the rules and corporate policies to generate the 
firm performance. 
The definition of corporate governance is more complicated in the financial sector. This is 
because of the different characteristics (e.g. high leverage and more regulated) and high 
complexity that the financial industry has. In detail, corporate governance in the financial 
industry extends its goals to cover all stakeholders. The Basel Committee for Banking 
Supervision (BCBS, 1999) defines corporate governance as the method through which the 
business and activities of institutions are monitored by its board and senior management, 
which in turn affects the way that stakeholder interests, corporate objectives and daily 
business are set. The aims of corporate governance from the perspective of banks are to assure 
the soundness of its financial system and its compliance with laws and regulations and to 
protect the stakeholders’ interests. The notion of stakeholders is more extended in the 
financial industry as BCBS includes customers, depositors, suppliers, employees, supervisors, 
the community and government. In sum, corporate governance in the financial sector is 
different to corporate governance in other institutions as it needs to take into consideration a 
large group of stakeholders and to comply with external regulations. 
2.4.2 Theories of corporate governance 
This section aims to provide theories associated with corporate governance. In this section, 
agency costs, stakeholder, resources dependence, social norms, and institutional theories have 
been discussed. The rationales behind these chosen theories are because of (1) their common 
relations and applications in corporate governance studies and (2) their direct associations to 
the thesis. In the first empirical chapter, board of directors’ structures have been considered as 
factors that assure the board of director’s effective roles (i.e. monitoring and advisory). 
Agency theory mainly supports the roles of board of director in controlling and monitoring 
managers, thereby reduce agency costs (Brennan et al. 2016). However, the advising roles 
(strategy and service functions) are informed by resource dependence theory (Hillman and 
Dalziel, 2003; Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003). One of the most important aspect of this thesis is 
Islamic corporate governance (will be discussed later in section 2.4.3.5), which tends to adopt 
the stakeholder view theoretically. It also supports the social moral and norms of the society. 
Thus, stakeholders and social norms theories should be discussed. Another important aspect 
of this thesis is the risk governance mechanisms (i.e. separate risk committee and chief risk 
officer), which is studied and investigated in the second empirical chapter. Risk governance is 
created as consequences of a number of external pressures (e.g., regulators) on corporate 
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governance mechanisms - related to risk management practices, which could be supported by 
institutional theory.     
2.4.2.1 Agency cost theory 
The separation between ownership and management is the main concept that the agency 
theory is built on. Thus, this theory treats the conflicts of interest (Shileifer and Vishny, 1997) 
derived from the manager’s incentive to maximise his personal wealth at the expense of the 
owners (Tricker, 1994). Specifically, managers may exploit their power to not benefit the 
principal interests (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). However, Jensen (1986) argues that 
managers can privately benefit from using the free cash flow surpluses when there is no 
effective monitoring.7 To tackle this issue, creating a governance board that monitors the 
management’s decisions, and making sure that these decisions adhere to the interests of the 
principal are considered effective solutions (Allen and Gale, 2000). Consequently, the board 
of directors contributes to reducing the agency cost (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Williamson, 1988; McKnight and Weir, 2009). 
2.4.2.2 Stakeholder theory 
Unlike the agency cost theory, the stakeholder theory extends attention to the conflicts of 
interest that might be raised between managers and other stakeholders who also add to the 
firm’s achievements (Cyert and March, 1963; Mintzberg, 1983; Freeman, 1994; Freeman, 
2010). The stakeholder theory’s definitions cover the firm’s shareholders, creditors, 
employees, suppliers, customers and communities. Freeman (2010) argues that the term 
‘stakeholders’ can be applied to any group of individuals that can affect or are affected by the 
firm’s activities and decisions. Specifically, meeting the stakeholders’ interests is very 
important for the firms to be able to effectively accomplish their activities (Clarkson, 1994). 
Furthermore, Clarke (1998) argues that “The attenuation of shareholders’ roles in managing 
business and the rise of professional management is associated with growing recognition of 
the significance of the role and the contribution of other stakeholder groups to the 
performance of the company” (p.183). This is more pronounced for the banking sector 
considering its complexity and its effect on economic growth. Jurgens et al. (2010) argue that 
most of the European corporate governance models (bank models) are supported by the 
stakeholder theory. Thus, the bank’s corporate governance mechanisms should rely more on 
the stakeholder view since banks have a special stakeholder group, comprised of regulators, 
bondholders, depositors and other stakeholders. Moreover, the stakeholder theory is the most 
                                                     
7 A number of previous studies have assured this relationship (e.g., Harford 1999; Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith 
2007; Harford et al., 2008). 
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appropriate view for IBs because of its ability to consider ethics and to address moral values 
related to other stakeholders while managing the firm. Consistent with the agency theory, the 
governance board also enhances the compliance with the stakeholders’ interests. The 
stakeholder theory suggests that independent directors can make important judgements on 
corporate decision making, increase the monitoring of managers’ behaviour, and, thus, 
enhance stakeholders’ interests (Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990). 
2.4.2.3 Resource dependence theory 
Pfeffer and Salancik (2003) explain the resource dependence theory, which states that the firm 
can be viewed as an open system. In more detail, the resource dependence theory assumes that 
the firm needs to understand the environmental factors that can affect its success and how to 
work in that environment (Pfeffer, 1972). Therefore, based on this theory, the firm needs to 
adapt effectively to external interdependencies to be able to survive (Hillman et al., 2009). 
Pfeffer and Salancik (2003) discuss how the board of directors work as a linking channel 
between the firm and external organisations in order to solve environmental dependencies. 
The authors provide four essential benefits for this linkage. However, Hillman et al. (2000) 
develop the four primary benefits and suggest that diversity of director types enhances the 
benefit of a variety of resources to the firm. The diversification of the board can be 
accomplished by increasing the board size and independent fractions, which increases the 
expertise and knowledge on the board. Therefore, the board of directors can provide much 
stronger monitoring and advice for the management, which will enhance the firm’s 
performance and value. 
2.4.2.4 Social norms theory 
Individual behaviour, investor preferences and financial decisions are significantly influenced 
by social norms (Kübler, 2001; Kim and Venkatachalam, 2011; Baker and Nofsinger, 2012). 
However, social norms refer to a number of aspects around our lives such as ethics, 
environment and faith. A number of social norms studies define acceptable norms based on 
what is acceptable in certain religions, and how they affect individual behaviour (e.g. Halek 
and Eisenhauer, 2001; Barro and McCleary, 2003; Hilary and Hui, 2009). Therefore, firm 
behaviours should represent the individual characteristics by appreciating their norms, values 
and attributes. This view can be applied to IBs, as IBs should not engage in any prohibited 
activities that conflict with Shari’ah principles. AAOIFI also assures that social and religious 
dimensions need to be considered by IBs. They state that the chief objective should be to 
fulfil the stakeholders’ wishes by conducting financial operations in compliance with 
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Shari’ah principles. With regard to this theory, the Islamic governance mechanism (SSBs) 
can play a crucial role in meeting the required norms that the banks have to follow. 
2.4.2.5 Institutional theory 
The institutional theory focuses on institutionalised pressure groups and public opinion and 
how these factors impact the firm structures (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Oliver, 1991). This 
thesis focuses on the perspective that takes the institutional system as a “class of element” 
even though there are a variety of perspectives for the institutional theory. This perspective 
was developed by Scott (1987), who proposed that firms derive benefits from creating internal 
structures in response to external institutional pressures. In other words, firms develop an 
internal structure in order to increase their legitimacy, resources and ability to survive (Meyer 
and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 2000). However, DiMaggio and Powell (2000) 
claim that coercive isomorphism, which is derived from the external regulatory-type pressures 
for organisational convergence, leads institutions to be similar to each other in the same 
environment. More specifically, regulators determine procedures, rules and structures for 
organisations in order to provide legitimacy and support (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). This 
theory could be used to understand the development in corporate governance structure. 
Specifically, firms improve their risk governance mechanisms, creating a dedicated board 
level risk committee and assigning a chief risk officer, in order to meet the regulatory 
pressures that demand more monitoring and management over the risk management process. 
 
2.4.3 Corporate governance models 
Models of corporate financing are an essential element that determines corporate governance 
(Okabe, 2004). Two categories of financial systems define the corporate governance models. 
These are market-based and bank-based systems (Okabe, 2004). A number of corporate 
governance models have been founded under these two categories. Previous studies (e.g. 
Clarke and Chanlat, 2009; Hassan, 2009; Hasan, 2011) compare four different corporate 
governance models, namely the Anglo-Saxon model, the Germanic model, the Japanese 
model, and the Islamic model. 
2.4.3.1 The Anglo-Saxon Model (market-based model or principle-agent model) 
This model is the most distributed corporate governance model. The two most advanced 
countries that use this corporate governance model are the UK and the US. The model is 
important for corporations as it defines corporate goals in order to maximise shareholder 
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wealth.8 It assigns a number of legal rules and polices to the board of directors and executive 
officers to comply with shareholders’ interests. Evidently, this corporate governance system is 
mainly built to protect the shareholders’ interests and rights (Pearson, 2010). Moreover, this 
model is primarily motivated by profit-oriented manner. 
The fiduciary relationship between the shareholders and managers is the main corporate 
concept that the Anglo-Saxon model adopts (Clarke and Chanlat, 2009). Hence, it is well-
matched with the agency theory, which was developed by American financial economists in 
the 1970s. Cernat (2004) illustrates the structure of the Anglo-Saxon model, which is 
presented in Figure 2.1. This figure shows how the board of directors behave as agents to 
guard the shareholders’ interests and rights. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: (Cernat, 2004) 
 
2.4.3.2 The European Model (The stakeholder model) 
Some scholars criticise the principle-agent system as it does not address the agency problem 
effectively (Macey and Miller, 1997). Thus, a new model has been developed, which is the 
European model or the stakeholder model, to overcome the limitations and problems in the 
Anglo-Saxon model. This corporate governance system was proposed by Clarkson (1995) and 
Donaldson and Preston (1995), who claim that the interests of all stakeholders rather than just 
shareholders should be considered. This model has proven its validity in industrial societies as 
it successfully builds a trusting relationship between stakeholders and management, which 
enhances positive investment and mutual beneficial exchange (Jones, 1995). 
                                                     
8 There are differences between US and UK corporate governance systems even though both countries use the 
Anglo-Saxon model. While 75% of S&P 500 companies in the USA have one person holding both Charmian of 
BOD and CEO positions, most UK companies separate these roles (Keenan, 2004). Also, in the UK most firms 
assign an additional executive director besides the Chairman, CEO, and CFO, while this practice is rare in the 
US (Keenan, 2004). 
Shareholders  
Board of 
Directors Managers 
Figure 2.1 The Anglo-Saxon Model  
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Figure 2.2 The European model of corporate governance  
Source: (Cernat, 2004). 
Figure 2.2 depicts the structure of the corporate governance for the European model. Its 
function is based on a two-tier board system, management and supervisory boards. The 
management board is elected by the supervisory board, and the shareholders and employees 
have the authority to elect the supervisory board (Tricker, 1994; Schilling, 2001). A number 
of board members hold the identities of shareholders, work council representatives and trade 
union members. The responsibility for managing the firm’s business to meet all the 
stakeholders’ rights and interests belongs to the management board, while the supervisory 
board is responsible for advising and monitoring the management board’s behaviours 
(Schilling, 2001). 
2.4.3.3 The German model 
As stated before, corporate governance models can be categorised into two main systems, the 
market model and bank model. The German model of corporate governance is classified 
under bank-based systems of corporate governance. The German model operates under the 
two-tier board system and tries to maximise all the stakeholder values (Sadowski et al., 2000; 
Goergen et al., 2005). This model supports the bank’s power to control the firm as it promotes 
the adoption of the universal banks concept, which refers to the bank having a large 
proportion of members on the board because of its high ownership stake. Goergen et al. 
(2005) argue that the “German regime is characterised by the existence of a market for partial 
corporate control, large shareholders, cross-holdings and bank/creditor monitoring, a two-tier 
(management and supervisory) board with co-determination between shareholders and 
employees on the supervisory board, a non-negligible sensitivity of managerial compensation 
Shareholders 
Board of Directors Supervisory Board 
   Corporate Governance 
Trade Unions Works Council 
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to performance, competitive product markets, and corporate governance regulations largely 
based on EU directives but with deep roots in the German legal doctrine” (p.2). 
2.4.3.4 Japanese model of corporate governance 
This corporate governance model is also categorised under the bank-based model, as it 
considers the bank as a controlling shareholder and a powerful monitoring element and 
intervention (Okumura, 2004). This model promotes the efficient allocation of shareholders’ 
and stakeholders’ resources (Allen and Zhao, 2007). The Japanese model affects the corporate 
governance structures and objectives by focusing on protecting the loan portfolio quality for 
bank shareholders and maximising wealth for corporate shareholders (Yoshikawa and Phan, 
2005). Banks play a crucial role in governing companies’ lending channels. In brief, this 
model is very similar to the European model with a greater concentration on the debt-
financing system as the power to control the firm. 
2.4.3.5 Islamic corporate governance (ICG) 
2.4.3.5.1 Overview: Conceptual frame work 
Unlike conventional corporate governance, a paucity of literature exclusively evaluates ICG 
even though Islamic finance has been growing rapidly globally (Yunis, 2007). Theoretically, 
Islamic corporate governance (ICG) can be defined as the mechanism to direct, manage, 
govern, and control the corporation through a corporate governance structure, which aims to 
protect all the stakeholders’ interests, achieve the firm’s objectives, endorse social 
responsibility, and comply with Shari’ah principles. Furthermore, the Islamic Financial 
Services Board (IFSB, 2006) defined ICG as: 
a set of organizational arrangements whereby the actions of the management of IFIs 
are aligned, as far as possible, with the interests of its stakeholders; provision of 
proper incentives for the organs of governance such as the BOD, Shari_ah board, 
and management to pursue objectives that are in the interests of the stakeholders and 
facilitate effective monitoring, thereby encouraging IFIs to use resources more 
efficiently; and compliance with Islamic Shari_ah rules and principles (p.27). 
 
The IFSB’s definition illustrates the actual framework of Islamic corporate governance. 
Specifically, it provides the essential elements of corporate governance framework besides the 
requirements of complying with shari’ah principles. The first part of the definition clarifies 
the main practical objective of corporate governance as a set of relationships between the 
institution stakeholders. The second part of the definition assures the need to integrate the 
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requirements of the shari’ah compliance. The second part clarifies why the conceptual 
framework of Islamic corporate governance is distinctive. 
 
ICG is distinctive as it sets Islamic norms and morals as the highest priority, whilst 
stakeholder interests come after that to ensure that human affairs are achieved (Choudhury 
and Hoque, 2004). Archer et al. (1998) argue that IBs’ managers are obliged to achieve the 
corporation objectives, i.e. maximising shareholders’ values, in a Shari’ah- compliant 
manner. With no doubt, it is complicated to incorporate Islamic values into conventional 
corporate governance as it is hard to minimise the transaction costs, achieve the corporate 
goals, and comply with Shari’ah Law at the same time (Choudhury and Hoque, 2006). During 
the previous decade, a number of Islamic institutions failed to operate their business 
successfully because of the weak corporate governance system.9 This confirms the urgent 
need to develop an efficient corporate governance system for Islamic financial institutions 
(IFIs) in which all the Islamic concepts are sufficiently covered. Thus, a number of authorities 
i.e. AAOIFIs and the IFSB, were assigned to issue Islamic governance codes and guidance to 
be employed in IFIs. 
Building on the conventional models and taking into account the unique agency issues faced 
by IFIs, a number of researchers recommend an additional distinctive governance mechanism. 
Generally, compliance with Shari’ah Law is the main agency issue that governance structures 
need to consider in IFIs. Thus, the conceptual framework of Islamic governance has been 
conducted from two different perspectives: Tawhid and Shura. Choudhury and Hoque (2004) 
refer the theory of ICG to the epistemology of Tawhid (Oneness of God). Choudhury and 
Hoque (2006) also discuss the Tawhid epistemology as a theoretical framework that is 
effective in structuring ICG and supporting the decision-making process. Figure 2.3 illustrates 
the corporate governance framework in the Islamic context. This figure explains the Tawhid- 
and Shura-based approaches. A number of ICG definitions agree with this approach. For 
example,  Ibrahim (2006) views ICG as having all the transactions comply with Shari’ah 
principles. Figure 2.3 illustrates that the Tawhid epistemology is the base root that ICG relies 
on, whereas corporation roles rely on Shari’ah Law. The concept behind this epistemology is 
that it brings the vicegerency (Khilafah), trust (amanah), and justice (aladl wal ihsan) morals 
in the institution operating system. Stakeholders as religious believers have the fiduciary duty 
to support these morals/principles by authorising the Shura group. As stated before, the ICG 
                                                     
9 A number of Islamic Institutions failed including Ihlas Finance House in Turkey, the Islamic Bank of South 
Africa, the Islamic Investment Companies of Egypt, Dubai Islamic Bank, and Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad. 
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system is also based on shuratic decision making, hisbah and Shari’ah auditing (Rahman, 
1998). Shuratic decision making is a process whereby the members of the board discuss 
between them certain issues and they have to vote on them to make the decision (Ijmah), 
which enhances the moral value. 
 
 
Figure 2.3. Islamic Corporate Governance Based on Tawhid and Shura Approach. 
Source: (Choudhury and Hoque, 2004) 
The Tawhid approach illustrates the theoretical foundation of Islamic corporate governance. 
However, this epistemological foundation seems to be ambiguous in terms of how it could be 
implemented in corporate governance systems. Hassan (2009) argues that the Tawhid 
approach is vague as there are no clear mechanism for the implementations of corporate 
governance practices in real-world settings. Furthermore, the majority of IFIs seem to follow 
the conventional epistemology bases of corporate governance models (e.g. the shareholder 
model), with relying on the shari’ah supervisory board (Hassan, 2009). Iqbal and Mirakhor 
(2004) criticise the Tawhid approach, and consider the compliance with Shari’ah to be one of 
the stakeholders’ rights, and thus support the stakeholders’ value system as a structure for the 
ICG model. 
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Another unsolved gap in the Tawhid approach is the relation with Investor Account Holders 
IAHs, as IFIs may only share the profits in IAH contracts, but they may not share the risks 
and losses. In addition, institutions do not allow IAHs to be part of the management of the 
fund that they provide. Hence, IAHs do not have the right to control the cash flow 
(Safieddine, 2009). Therefore, managers in IFIs might have opportunities to acquire personal 
benefits at the expense of IAHs’ interests (Abdel Karim and Archer, 2002; Archer and Karim, 
2006). Acknowledging this agency matter, researchers recommend a mechanism to mitigate 
the gap between IAHs’ control and cash flow. Archer et al. (1998) suggest that shareholders 
can act to protect the IAHs’ benefits by preventing the management from exposing the fund to 
high-risk projects, given that these shareholders can increase their own profits by attracting 
more IAHs. As a result, an Islamic governance framework has been proposed by Asri and 
Mohamed (2004) to address this issue by creating a group of Shura consultants. This group 
includes representatives of shareholders, the board of directors, the SSB, the public and 
creditors. Grais and Pellegrini (2006a, 2006b) suggest that similar to shareholders, 
unrestricted IAHs should be granted a representative on the board as a communication 
channel to discuss their demands and concerns, as well as approving their involvements in the 
management of the institutions. 
2.4.3.5.2 The additional corporate governance layer: Shari’ah Supervisory Board (SSB) 
Researchers argue that the role of board governance is to increase the governance practices in 
IFIs. Grais and Pellegrini (2006a) argue that the board of directors is responsible for two 
mains roles. First, it needs to reassure the stakeholders that the institution is fully compliant 
with Shari’ah Law.10 Second, it needs to ensure the IFIs’ growth, efficiency, soundness and 
stability. Regarding the first role, IFIs need to have specialised scholars in Shari’ah. 
Therefore, an additional layer of ICG was created, i.e. the Shari’ah supervisory board (SSB). 
International organisations, researchers and scholars emphasise that the primary role of SSBs 
is to reassure the stakeholders about the Islamic institutions’ compliance with Shari’ah 
principles (Abdel Karim and Archer, 2002; Caruana, 2005). Safieddine (2009) argues that the 
board of directors relies on the SSB to make decisions and to acquire the trust of stakeholders 
regarding the compliance with Shari’ah principles. 
Principle 13 of IFSB (2006) requires IFIs to set up a SSB and to allocate at least three 
members to monitor and oversee the IFIs’ transactions and to ensure the application of 
                                                     
10 Stakeholders in Islamic Financial Institutions include customers, depositors, regulators, governments,   
employees, communities, environments, and shareholders (IFSB, 2006). Furthermore, IFIs have another type of 
stakeholders, Investment Account Holders (IAHs). 
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Islamic concepts. In more detail, SSBs’ functions include two roles: advisory roles and 
supervisory roles. The advisory role is to advise the IFIs’ board of directors and to manage 
their operations and all Shari’ah aspects of financial contracts and transactions. On the other 
hand, the supervisory role includes the monitoring of Shari’ah contracts and financial 
transactions. As a result, effective Islamic and Shari’ah governance systems will enhance the 
customers’ confidence and mitigate Shari’ah compliance risks, which eventually contributes 
to the growth and stability of IFIs. 
 
The SSB’s authority allows them to restrain the board of director activities under the Shari’ah 
monitoring concept. Figure 2.4 depicts the Islamic governance framework based on the SSB 
authority approach (multi-layer governance). This approach argues that the SSBs have 
supervisory authority above the board of directors, driven by Shari’ah Law. As can be seen 
from the figure, SSBs prohibit boards from issuing credit against credit, due to the Riba 
concept (prohibition of interests) and also from any involvement in doubtful investment 
products (Ghara) such as CDS. Furthermore, contributing to social justice and avoiding high 
risk-taking and poor-quality lending are expected behaviours of boards in IBs due to the 
religious beliefs and commitment to ethics (Mollah and Zaman, 2015). 
 
Figure 2.4 Islamic Corporate Governance based on multi-layer framework  
Modified Source: (Mollah and Zaman, 2015) 
 
Shari'ah 
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• SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY: 
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involovment of doubtful investment (i.e. the Arabic world Gharar)  
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2.4.4 Comparing corporate governance models 
This section presents a comparison table between the various corporate governance models 
that have been discussed earlier in this chapter. This helps to gain an understanding of the 
differences between these models, comparing Islamic governance with the conventional 
models. Table 2.3 shows the details of various corporate governance models. 
 
Aspects The Anglo-Saxon The European/ 
German 
Japanese model Islamic model 
Theory orientation  Shareholder Stakeholder Stakeholder Stakeholder 
Episteme 
Rationalism and 
rationality 
Rationalism and 
rationality 
Rationalism and 
rationality 
“Tawhid” 
Objectives 
Rights and 
interests 
To protect the 
interests and rights 
of the shareholders 
The right of the 
community in 
relation to the 
corporation  
The right of the 
community in 
relation to the 
banks 
To protect the 
interests and rights of 
all the stakeholders 
but subject to the rules 
of Shari’ah 
Corporate goal 
Shareholders 
controlling 
managers for the 
purpose of 
shareholders’ 
profit  
Society 
controlling 
corporation for the 
purpose of social 
welfare  
Society 
controlling 
corporation for the 
purpose of social 
welfare 
Acknowledgement of 
being profit oriented 
but balanced with the 
Shari’ah objective and 
principles  
Nature of 
management  
Management 
dominated  
Controlling 
shareholder 
dominated  
Controlling 
shareholder 
dominated  
Concept of 
vicegerency and 
‘shura’ process  
Management 
boards  
One-tier board Two-tier board Two-tier board 
Two-tier board 
Shari’ah board as 
ultimate governance 
Capital related and 
ownership 
structure  
Widely dispersed 
ownership; 
dividends 
prioritised  
Banks and other 
corporations are 
major 
shareholders; 
dividends less 
prioritised  
Banks are key 
shareholders. 
Strong bank-
corporation 
relationship; 
dividends less 
prioritised  
Shareholders and 
depositors or 
investment account 
holders; dividends are 
less prioritised 
Table 2.3 Comparison between corporate governance models  
Sources: (Clarke and Chanlat, 2009; Hassan, 2009; Hasan, 2013) 
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2.5 Risk Management from both Conventional and Islamic Perspectives 
The risk-return trade-off is a common financial concept that most academics and market 
practitioners utilise. Although researchers and practitioners usually refer to the main objective 
of corporations as maximising return, the precise objective statement should be “to maximise 
return for a certain level of risk”. Corporations should acknowledge the importance of returns 
alongside with good risk management. In practice, many examples illustrate that corporations 
poorly manage, or in some cases ignore, the risk aspects in their operations, causing 
catastrophic financial consequences. This risk management concept is particularly critical in 
the banking industry due to its important role in the whole financial system. In the recent 
financial crisis, banks were blamed for taking excessive risks due to their weak risk 
management system and lack of solid corporate governance (Kirkpatrick, 2009). Tao and 
Hutchinson (2013) argue that the failure of one financial institution in the crisis was likely to 
be contagious to others and hence increase the probability of their failures. Aebi et al. (2012) 
discuss the growing need for strong risk management techniques and structures after the 2007 
crisis and the subprime US crisis. Therefore, regulators and other authority organisations have 
put downward pressure on financial institutions’ boards of director and senior management to 
improve the governance and risk management structures so that they may withstand such 
shortcomings (Greuning and Iqbal, 2008). 
2.5.1 Risk management concepts 
Uncertainty and volatility are terminologies that can be used to define risk (Artzner et al., 
1999). Furthermore, DeLorenzo (2006) defines risk as the uncertainty of future events and 
how different decisions can bring different outcomes. However, the process of managing risk 
is more comprehensive, as the management should identify the risks and use certain strategies 
and tools to minimise them. Pyle (1999) states that the risk management process involves the 
management identifying the key risks, determining the probability/likelihood of certain types 
of risk, and establishing mechanisms to monitor and control the results of that risk. In general, 
the process of risk management comprises several main components, which are: risk 
identification, risk assessments, risk estimations, measuring risk, risk monitoring and risk 
mitigation. 
The risk management process in financial institutions is more complicated due to the special 
types of risk that they encounter. Therefore, risk management in financial institutions can be 
seen as more than just a process, but a business strategy. There are more aspects to managing 
risk in financial institutions, as banks need to recognise the importance of managing 
compliance, financial, hazard, operational, and strategic risk in a comprehensive manner and 
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assigning these actions to the risk enterprise’s framework and risk appetite (Randeva et al., 
2014). Ardrey et al. (2009) define banks’ risks management as a process of monitoring and 
controlling the business transactions using a set of policies that can influence the banks’ 
operations and effectively identifying, managing and mitigating the banks’ risks. There are 
two perspectives that can explain the risk management process in financial institutions. These 
are: regulatory requirements and voluntary risk management practices. Under regulatory 
requirements, banks have to follow the risk management guidelines issued by the local 
regulatory bodies. Furthermore, a well-developed risk management system has to be set by 
the bank to monitor and mitigate risks effectively (Talwar, 2011). 
Regulatory requirements emphasise the importance of the risk management process of banks. 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision  (BCBS, 2011) confirms that risk management 
has four main perspectives: (1) risk identification (e.g. market risk, operational risk, and credit 
risk etc.); (2) risk assessment using risk models; (3) timely monitoring and measuring risks; 
and (4) risk control by senior managers. However, regulators enhanced the risk management 
requirements and guidelines as a result of the recent financial crisis (Mongiardino and Plath, 
2010). 
Notably, risk management in banks is more associated with corporate governance as the latter 
involves a number of decisions relating to risks. Thus, it could be said that poor corporate 
governance might be related to an ineffective risk management process. There are five types 
of decision-making processes that might influence risk management quality (Clark and 
Urwin, 2008). These are: strategic decision making, structural decision making, operational 
decision making, tactical decision making, monitoring and oversight decision making. 
2.5.2 Types of risk 
Risks are divided to two main categories: market risks (systematic/un-diversifiable risk) and 
financial risks (unsystematic/diversifiable risk) (Santomero, 1997). This section will introduce 
the five most common types of risk that are considered in financial institutions, and also the 
five risks being studied in this thesis. Furthermore, the Islamic banking and finance 
implications on these risk types will be discussed as well.  
2.5.2.1 Credit risk 
Credit risk can be defined as the probability of parties failing to pay back a financial 
contractual obligation. Crouhy et al. (2006) define credit risk as “the risk of loss following a 
change in the factors that drive the credit quality of an asset” (p.14). Richard et al. (2008) 
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argue that credit risk is categorised as one of the most important risks in the banking sector. 
Previous literature (Barnhill Jr et al., 2002; Bratanovic, 2003) mentioned that bank failures in 
general and in the recent financial crisis in particular are mainly caused by weak credit risk 
management. According to capital requirements released by Basel II, credit risk is the most 
crucial risk that needs to be considered when calculating the capital adequacy ratio (Abu 
Hussain and Al-Ajmi, 2012). There are five well-known factors that are used to assess credit 
risk, which are: capital, collateral, cash flow, character and conditions (Heffernan, 2005; 
Jesswein, 2008; Richard et al., 2008). 
Credit risk is also a common risk in Islamic bank. The Islamic financing contracts (e.g. 
Mudharabah (profit sharing), Musharaka (joint venture), Murabaha (commercial funding 
with a profit margin)) are also subjected to customers failures to fulfil their obligation toward 
the contractual terms. As discussed in section 2.3.1, Islamic banks financing contracts must be 
based on a Profit and loss sharing (PLS) principle. However, PLS financing contracts increase 
the overall level of assets risk even though they transfer the direct credit risk from the Islamic 
banks to their investment depositors. This is because PLS financing contracts make IBs 
vulnerable to risks that are carried by equity investors instead of debtholders (Cihak and 
Hesse (2010)). Moreover, IBs are not allowed to use hedging tools to avoid credit risk (e.g. 
credit derivatives), which will contribute to a higher default risk and longer delays in 
repayments (Chapra and Ahmed, 2002; Sundararajan, 2007).              
2.5.2.2 Market risk 
Market risk is the systematic risk that is not avoidable or diversifiable because it is generated 
by factors that affect the overall market performance rather than specific companies/ 
industries. Beaver et al. (1970) state that market risk could be seen as the risk that occurs due 
to stock market price movements, which are more related to banks’ financial portfolios. 
Bessis (2015) recognises market risk as the losses from the balance sheet and the 
consequences of market price movements. The market risk is subject to a number of other 
types of risk (i.e. interest rate, equities, exchange market and commodities risks) (Bessis, 
2015).  
Market risk in IBs may arise from fluctuations in tradeable, marketable, and leasable asset 
values (Greuning and Iqbal, 2008). In particular, the risk might arise from any financing 
contract that includes future delivery or deferred payment (Iqbal, 2013). Unlike Conventional 
banks, IBs are prohibited to earn profits from speculative transactions and contracts that 
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involve incidence or non-incidence of future events (e.g. hedging or derivatives) (Haron and 
Hock, 2007).  
2.5.2.3 Liquidity risk 
Liquidity risk, a bank’s ability to meet short-term obligations, is dramatically important for 
financial institutions. Based on the financial intermediation theory, the provision of liquidity 
and financial services are the two most important elements for financial institutions, 
especially banks. However, since financial institutions are working as an intermediation 
channel that needs to balance deposits and loans, they might face a number of liquidity 
problems (risk). BCBS (2008b) states that banks tend to transfer short-term deposits into 
long-term loans, which makes them subject to liquidity risk. In more detail, banks face regular 
and irregular demands for deposits and the latter might cause a liquidity problem if do not 
have enough cash to meet the depositors’ demands (BCBS, 2008a). The liquidity risk of 
financial institutions is related to two aspects: funding and assets (Crouhy et al., 2006; Bessis, 
2015). 
Many recent financial problems that have occurred during the last decade such as the US 
deficit problems (2004-2005) and the global financial crisis (2007-2009) were directly linked 
with liquidity problems. Therefore, there is a critical need for liquidity risk management to 
maintain the banks’ soundness. A weak liquidity position and poor liquidity risk management 
might expose the banks to other types of risk such as fiduciary risk and displaced risk, and 
may subsequently influence the bank’s financial stability (Mohamad et al., 2013). 
Consequently, the Senior Supervisory Group (2009) recommended that banks develop their 
liquidity risk management by setting up a comprehensive approach. Greenbaum et al. (2015) 
argue that banks can manage their liquidity risk using a number of approaches such as 
investing in liquid assets, expanding funds from different depositors, and maintaining a 
reserve at the central bank to borrow from when necessary. 
Liquidity risk is classified as one of the most serious risk faced by IBs (Sundararajan, 2007). 
In the events of liquidity distress, IBs might be suffered from higher liquidity risk compare to 
CBs because of the Shari’ah law constraints on accessing short wholesales financing (e.g., 
certificates of deposits) and other interest-based funds (Safiullah and Shamsuddin, 2018).  
Furthermore, the heavy reliance on asset-based financing is considered as another reason of 
why IBs are exposed more to liquidity risk (Basher et al. 2017).  
  
39 
 
2.5.2.4 Operational risk 
The risk of losing as a result of failed internal processes, systems and people, including fraud, 
assets damage, business disruption and legal risk is called operational risk (BCBS, 2011). 
Operational risk is managed differently depending on the bank’s size and complexity; more 
complicated banking businesses need a stronger operational risk management framework. 
Ghosh (2012) argues that banks need to manage the operational risk independently to be able 
to accurately identify, monitor, assess, control and mitigate these operational risks. 
Besides the conventional sources of operational risk, IBs exposes to an additional source of 
operational risk that arises from failures in complying with Shari’ah requirements (Chapra 
and Ahmed, 2002). Operational risk in IBs might make fund providers to withdraw their 
funds, which results in diminished reputation, loss of income, and limited business 
opportunities (Iqbal, 2013). Cihak and Hesse (2010) states that there are complexities being 
derived from administration of PLS modes, which assure the importance of managing the 
operational risk in Islamic finance. Due to IBs complexity model, younger age and smaller 
size of IBs might have a higher cost structure, greater administration, and operating cost, 
which result in higher operational risk for IBs compare to CBs (Beck et al., 2013; Johnes et 
al., 2014; Rashwan and Ehab, 2016).   
2.5.2.5 Insolvency risks 
Insolvency risk is defined as the risk of having the value of the bank’s assets drop below their 
liabilities value. Banks’ insolvency is inversely related to banks’ financial stability, as a 
higher insolvency risk indicates the lower financial stability of the bank. Boyd and Graham 
(1986) and Hannan and Hanweck (1988) argue that insolvency risk is essential in assessing 
banks’ risk and their overall financial stability. Insolvency risk is also known as default risk. 
A number of banks have failed as a result of weak risk insolvency management. García-
Sánchez et al. (2017) argue that managing the insolvency risk is important in financial 
institutions as failing to manage such risk is costly at the micro- and macroeconomic levels. 
Insolvency risk exposure might be different for IBs because of their unique business models. 
The nature of PLS contracts make investment depositors bear the financial risks with the 
banks. This feature increases the IBs ability to absorb losses and reduce the cash flows 
volatility, which result in a reduction in insolvency risk levels (Safiullah and Shamsuddin 
2018). Nevertheless, IBs might be risker because of the Shari’ah principles prohibitions from 
utilizing interest-based wholesale funding and traditional risk hedging tools, and investing on 
some activities, which in turn makes IBs more exposed to insolvency risks (Abedifar et al. 
2013, Beck et al. 2013).        
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2.5.2.6 Shari’ah risk (Shari’ah compliancy risk) 
As stated earlier, IBs possess unique characteristics with complicated business model because 
of the Shari’ah requirements. Consequently, IBs should not involve in activities that violate 
the Shari’ah principles as stakeholders of IBs may react negatively otherwise. Ali (2003) 
discussed that IBs that violate the Shari’ah principles face excessive withdrawals of deposits. 
Thus, besides other conventional types of risks including market, credit, operation, liquidity 
and insolvency risks, IBs are exposed to an additional risk – Shari’ah risk (Shari’ah 
compliancy risk). Shari’ah risk is the risk of not being compliant with the Shari’ah principles 
(Iqbal, 2013). Archer and Haron (2007) also define Shari’ah compliancy risk as the banks’ 
exposure to failure because of violations of Shari’ah principles. They argue that IBs deviation 
from Shari’ah principles might face the risk of credibility loss, which can damage the bank’s 
overall reputation. Ginena (2014) discusses that deviation from Shari’ah principles (Shari’ah 
risks) can cause various dangers. These are credit, legal, reputational, and market risks, which 
in turn leading to serious problems such as withdrawal of funds, higher costs of attracting 
deposits, direct and indirect financial losses, liquidity issues, bank runs, bank failures, and 
financial instability. IFSB (2005) argues that violating Shari’ah requirements have a strong 
influence on the bank’s market position, liquidity, solvency, and profitability. 
2.5.3 Risk management key participants 
2.5.3.1 Board of directors (BOD) 
The board of directors is responsible for a number of roles in financial institutions, and one of 
their most important roles is managing institutional risks. In general, the BOD’s 
responsibilities include ensuring the safety and soundness of the bank’s operations and 
activities and the solvency of the financial system. Furthermore, the BOD is responsible for 
monitoring and protecting the bank from any unwanted risks. The risk management roles of 
the BOD are monitored by regulators. BCBS (2010a) emphasises that the BOD’s 
responsibilities with regard to risk management include approving and overseeing the risk 
objectives, risk strategies such as risk tolerance and risk appetite level, senior managers’ 
activities, and corporate governance issues. BCBS (2014a) updated the principle codes for 
this responsibility of BODs, in which it states that the BOD is accountable for developing risk 
appetite by considering the regulatory requirements and long-term interests of shareholders, 
and, along with senior managers and the Chief Risk Officer (CRO), it is responsible for 
enhancing the bank’s ability to manage risk. The board should approve and monitor the 
application processes of internal controls, the liquidity plan, and capital adequacy assessment 
for the bank. 
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The BOD’s responsibility also includes ensuring that the necessary actions are taken by the 
management department to identify, control, measure, and monitor the risk exposure. 
However, the management should also inform the BOD on a regular basis of all risk type 
statuses through reports (Khan and Ahmed, 2001; Ghosh, 2012; FSB, 2013). 
2.5.3.2 Senior managers 
The responsibilities of senior managers come after the board’s roles, as the management has 
to apply the policies installed by the board. The senior management is also accountable for 
developing the risk management policies and procedures such as the risk management 
process, setting risk-taking limits, the system of risk measures and internal risk control. 
Furthermore, they are responsible for setting up mechanisms or procedures to ensure that the 
objectives installed by the board are achieved. 
2.5.3.3 Risk committee 
The risk committee’s responsibilities and activities have increased after the recent crisis. 
Regulators have put more pressure on banks to create a separate risk committee that has full 
responsibility for overall risk in the banks. The risk committee is a sub-committee of the 
board and it specialises in managing risks. The committee’s responsibilities include advising 
the board on overall risk tolerance, risk appetite and risk polices. They also monitor the senior 
management’s application of the risk strategies set by the board of directors. They report to 
the BOD and/or CEO regarding this issue. Furthermore, the risk committee communicates 
directly with the risk management enterprise department and the CRO (BCBS, 2010). The 
risk committee should discuss the business unites’ performance, their compliance with risk 
appetite, and risk restrictions set by the BOD with the CRO and senior management through 
regular meetings (FSB, 2013). The risk committee is responsible for overseeing the risk 
management framework implementation and providing recommendations about optimal risk 
strategies. 
2.5.3.4 Enterprise risk management department 
The enterprise risk management department is accountable for detecting, controlling, 
monitoring, measuring, mitigating and reporting risk to the senior managers (FSB, 2013). 
This is a separate department that controls all the bank’s risk management enterprise. BCBS 
(2010) confirms that the department is independent from the institution, and is responsible for 
applying the risk management framework across the entire institution, ensuring compliance 
with the risk strategies set by the BOD. The responsibilities of this department are to monitor 
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and evaluate the risk profile on a daily basis (Baxter et al., 2013), and to implement all the 
risk policies including market, credit, and liquidity risks. 
2.5.3.5 Chief Risk Officer (CRO) 
The role of the CRO also received more attention after the recent financial crisis. Regulators 
revealed a number of ways to improve the risk management function in financial institutions. 
BCBS (2010) states that the role of the CRO is independent, and that this person is 
responsible for the overall risk management functions and framework of the bank. FSB 
(2013) argues that monitoring risks and the risk process are the responsibility of the CRO, as 
this ensures that the BOD and senior management have sufficiently addressed the risk 
relevance and risk profile in a timely manner. The CRO is distinct from the business lines and 
can report directly to the BOD or to the CEO. Furthermore, the CRO might be a member of 
the risk committee or have a direct link with the RC. In addition, fundamental decisions 
regarding risk setting, plans, strategies, funding and liquidity management are also areas 
where the CRO is involved. 
2.5.4 Risk management from Islamic perspectives 
Risk management is considered as an important factor of the IBs success and sustainable 
growth (Obaidullah, 2002; Greuning and Iqbal, 2008). As previously stated, IBs have 
different characteristics and adopt the two corporate governance layer approach. As a result, 
risk management might also be different from that operating in CBs. In more detail, risk 
dynamism, risk management and risk mitigation are not the same in IBs. Furthermore, while 
CBs utilize risk-transfer, IBs strongly support the risk-sharing (Iqbal, 2013), which is 
considered as the main difference between IBs and CBs in risk management. Mirakhor and 
Krichene (2010) argue that from an economic point of view, the Shari’ah law supports the 
risk sharing and prevents risk transfer /shifting by prohibiting the interest-based contracts. 
Risk-sharing features make IBs less vulnerable to instability than CBs (Ali, 2007). However, 
even though this feature supports IBs stability, IBs could be risker and more vulnerable than 
CBs as a number of conventional hedging instruments cannot be employed.   
PLS contracts might increase the risk level at IBs as they are difficult to monitor. Akkizidis 
and Khandelwal (2008) discuss that there is no standardisation in the way of financing project 
in IBs, which is considered as another factor that makes IBs risker. Furthermore, the scarcity 
of legal requirements in controlling the relationship between the banks and entrepreneurs and 
the absence of a short wholesales funding market for Islamic finance make IBs to be more 
vulnerable (Akkizidis and Khandelwal, 2008). 
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IBs tools in mitigating and managing risks are limited due to the Shari’ah principle 
restrictions (Ahmed and Khan 2007). Furthermore, the IBs unique risks (as discussed in 
section 2.5.2) assure the needs to develop more hedging instruments that do not violate the 
shari’ah rules. Ahmed and Khan (2007) argue that IBs’ unique risks are complex and difficult 
to mitigate for several reasons. First, IBs are highly exposed to market risks in addition to 
credit risks because of their trading-based instruments and equity financing. Second, risk in 
IBs combine and alter from one type to another during different stages of the transactions. For 
instance, IBs might be exposed to credit risk during the period of Salam contracts, whereby 
the IBs are exposed to commodity price risk at the end period of the contracts. Finally, IBs 
risks are hard to mitigate because of the rigidities and deficiencies in the Islamic finance 
infrastructure. 
Another difference in risk management between IBs and CBs is regarding the risk-taking 
behaviour. There are two extremes of risk strategies that Islam prohibits: (1) excessive risk-
taking and (2) risk avoidance. For example, Shari’ah principles prohibit gharar, riba, and 
mayser, which do not allow IBs to engage in any excessive risk-taking or risk avoidance 
activities. Obaidullah (2002) argues that risk management in Islamic finance might accept 
risk-taking and uncertainties, yet major elements (e.g. gharar, riba, and mayser) must be 
strictly prohibited. 
Even though a number of studies (e.g. Obaidullah, 2002; Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2007; Hassan, 
2009) agree on the importance of risk management elements for IBs, IBs face some 
difficulties in pursuing Islamic risk management (Iqbal and Mirakhor 2007). IBs’ risk 
management is in its early stages and is still under development since it is missing the depth 
and breadth of risk management tools. This affects the risk governance practices in IBs. 
Compared to CBs, IBs possess similar key participants in risk management, as mentioned in 
Section 2.5.3. However, the key participants in risk management in IBs have additional 
responsibilities besides the conventional one; that is accomplishing their roles in a manner 
that is compliant with Shari’ah. Nevertheless, because of the additional risk (Shari’ah risk), 
IBs should improve their risk management system by having a more comprehensive risk 
management and reporting procedures that include the Shari’ah board to oversee the risk 
profile and identify, measure and monitor risks. Greuning and Iqbal (2008) discuss the 
increasing need for IBs to have a more comprehensive risk management framework to be able 
to compete in the market. BCBS (2006) requests that the BOD and senior management 
approve the risk management process. However, this risk management process should be 
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compliant with Shari’ah principles and relevant risk issues should be reported to the 
supervisory authority (IFSB, 2005). 
2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter provided the background and all the basic knowledge required to approach and 
understand this thesis. The chapter explained the history of Islamic finance and its 
development. It also discussed the Islamic law, and differences in characteristics between 
conventional banks and IBs, as well as banks regulations. Furthermore, this chapter presented 
the corporate governance concepts, theories, and models and compared them to the Islamic 
governance model. More explanation is provided in a discussion of the SSB within the 
Islamic banking system. Moreover, the chapter also examined risk management from both 
conventional and Islamic perspectives as this is a key element in the thesis. Risk management 
conceptual definitions have been given to provide initial ideas about risk management before 
discussing the risk types and the key participants in the risk management process. 
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Chapter 3. Governance Structure and Financial Flexibility: A Comparison 
Study of Banking Systems 
  
3.1 Introduction 
The banking industry has captured the attention of academics and practitioners due to its 
unique characteristics and financial practices when compared with other unregulated firms 
(Adams and Mehran, 2003). Alongside the conventional banking system, there is a noticeable 
surge in the Islamic banking industry in Western countries (Khan and Bhatti, 2008) assuring 
increased demand for Islamic financial instruments and the industry’s economic resilience.11 
After the financial crisis of 2007-2008, researchers increasingly focus on the Islamic banking 
system’s durability because of its surprisingly resilient performance during the crisis (Hasan 
and Dridi, 2010; Beck et al., 2013; Mollah and Zaman, 2015). Accordingly, many studies e.g. 
(Cihak and Hesse, 2010; Abedifar et al., 2013; Farooq and Zaheer, 2015; Khediri et al., 2015; 
Alqahtani et al., 2017) investigate the financial health of the Islamic Banks, including their 
stability, efficiency, insolvency risk, and liquidity management. They aimed at determining 
the differences in financial systems of the Islamic banks and conventional banks, which may 
explain the better performance of Islamic banks during the crisis. However, despite studying 
different aspects of banks’ financial health, the literature has not yet considered banks’ 
financial flexibilities. In addressing this research gap, this study examines the effects of 
corporate governance structures on financial flexibility for both types of banks. We utilise the 
Islamic banking model, operating on an extended governance structure (i.e., Shari'ah 
supervisory boards–SSB), to offer insights into identifying the influence of banks’ 
institutional characteristics and additional monitoring mechanisms on financial flexibility. 
 
The financial flexibility of a firm can be defined as its ability to fund positive net present 
value projects and avoid financial risk (distress) (Bonaimé et al., 2013; Ferrando et al., 2017). 
According to current literature (DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 2007; Gamba and Triantis, 2008; 
Mittoo et al., 2011; Meier et al., 2013), more financially flexible firms are more likely to 
survive in periods of economic stress. Billett and Garfinkel (2004) show that US banks with 
more financial flexibility have greater values. It appears that the same principle may apply to 
banks such that financial flexibility could alleviate ongoing investment issues and help banks 
avoid financial distress. In this study, the financial flexibility of banks is determined using 
                                                     
11 The growth rate of Islamic banks is 50% faster than the overall banking sector, and the average annual growth rate was 
17.6% from 2008 to 2012. Also, the financial assets of Islamic banks are expected to reach US$ 3.4 trillion by 2018 and US$ 
6.5 trillion by 2020 (Ernst and Young, 2013). 
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two main properties: funding and liquidity positions relative to targeted ratios. Banks with 
more stable funding sources (e.g. core deposit) and more liquid assets tend to be more 
financially flexible. Although financial flexibility is not directly observable, it can be inferred 
from the amount of reserves that a bank holds to monitor and limit financial risk and develop 
profitable growth strategies.    
 
This research examines the impact of banks’ governance practices on their financial 
flexibility. The main research question is constructed to investigate two main mechanisms: 
setting the risk-taking policies and monitoring. Firstly, corporate governance may affect a 
bank’s financial flexibility through the risk-taking strategy (risk management) that a bank 
adopts in developing its financial policies. Therefore, influencing the two main properties of 
financial flexibility, funding and liquidity. High risk-taking in either or both of these policies 
would result in lower reserve of funding and liquidity, a bank’s financial flexibility would be 
reduced accordingly. Secondly, the agency theory of Jensen (1986) suggests that higher 
monitoring power of a bank tends to reduce its agency costs through the reduction of 
managers’ ability to exploit the bank’s financial sources. As a result, a bank’s financial 
flexibility might be maintained. Furthermore, the literature shows that strong corporate 
governance enhances the monitoring power of a firm (Harford, 1999; Dittmar and Mahrt-
Smith, 2007; Harford et al., 2008). Consequently, effective corporate governance can improve 
the financial flexibility.  
 
We examine the influences of unique aspects of banks’ governance systems (board of 
directors and board risk committees of both banking systems and the SSB of Islamic banks) 
and their effect on financial flexibility for 28 Islamic banks and 37 conventional banks in 11 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries between 2009 –2015. To our knowledge, 
this study is the first to examine this relationship for both types of banks. This cross-banking 
examination is essential due to differences between the two banking systems. Most 
noticeably, Islamic banks offer Shari’ah compliant financial contracts and have an additional 
layer of board governance, the SSB.  
 
We construct a measure of financial flexibility as a single index consisting of more than one 
perspective (funding structure, liquidity and insolvency risks). This index uses a mechanism 
that allows us to allocate scores to a bank’s financial flexibility. We employ a sample that 
covers the MENA region. This region has the highest concentration of IBs in the world, and 
comprises emerging countries where investors have less legal protection, which has led to a 
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higher level in asymmetric information and contracting problems. La Porta et al. (1997) 
discussed that less legal protection might cause a negative effect on the corporate financial 
and investment decisions. Ferrando et al. (2017) argue that firms in countries with less legal 
protection would value their financial flexibility more highly. This because firms in these 
countries have a high volatility in their capital flows, which will affect their ability to access 
external financial markets (Guo and Stepanyan, 2011; Agosin and Huaita, 2012). Therefore, 
investigating the MENA milieu might help us understand how corporate governance 
mechanisms can mitigate banks’ asymmetric information problems as well as affect their 
financial flexibility. 
 
We conclude that while a larger board size is positively related to conventional banks’ 
financial flexibilities, it is negatively associated with that of Islamic banks. These different 
board size effects can be explained by three main characteristics of Islamic banks: Shari’ah 
compliance risk, lack of protection for stakeholders’ rights, and a lower level of complexity. 
The results also suggest that the existence of a dedicated risk committee improves 
conventional banks’ financial flexibilities, but it does not affect Islamic banks’ financial 
flexibilities. Furthermore, we find that the more effective the SSB, the better the Islamic 
bank’s financial flexibility. Larger SSB comprising members with multi-membership bring 
their accumulated knowledge and experience to improve the quality of monitoring processes.  
 
This research has implications for banks and their regulators. By showing that a board’s 
effectiveness enhances the bank’s financial flexibility, both types of banks should determine 
their board size and composition effectively to ensure effective monitoring and advising 
functions. Banks should also implement a risk governance approach to mitigating bank risk 
taking. Furthermore, as an additional monitoring mechanism that seems to have a positive 
added value for Islamic banks (i.e., the SSB), conventional banks could consider 
implementing an additional controlling instrument for improving corporate governance 
practices. Likewise, Islamic banks and their regulators should pay more attention to the SSB’s 
structure and function, as its malfunction might negatively affect bank reputation and client 
trust. Although the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision recently increased the capital 
requirements for banks by applying Basel III and released new liquidity requirements for 
banks, the regulators may consider targeting banks’ governance mechanisms to enhance the 
resilience of their financial systems and operations. 
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The rest of this paper is organised as follows: Section 3.2 presents the literature review and 
hypothesis development. Section 3.3 shows the data and methodology. The results and 
empirical analysis are presented in Section 3.4. The final section concludes this paper. 
3.2 Literature review and hypothesis development 
Bank corporate governance has not been well researched since the majority of the previous 
literature tends to exclude banks (Adams and Mehran, 2012) in spite of their unique position 
in financial practice. In essence, the bank as a financial institution is very different from 
unregulated firms (Adams and Mehran, 2003). It operates in an extensively regulated 
environment due to its high leverage level and potential for contagion within the banking 
industry, as well as its significant influence on the real economy (Elyasiani and Zhang, 2015). 
Drawing from the uniqueness of bank governance, Elyasiani and Zhang (2015) suggest that 
“the effects of bank boards on banking firm performance and risk may be dissimilar to their 
effects on nonfinancial firms and, hence, worthy of special attention” (p.239). Furthermore, 
the banking industry is subject to not only the conventional agency problems that firms are 
exposed to, but its unique agency costs derived from managers’ duty to protect the interests of 
different capital providers (Safieddine, 2009). Indeed, banks are susceptible to higher agency 
costs due to a lack of transparency in their contracts, higher leverage (Mehran et al., 2011), 
and higher information asymmetry between managers and shareholders (Morgan, 2002).  
 
Governance in Islamic banking, although similar to the Anglo-American model, is perceived 
as being stronger with the additional layer of monitoring in the form of religious or ethical 
boards – the so-called Shari’ah supervisory board (SSB) (Elnahass et al., 2014; Mollah and 
Zaman, 2015; Abdelsalam et al., 2016). In Islamic banks, the agents are required to adhere to 
the Islamic principles of Shari’ah when fulfilling their missions to maximise shareholder 
wealth (Safieddine, 2009). The stakeholders’ interests in Islamic banks may extend beyond 
financial interests to ethical and religious values (Alnasser and Muhammed, 2012). Any 
divergence by Islamic bank agents from placing all of their supplied funds in Shari’ah-
compliant investments creates an additional source of problems for them (Safieddine, 2009). 
These agency conflicts increase further due to the different operations of Islamic banks 
involving a variety of stakeholders and contract structures, thus causing the managers to use 
their discretion when using the various stakeholder funds. For example, one of the main 
agency problems that Islamic banks face is related to investment account contracts. 
Investment accounts in Islamic banks are based on profit sharing and loss bearing 
(Mudarabah) or profit and loss sharing (Musharaka) contracts because of the prohibition on 
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paying interest as a return (riba). This provides Islamic banks with more legal liberties 
(Abdelsalam et al., 2016), whereby Islamic banks engage in investments and share the profits 
with investor account holders (IAHs) based on the overall profits that they achieved. This 
increases the possibility of manipulating the returns for the IAHs, as argued by Safieddine 
(2009). In the case of Mudarabah contracts, the losses are borne only by the depositors, which 
may increase the moral hazards, as banks can take greater risks and leave the IAHs, who have 
no control over investment decisions, to bear this risk (Aggarwal and Yousef, 2000; Belal et 
al., 2015).  
3.2.1 Board of directors’ effectiveness and financial flexibility 
As mentioned earlier, the financial flexibility of a bank comprises two main properties: 
funding and liquidity, which can be influenced by the bank’s risk-taking strategies in regards 
to financial policies and monitoring channel. Firstly, previous studies have suggested that 
firms can improve their financial flexibility by following conservative risk strategies when 
determining financial policies (i.e., policies related to funding and liquidity) (DeAngelo and 
DeAngelo, 2007; Gamba and Triantis, 2008; Denis, 2011).12 Applying these findings to the 
banking industry, the risk-taking policies that managers follow in funding and liquidity 
influence a bank’s financial flexibility. For example, if a bank follows a low-risk funding 
policy such that it depends mainly on core deposit (stable funding sources), its funding 
position is more likely to be higher relative to its target. In other words, the bank is more 
financially flexible. The previous literature (Bologna, 2011; Cornett et al., 2011; Oura et al., 
2013; Jung and Kim, 2015) shows how stable funding increases a bank’s ability to operate 
and encounter risks even during times of crisis. A similar mechanism is applied to low-risk 
liquidity policies. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS, 2014) and the 
Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB, 2015) assure that effective liquidity risk management 
can increase a bank’s resilience.  
 
Secondly, a bank’s financial flexibility can be influenced by their monitoring channel. 
According to the agency theory (Jensen, 1986), a strong monitoring system prevents 
managers from exploiting a firm’s financial sources. That prevention might positively affect 
the financial flexibility of the firm. After banks decide on their optimal financial policies, the 
managers of banks are expected to adhere to those policies to meet the banks’ objectives. 
                                                     
12 Conservative risk strategies can be identified by having more reserves of cash and /or stable funding than the 
industry average or clear optimal targets in financial policies. In other words, the conservative risk strategies in 
this paper stand for conservative financial systems. 
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However, due to conflict of interests between different agencies, there are incentives for 
managers to take advantage of the bank’s financial sources for their private benefits. 
Therefore, a slack monitoring network within banks due to weak corporate governance 
mechanisms may provide managers with more opportunities to take private benefit using free 
cash flow (Harford, 1999; Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007; Harford et al., 2008). 
Consequently, if managers act against the established conservative funding and liquidity 
policies, banks’ financial flexibilities might be reduced.  
 
As explained above, banks’ risk-taking policies and monitoring power can influence their 
financial flexibility. The study initially proposes that the board effectiveness enhances banks’ 
financial flexibilities through these two channels. Building on agency theory, an extensive 
body of literature states that effective corporate governance reduces agency costs (Fama, 
1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Williamson, 1988; McKnight and 
Weir, 2009). Notably, the structure of the board of directors is one of the most important 
corporate governance mechanisms that can improve a firm’s performance (Cadbury 
Committee, 1992). According to Brennan et al. (2016), the board’s roles involve (i) the 
controlling function, informed by agency theory and (ii) the strategy and service functions, 
informed by resource dependence theory (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Pfeffer and Salancik, 
2003). Additionally, the board is the “professional referee” (Fama, 1980) (p.293), serving as a 
monitoring agent that has a legal and moral obligation to align management and shareholder 
interests (Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
 
Boards may effectively influence both risk strategies (through financial policies) and agency 
costs. These links are well-established in the literature. For the former, some previous studies 
(McCrae and Balthazor, 2000; Kaen, 2005; McNulty et al., 2013) discuss the link between 
risk management and corporate governance. Dionne (2004) and Karim et al. (2014) suggest 
that the effectiveness of a bank’s governance can be inferred from the effectiveness of its 
capital risk management. Furthermore, Yun (2008) and Caprio et al. (2011) suggest that 
stronger corporate governance leads to more efficient financial policies (i.e., more liquid asset 
reserves) For the latter, the link between the board of directors and agency costs, the literature 
(Harford, 1999; Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007; Harford et al., 2008) asserts that managers 
can gain private benefits by using free cash flow when corporate governance mechanisms are 
weak. According to La Porta et al. (1997), an effective board may prevent managers from 
exploiting their firm’s financial resources and maintain a good financial reserve position. 
Moreover, the previous literature shows that a more effective board enhances a firm’s ability 
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to reduce the agency costs of debt financing (Lorca et al., 2011; Fields et al., 2012). As such, 
we propose that a more effective board improves the bank’s risk-taking policies and the 
monitoring system within the bank. Consequently, the bank becomes more financially 
flexible.  
 
H1: There is a significant relationship between board effectiveness and financial 
flexibility. 
 
3.2.2 Board of directors’ effectiveness in Conventional and Islamic banks 
The board is responsible for a bank’s soundness and safety through its two fundamental roles: 
monitoring and advising (Adams and Mehran, 2003). It is the body that is ultimately 
accountable for liquidity risk management at a bank (BCBS, 2008b). The theoretical and 
empirical literature recommends that these two board roles can be made more efficient by 
adjusting the board’s size and composition (Raheja, 2005; Harris and Raviv, 2006; Adams 
and Ferreira, 2007; Boone et al., 2007; Coles et al., 2008; Linck et al., 2008; Lehn et al., 
2009; Pathan and Skully, 2010; Adams and Mehran, 2012). In other words, the board’s size 
and composition significantly affect the effectiveness of the board. 
 
However, the direction of the established significant relationship between board effectiveness 
and firm value is challenged by Coles et al. (2008). In detail, Coles et al (2008) discuss that 
based on firms’ characteristics, board effectiveness is determined differently. In this paper, we 
further hypothesize that board effectiveness is determined differently for conventional and 
Islamic banks. Therefore, the standard definition of board effectiveness for conventional 
banks is not able to explain the manifestation of financial flexibility for Islamic banks. This 
might be due to their unique characteristics, as previously discussed. Although the boards of 
Islamic banks are also responsible for monitoring their managers’ decisions to protect other 
stakeholders, their missions and functions are more challenging compared to those of 
conventional banks due to the different operations and contractual frameworks within Islamic 
banks. Below, we discuss the hypothesized direction of the relationship between board 
effectiveness and financial flexibility, separately for conventional and Islamic banks. 
 
For conventional banks, a large body of literature has shown that a higher number of board 
members with a greater proportion of outsider directors can lead to much stricter controls and 
better advice on a bank’s management, thus improving the board’s effectiveness see (Boone 
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et al., 2007; Singh et al., 2018). However, the advisory role of the board has received less 
attention than its monitoring role. Dalton et al. (1999) argue that, in general, a larger board 
gives better advice to the CEO, an effect which is increased by the higher proportion of expert 
and knowledgeable outsiders. The rationale is that independent directors prevent private 
benefits of insiders, thus enhancing stakeholder interest and firm performance (Rosenstein 
and Wyatt, 1990; Pathan and Skully, 2010; Harford et al., 2012). Moreover, higher 
percentages of outside directors leads to larger board sizes causing board diversification, 
subsequently enhancing the board’s monitoring role (Harris and Raviv, 2006; Boone et al., 
2007). Hillman et al. (2000) suggest that having different kinds of directors enhances a firm’s 
benefits through accessing various external resources. Overall, a higher number of board 
members with a greater proportion of outsider directors can lead to much stricter controls and 
better advice on a bank’s management, thus improving the board’s effectiveness. Nonetheless, 
the situation is different for Islamic banks, where a larger board with a greater proportion of 
outsider directors is often associated with less board effectiveness (Mollah and Zaman, 2015; 
Mollah et al., 2017b). This is because of a number of reasons.  
 
Firstly, Islamic banks’ corporate governance structures and agency costs are significantly 
affected by the differences in their financing and investment models, contracts, and business 
models (Abdelsalam et al., 2016). In addition to the shareholder and regulatory requirements, 
the boards of Islamic banks must act in accordance with Shari’ah requirements (Safieddine, 
2009). Non-Shari’ah compliant Islamic banks are exposed to excessive withdrawals of 
deposits (Ali, 2003). Ginena (2014) suggests that the violation of Shari’ah principles 
(Shari’ah risks) can lead to various dangers. These are credit, legal, reputational, and market 
risks which cause serious issues such as withdrawal of funds, higher costs of attracting 
deposits, direct and indirect financial losses, liquidity issues, bank runs, bank failures, and 
financial instability. As a result, the boards of Islamic banks are responsible for managing 
these Shari’ah risks and for having a real understanding of their influence on the stakeholders 
and their objectives (Ginena, 2014). This underscores the necessity of having members with 
Shari’ah knowledge on board to avoid these various types of risks. In real practice, it is rare to 
have members with knowledge of Shari’ah principles on board. Therefore, the boards of 
Islamic banks tend to rely on the Shari’ah supervisory board to support their reputation and 
ensure their clients’ trust. Safieddine (2009) finds that 85% of surveyed banks consider 
Shari’ah supervisory board decisions to be mandatory. Thus, a larger board made up of a 
higher number of outside directors who have insufficient knowledge of Islamic finance might 
be costly, making the monitoring and advisory processes weaker due to their naivety. Adams 
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and Mehran (2012) argue that outsider directors with a lack of firm-specific knowledge might 
be associated with a cost. Also, as suggested by Beltratti and Stulz (2009), ineffective 
independent members increase a bank’s costs and affect its performance. Therefore, a larger 
board made up of a higher number of outside directors who have insufficient knowledge of 
Islamic finance might be costly, making the monitoring and advisory processes weaker. This 
also might expose IBs to be non-compliant with Shari’ah. Consequently, the overall risks 
(including liquidity) for Islamic banks might increase, which might negatively impact their 
financial flexibility.   
 
Secondly, the board might be motivated to increase shareholder wealth by taking on high-risk 
projects, which might in turn, affect other stakeholders’ wealth, such as that of the investment 
account holders (IAHs) who are typically averse to risk. One reason why this conflict of 
interests has not been satisfactorily resolved is that IAHs have no representatives protecting 
their interests on the board. This gives managers the opportunity to exploit the IAHs’ funds 
(Abdel Karim and Archer, 2002). In fact, IFSB (2006) recommends that Islamic banks assign 
a governance committee to protect IAHs’ interests. However, in most cases Islamic bank 
clients are religiously motivated and deposit their funds in Islamic banks because of their 
compliance with Shari’ah. The existing literature (Miller and Hoffmann, 1995; Osoba, 2003; 
Hilary and Hui, 2009) argues that highly religious investors are risk-averse. Therefore, a large 
board with a higher fraction of outside directors in an Islamic bank is often associated with 
greater risk taking behavior (Mollah et al., 2017a). Thus, we argue that a larger board with a 
higher fraction of outside directors in an Islamic bank would lead to exploitation of the bank’s 
other stakeholders’ interests through aggressive risk-taking behaviour, hence reducing the 
effectiveness of that Islamic bank’s board. 
 
The final argument refers to the lower complexity of Islamic banks. Complex firms can be 
defined as being larger, more diverse (scope of operations), and/or heavily reliant on debt as 
an external source of financing (Klein, 1998; Coles et al., 2008). It is arguable that more 
complex firms need a larger board with more independent fractions in order to have more 
effective monitoring and adequate advice (Dalton et al., 1999; Coles et al., 2008). The 
previous literature (Boone et al., 2007; Coles et al., 2008; Linck et al., 2008; Lehn et al., 
2009) indicates a positive relationship between board size and a firm’s diversification. 
However, compared to Islamic banks, the previous literature claims that conventional banks 
are larger, more highly leveraged, and more diverse (Beck et al., 2013; Khediri et al., 2015). 
Moreover, Islamic banks may have more capital and maintain greater reserves of liquid assets 
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than conventional banks. This is due to their inability to raise non-equity capital because of 
their limited access to loans (Metwally, 1997; Olson and Zoubi, 2008; Bourkhis and Nabi, 
2013; Karim et al., 2014). Therefore, we argue that as Islamic banks are less complex than 
conventional banks in regards to non-Shari’ah activates, relatively small size and few outsider 
members will increase a board’s effectiveness. 
 
In brief, the existing literature supports the positive influence of board effectiveness (the 
board’s size and composition) on financial flexibility of both conventional banks and Islamic 
banks. However, based on the three arguments above, it can be suggested that the board’s 
effectiveness might be determined differently across conventional banks and Islamic banks. 
Precisely, larger board size and a higher proportion of outsider directors may improve the 
board’s effectiveness in conventional banks but reduce the board’s effectiveness in Islamic 
banks. Consequently, the following hypothesis will be tested: 
 
H2a: A larger board size with a higher proportion of outsider directors is associated with 
greater financial flexibility for conventional banks 
 
H2b: A smaller board size with a lower proportion of outsider directors is associated with 
greater financial flexibility for Islamic banks 
3.2.3  Risk committee and financial flexibility 
John et al. (2016) suggest that the board’s effectiveness is influenced by its committees. The 
bank activities together with the regulatory recommendations assure the vital role of board 
committees. Recently, governments and industries have started emphasising the importance of 
improving firms risk management (Woods, 2009; Arena et al., 2010). Most of the corporate 
governance codes around the world recommend the creations of dedicated risk committee to 
oversee the overall risk-taking management of the firm (Brown et al., 2009; Lundqvist, 2015). 
Consequently, recent corporate governance literature has focused on the role of the risk 
committee (Aebi et al., 2012; Lingel and Sheedy, 2012; Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013; Al‐Hadi 
et al., 2016). 
 
Aebi et al. (2012) investigate the effect of a separate risk committee existing and the presence 
of chief risk officer (CRO) on a bank’s performance during the financial crisis. They show 
that the existence of dedicated risk committee affected the bank’s performance negatively 
after controlling for other risk management components. Al‐Hadi et al. (2016) examine 
whether risk committee effectiveness is associated with the market risk disclosure. They show 
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that banks with a dedicated risk committee with a larger size, and more risk committee 
members with better qualification are associated with greater market risk disclosure. Lingel 
and Sheedy (2012) find that stronger risk governance decreases the risk-taking and increases 
the return on assets. Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) find that independent risk management 
function can reduce risk-taking and enhance the banks’ values. Ames et al. (2018) find that 
board risk committee exstiance is associated with higher financial strength rating. The overall 
results of risk governance studies suggest that more proper and stronger risk governance 
might mitigate the banks’ risk-taking behaviours and increase the financial position, which as 
a result enhances the financial flexibility of the financial system. Consequently, we 
hypothesise that a stronger risk governance mechanism through creating a dedicated risk 
committee might improve the banks financial flexibility. Therefore, the following hypothesis 
will be tested:     
 
H3: There is a positive relationship between a stand-alone risk committee (RC) and a 
bank’s financial flexibility.     
 
3.2.4  The Shari’ah supervisory board and financial flexibility 
As previously discussed, besides the traditional agency conflicts, Islamic banks encounter 
conflicts arising from their compliance with Shari’ah principles and the profit-and-loss-
sharing-based contracts. These conflicts cause a separation between cash flow rights and 
control rights for IAHs (Islamic Finance Qualification (IFQ), 2007; Safieddine, 2009). IAHs 
have cash flow rights but no control rights. Most Islamic banks fund providers (shareholders, 
depositors and investment account holders) want their funds to be invested in Shari’ah-
compliant assets and activities. Therefore, Islamic banks should not engage in any prohibited 
activities that violate Shari’ah principles. The Accounting and Auditing Organization for 
Islamic Financial Institution (AAOIFI) asserts that social and religious dimensions need to be 
considered by Islamic banks’ managements. They state that the chief objective should be to 
fulfil their stakeholders’ interests by conducting their financial operations in compliance with 
Shari’ah principles. 
 
The previous literature argues that individual behaviour, investor preferences, and financial 
decisions are significantly influenced by social norms (Kübler, 2001; Kim and 
Venkatachalam, 2011; Baker and Nofsinger, 2012). Al-Awadhi and Dempsey (2017) 
investigate the effect of religious belief on the stock market of Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) and find that Islamic stock in these markets have higher liquidity and encounter less 
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liquidity risk compared to non-Islamic banks. Therefore, Islamic banks are exposed to various 
risks resulting from potential deviation from Shari’ah laws (Shari’ah non-compliance risk). 
Islamic banks’ stakeholders exhibit norms and values that are closely aligned with the Islamic 
religion. Any action by Islamic banks that are inconsistent with Shari’ah principles can 
induce negative reactions from these stakeholders. Archer and Haron (2007) define Shari’ah 
non-compliance risk as the banks’ exposure to losses because of a breach of Shari’ah rules 
and principles. They argue that there is a risk of IBs to losing their credibility because of their 
deviation from Shari’ah principles. This loss of stakeholders’ trust can severely damage a 
bank’s reputation. According to Chapra and Ahmed (2002), approximately 68% of depositors 
in Bahrain and 95% in Sudan would show a strong willingness to withdraw their money if an 
Islamic bank failed to comply with Shari’ah principles. Consequently, this might have a 
strong effect on the bank’s market position, liquidity, solvency, and profitability (IFSB, 
2005). This decreased funding liquidity would affect the bank’s ability to attract new 
investors (Chapra and Ahmed, 2002).  
 
To guarantee that Islamic banks are fully compliant with Shari’ah, they are obliged to 
construct an additional layer of governance, the so-called the Shari’ah supervisory board 
(SSB), in addition to their boards. The previous literature (Abdel Karim and Archer, 2002; 
IFSB, 2005) emphasises the critical role of the SSB in mitigating and controlling a bank’s risk 
of Shari’ah non-compliance. Safieddine (2009) argues that since the main difference between 
Islamic banks and conventional banks is the true and fair compliance with Shari’ah laws 
(Grais and Pellegrini, 2006a), it is important to have a clear mechanism and procedure to 
guarantee the SSB’s monitoring role (through supervision and disclosures) of banks’ 
activities. Thus, stakeholder trust can be enhanced by having an effective SSB. Given the 
important role of an SSB in monitoring Shari’ah compliance, it plays a fundamental role in 
the decision-making processes of Islamic financial institutions (Kumar, 2009). 
 
Evidence shows that compliance to Shari’ah principles is associated with higher profitability 
and reduced risk taking. Mollah and Zaman (2015) compare Islamic banks and conventional 
banks and find that a SSB’s supervisory role improves the performance of Islamic banks. 
Abedifar et al. (2013) and Beck et al. (2013) show that Islamic banks have higher capital 
levels compared to conventional banks. A bank’s liquidity, another source of financial 
flexibility, is also higher to compensate for their limited access to the loans markets 
(Metwally, 1997; Olson and Zoubi, 2008; Bourkhis and Nabi, 2013; Karim et al., 2014).  
Therefore, Islamic banks’ financial flexibility position is expected to be influenced by their 
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Islamic governance practices. For example, Shari’ah principles set restrictions on the types of 
risky investments Islamic banks are allowed to undertake, which is turn explains the Islamic 
banks’ higher capital positions. Also, Shari’ah-compliant restrictions on external financial 
markets have led Islamic banks to hold more liquid assets. Therefore, agency problems that 
arise as the result of breaching Shari’ah principles may contribute to the decrease in an 
Islamic bank’s financial flexibility.  
 
The effectiveness of SSB depends on its characteristics. The more effective the SSB, the 
stronger the monitoring process. Consequently, the risk of Shari’ah non-compliance can be 
reduced, which in turn strengthens banks’ conservative strategies for their funding and 
liquidity policies (i.e., their financial flexibility). The AAOIFI states that SSB should include 
at least three scholar members recommended by a board. However, the senior management 
and board should assure the independence of the SSB members (IFSB, 2009). Increased 
independence can be achieved by having a larger SSB. Becker (1994) argues that having a 
higher number of board members can bring more knowledge, skills, and experience, which in 
turn strengthens the monitoring process. As a result, an Islamic bank’s compliance with 
Shari’ah laws can be ensured, thus leading to improved financial flexibility. 
In practice, there is a shortage of experts in Islamic law (Morrison, 2014), resulting in most 
SSB members tending to hold multi-directorships. It could be claimed that this affects their 
performance in monitoring managerial behaviour. However, it could also be argued that as the 
SSB members have high multi-directorships, it may improve the quality of their monitoring 
because of their accumulated knowledge and experience. Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen 
(1983) argue that members with good reputations tend to have more directorships because of 
their strong knowledge and experience in monitoring and advisory roles. As a result of this 
effectiveness, they can increase their current clients’ trust as well as attract new religiously 
motivated investors to invest their money in Islamic banks.  
 
Furthermore, Grais and Pellegrini (2006a) suggest that it would be more effective to have a 
SSB with knowledge of both Islamic law and finance. Therefore, the members’ qualifications 
would play a crucial role when monitoring Islamic banks activities in respect of prohibited 
financial instruments. Members with financial knowledge may discourage their management 
from manipulating the facts when explaining their bank’s financial transactions and contracts 
to the SSB, thus leading to increased client trust with regard to the Islamic bank’s compliance 
with Shari’ah law. Thus, we expect that members’ qualifications may affect the SSB’s 
monitoring ability, which in turn affects that Islamic bank’s financial flexibility. 
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 Only a few studies have examined the effect of the SSB on Islamic banks’ operations 
performances. Alman (2012) examines the characteristics of SSB on banks’ risk-taking 
behaviours in the Middle East, North Africa, and Southeast Asia. He finds that SSB’s size, 
scholarly ranking, and annual changes positively impact credit risk. Mollah and Zaman (2015) 
compare Islamic banks and conventional banks and find that a SSB’s supervisory role 
improves an Islamic bank’s performance. Grassa (2016) investigates the SSB’s effect on 
Islamic bank’s credit rating. The results of her study confirm the SSB’ effectiveness at 
enhancing Islamic banks’ performances, such that a higher percentage of SSB multiple 
memberships increases an Islamic bank’s credit rating. Safiullah and Shamsuddin (2018) find 
that an increase in SSB size and SSB academic qualification are associated with lower 
operational and insolvency risks. However, these risks are positively related to the number of 
reputed member on the SSB. Although these few studies have addressed SSB’s effects on an 
Islamic bank’s performance and risk-taking, their effectiveness at ensuring an Islamic bank’s 
conservative strategies for their financial flexibility (their funding and liquidity policies) has 
not yet been investigated.  
 
Drawing on the extant literature, we can see that an effective SSB enforces specific 
disciplines for an Islamic bank’s management. The SSB provides a good mechanism for 
ensuring management compliance with Shari’ah, which in turn assists the maintenance of 
conservative financial policies. This improved compliance may increase stakeholder trust and 
lead to lower insolvency risk. Eventually, Islamic banks’ financial flexibilities may improve. 
Consequently, the following hypothesis will be tested: 
 
H4: There is a positive relationship between SSBs’ effectiveness and Islamic banks’ 
financial flexibilities.  
 
3.3 Research design and data 
3.3.1  Sample  
Our initial sample includes 360 banks; 94 Islamic banks (IBs) and 266 conventional banks 
(CBs) operating in 22 MENA countries between 2009 and 2015.13 The investigation is 
conducted during this period for several reasons. First, the selection of the sample period 
                                                     
13 Although IBs have expanded beyond Islamic countries (Safieddine, 2009), the majority are based in the Middle East & North 
Africa (MENA) region, where Islam is a dominant religion (Ernst and Young, 2012; Abdelsalam et al., 2016). Also, the growth 
of IBs in that region is high compared to other regions. The IBs in this region hold many of the assets among the IBs world-
wide which equal more than 1.3 trillion (Ernst & Young, 2012). 
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allows the study to avoid potential effects of the exogenous macroeconomic shock that banks 
experienced during the financial crisis of 2007-2008. This may distort the effects of corporate 
governance obtained. Second, corporate governance mechanisms (e.g., board of directors and 
its committees) have received significant reforms after the recent financial crisis. 
Furthermore, IBs experience a peaked flourish, which dramatically increased the global 
awareness towards IBs during this period. We require a bank to have full annual reports, 
published as the financial year ending on the 31st of December. Following prior literature 
(Abedifar et al., 2013; Beck et al., 2013; Abdelsalam et al., 2016; Mollah et al., 2017a), we 
filtered the sample further based on the following three criteria: (1) a country is required to 
have both types of banks; (2) only full-fledged commercial banks are used. Therefore, full 
investment banks and CBs with Islamic windows were dropped from the sample14; (3) and 
non-commercial, unlisted banks and banks with less than two consecutive years of data were 
eliminated. The final sample consists of 65 listed banks (440 bank-year observations). Table 
3.1 presents the sample distribution by country and bank, with 28 IBs (188 observations) and 
37 CBs (252 observations). The highest proportions of IBs are in Bahrain and Kuwait, while 
Jordan reports the highest concentration of CBs.
                                                     
14 CBs with Islamic windows refer to banks that provide products that are compliant with Shari’ah (Beck et al., 2013). We 
exclude CBs with Islamic windows, as they do not provide separate financial data that allow us to distinguish between these 
windows and full CBs (e.g., Cihak & Hesse, 2010). 
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Table 3.1 Sample distributions 
 
 
 
Country Observations 
(IBs) 
Observations 
(CBs) 
Observations 
(Full Sample) 
IBs  
Percentage 
CBs  
Percentage 
Full Sample 
Percentage 
Bahrain 35 14 49 18.62% 5.56% 11.14% 
Egypt 14 21 35 7.45% 8.33% 7.95% 
Jordan 14 70 84 7.45% 27.78% 19.09% 
Kuwait 35 28 63 18.62% 11.11% 14.32% 
Lebanon 0 28 28 0.00% 11.11% 6.36% 
Oman 6 21 27 3.19% 8.33% 6.14% 
Palestine 14 7 21 7.45% 2.78% 4.77% 
Qatar 21 35 56 11.17% 13.89% 12.73% 
Saudi Arabia 28 0 28 14.89% 0.00% 6.36% 
Tunisia  0 14 14 0.00% 5.56% 3.18% 
UAE 21 14 35 11.17% 5.56% 7.95% 
       
TOTAL 188 252 440 43.00% 57.00% 100.00% 
Number of 
Banks 
28 37 65    
       
Notes: The final sample employs an unbalanced panel data of 65 listed banks (440 bank year-observations), operating in 11 MENA countries. 
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The consolidated financial data (in US dollars) were obtained from the BankScope and 
Bloomberg databases. The governance-level data were manually collected from the banks’ 
annual reports that were available on their official websites. The country-level variables 
(macroeconomic and governance indicators) were retrieved from the World Bank website. 
3.3.2  Measures  
3.3.2.1 Financial flexibility  
Financial flexibility (FF) is not directly observable; rather, it refers to a firm’s desire to be 
financially flexible (Graham and Harvey, 2001). The previous literature concludes that FF 
should be achieved by using different aspects of a firm’s financial policies, i.e., capital 
structure, liquidity, and investment strategy decisions e.g. (Gamba and Triantis, 2008; Daniel 
et al., 2010; Marchica and Mura, 2010; Mittoo et al., 2011; Meier et al., 2013; Arslan-
Ayaydin et al., 2014; Rapp et al., 2014; Ferrando et al., 2017). The measure of FF by 
capturing one single aspect may be misleading. Gamba and Triantis (2008) argue that using 
one-dimensional measure for financial flexibility might be misleading as life-cycle may affect 
this dimension. In more detailed, firm’s financial policies (i.e., funding structure and 
liquidity) might be affected by its life-cycle. For example, constrained firms hold more cash 
because of the restrictions they face in accessing external funding, whereas mature companies 
consider cash holding to be a costly strategy, as they can obtain external financing at a lower 
cost because of their reputation and the size of their assets. The previous literature e.g. (Billett 
and Garfinkel, 2004) notes the negative relationship between cash holding reserves and a 
bank’s ability to access external funds. Therefore, it might be misleading to judge a firm’s FF 
based on only one proxy such as its liquidity policy.  
 
Although banking literature has not yet investigated the FF of banks, similar attributes have 
been examined in other banking studies. They compare both types of banks’ financial 
strengths focusing on individual aspects such as capital adequacy (Beck et al., 2013), bank 
insolvency (Bourkhis and Nabi, 2013; Mollah et al., 2017a), deposits (Karim et al., 2014), or 
profitability (Beck et al., 2013). The results of these studies are usually conflicting. Beck et al. 
(2013) find that IBs have a higher intermediation ratio, higher asset quality, and are better 
capitalised, but they are less cost-effective. A possible limitation of this analysis is that it only 
provides a partial view, as it judges banks’ overall financial strengths based on just one 
dimension. This being the case, constructing an index that addresses these possible limitations 
is of considerable valuable when measuring banks’ FFs.  
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We construct a financial flexibility index (FFI) using three proxies to capture a bank’s FF: 
core funding ratio, liquid assets ratio, and insolvency risk. The selection of these proxies is 
based on their intensive use by international regulators (e.g., core funding and liquid assets 
ratios) and their connotations to CAMEL framework categories.15 We include the core 
funding ratio when measuring banks’ FFs for many reasons. Unlike non-financial firms, 
banks can raise funds from two segmented markets (the insured and uninsured markets).16 
However, relying on the short-term wholesale market is risky, as it is not insured. Thus, 
creditors might be highly sensitive to market liquidity risks, which increase banks’ risk of 
funding withdrawals. In contrast, core funding is less vulnerable to a market liquidity shock.17  
 
The core funding ratio refers to the amount of available stable funding (BCBS, 2014). The 
previous banking literature documents the importance of stable funding on banks’ abilities to 
deal with unexpected losses and to take advantage of investment opportunities (Athanasoglou 
et al., 2008; Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010; Farag et al., 2013; Oura et al., 2013; Jung and 
Kim, 2015). A bank’s funding structure is effective for providing liquidity; thus, banks with 
more core funding are more stable (BCBS, 2014; Jung and Kim, 2015). Therefore, we 
consider the stability of a bank’s funding structure as a proxy for FF. Generally, the higher the 
stable (core) funding ratio, the greater the bank’s FF. Consistent with the previous literature 
(Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010; BCBS, 2014; Bologna, 2015; Jung and Kim, 2015; 
Ashraf et al., 2016), we consider core funding sources to be core deposits, core capital 
(Tier1), and debt and bank bonds with more than one-year maturities.18 We consider 95% of 
total customer deposits to be core deposits, as suggested by (BCBS, 2014). In addition, IBs 
have a different funding structure, whereby they rely on profit-sharing investment accounts 
(PSIAs) in addition to demand deposits. The previous literature e.g. (Cihak and Hesse, 2010; 
Abedifar et al., 2013) argues that PSIAs provide more flexibility for IBs since the risk is born 
on the investors’ interest. Thus, PSIAs also offer more stability for IBs, which increases their 
FFs. Consistent with the BCBS (2014); IFSB (2015) and Jung and Kim (2015), we estimate 
                                                     
15 CAMEL framework is used to assess the bank’s financial position in terms of capital adequacy (i.e., capital risk), assets 
quality (i.e., credit risk), management (i.e., expense management), earnings (i.e., profitability), and liquidity (i.e., liquidity risk) 
(Golin and Delhaise, 2013).      
16 Billett and Garfinkel (2004) argue that banks have more FF, as they have access to two different markets. The insured market 
is where a bank can raise funds from depositors. Whereas, an uninsured market is where banks can raise funds from investors. 
17 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) suggests retail (demand and term) deposits, capital and debt with one-
year maturity or more to be treated as core funding.  
18 See p.5 of the BCBS document “Basel III: The Net Stable Funding Ratio (2014)”. Available on (www.bis.org). Aebi et al. 
2012 and Myers, 1977 also assure that banks with more capital would suffer less from debt overhang problems and have more 
flexibility to respond to financial distress. Some of the previous literature only considers explicitly insured deposits to be core 
deposits; however, some of the countries in our sample have no insurance deposit system and have just implicit insurance on 
deposits from their central banks. 
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the core stable funding ratio (SFR) using total customer deposits (demand and term) *95% 
plus Tier 1 capital plus debt with long-term maturity scaled by total assets.19   
 
For the second proxy (liquid assets ratio), previous research (Opler et al., 1999; Bates et al., 
2009) concludes that firms are motivated to hold more cash due to certain changes (e.g., cash 
flow volatility, R&D spending, and market-to-book ratio). The liquid assets ratio refers to the 
financial slack that built by holding cash and cash equivalents to encounter the unexpected 
earning shocks and investment opportunities (Denis, 2011). Hugonnier and Morellec (2017) 
argue that liquid reserves and equity capital can work as buffer against default risk. Cihak and 
Hesse (2010) use the liquid assets ratio to measure banks’ liquidities. Billett and Garfinkel 
(2004) suggest that liquid assets could be used as a buffer against times of crisis. The higher 
this ratio, the greater a bank’s FF. Consistent with Arslan-Ayaydin et al. (2014)  and Billett 
and Garfinkel (2004) , we calculate the liquid assets ratio (LA) using the cash and cash 
equivalent scaled by total assets.  
 
Insolvency risk refers to the banks’ probability of being insolvent (Lepetit and Strobel, 2013). 
In considering the insolvency risk (Z-score), the previous non-financial literature (e.g., Daniel 
et al., 2010; Mittoo et al., 2011) uses the Altman Z-score to measure FF. However, as the 
Altman Z-score does not apply to banks, we employ another Z-score measure which the 
banking literature uses to measure insolvency risk. Hugonnier and Morellec (2017) find that 
increase in tail risk, leverage level, and cost of external finance, and decrease in liquid reserve 
led to the increase in insolvency risk. The Z-score can calculate both interest and fee-based 
income and it has been commonly used to measure banks’ financial stabilities (Cihak and 
Hesse, 2010; Aebi et al., 2012; Beck et al., 2013; Mollah et al., 2017a). The Z-score is 
inversely related to the probability of banks’ insolvencies. Banks become insolvent if their 
assets value drops below their debt value. A higher Z-score implies a lower insolvency risk 
for banks. Consistent with previous literature (Cihak and Hesse, 2010; Aebi et al., 2012; Beck 
et al., 2013; Mollah et al., 2017a), we calculate the Z-score as the expected return on assets E(ROA)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 plus the equity capital to total assets ratio (CAR)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 divided by the standard 
deviation of return on assets σ(ROA)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖.20 
 
                                                     
19 Both BCBS (2014) and IFSB (2015) give an ASF (available stable factor) of 100% for regulatory capital and liability with 
more than one-year maturity. Also, they give a 95% ASF for consumer deposits and unrestricted IAH. 
20 Z-score is captured using the natural logarithm to control for any outliers and high skewness of the distribution. The standard 
deviation of ROA is measured using three consecutive years (current + two previous year). 
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To construct our FFI, we use mechanisms established in the previous literature (Mittoo et al., 
2011; Meier et al., 2013; Arslan-Ayaydin et al., 2014; Ferrando et al., 2017) to evaluate a 
firm’s FF position. We take the country j average of each proxy at each time t and compare it 
with the bank i value of each proxy to capture the FF level. We take the country and time 
average to mitigate any bias that might affect this study. We then create dummy variables for 
each of the three FF proxies (see Appendix 1). Each dummy variable has a value of 1 if a 
bank’s proxy has a score above the country average, otherwise its score is 0. Finally, we give 
a scale value for the FFI from 0 to 3, where a high value means the bank is maintaining a 
healthier FF. We use the scale value derived from the three proxies to get the overall FF 
level.21 This mechanism for capturing the FF position can provide a full picture of a bank’s 
financial health, as it considers various aspects: funding structure, liquidity policies and 
insolvency risk.  
 
Table 3.2 introduce insight into the relationship between the FFI and the proxies that used to 
build this index. This table provides the averages of the ratios for each different categories of 
the FFI, together with the Pearson’s correlation coefficient between the used proxies and the 
FFI. The results declare that LA is the proxy most strongly related to the FFI, followed by z-
score and SFA respectively. Furthermore, the results show that the FFI range is increasing 
with the increase of all the FF proxies. This assures the validity of the FFI that is used in this 
paper. 
 
FFI range LA SFA Z-score 
0 0.14 0.71 3.21 
1 0.19 0.80 3.58 
2 0.24 0.83 4.04 
3 0.27 0.85 5.41 
Correlation 0.46 0.40 0.44 
This table shows the mean value of our FFI index component with each category of the FFI range. LA is the liquidity ratio. SFR 
is the stable funding ratio. Z-score is the financial stability measure. All the definition of these variables have been discussed in 
section 3.3.2.1   
Table 3.2 Relationship of financial ratios to FFI (Mean and Correlation) 
 
3.3.2.2 Corporate governance variables   
We use several characteristics related to the board of directors (BOD), board risk committee 
(RC), and Shari’ah supervisory board (SSB) monitoring mechanisms as our primary 
                                                     
21 We require the availability of all our FFI’s proxies to have a value. We, therefore, remove any missing values 
in the FFI components. 
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explanatory variables to measure a bank’s governance effectiveness.22 The BOD structure 
effects are measured using two indicators: (1) BOD size (BODSIZE), measured as the total 
number of a board of directors’s members (Coles et al., 2008; Adams and Mehran, 2012); (2) 
BOD independence (BODIND), measured as the percentage of independent non-executive 
directors on the BOD (Aebi et al., 2012; Mollah and Zaman, 2015). The risk committee effect 
is measured using a dummy variable capturing the existence of a separate RC (RCE). It takes 
the value of 1if the bank has a dedicated risk committee in year t and 0 otherwise. The SSB 
effectiveness is captured using three variables: (1) SSB size (SSBSIZE), measured by the total 
numbers of Shari’ah advisors on the board; (2) SSB qualification (SSBQUAL), measured by 
the percentage of Shari’ah advisors with financial qualifications on the SSB; (3) SSB multi-
memberships (SSBMULTI), measured by the percentage of Shari’ah advisors on the board 
holding multi‐directorships, calculated as the number of Shari’ah advisors serving on two or 
more additional (outside) firms divided by the number of Shari’ah advisors on the board. We 
also use a factor analysis approach to measure the SSB’s effectiveness (SSB-Effectiveness) 
instead of using the three SSB characteristics individually. This step allows us to capture the 
effectiveness of the SSB’s characteristics as a whole. 
3.3.2.3 Controls 
We control for the relevant banks-specific variables that may drive the empirical analysis. 
CEO-Duality has been considered to control for the board independence and the management 
actions. The separation between the role of CEO and the chairman of the board may improve 
the management actions as this avoids the problems associated with the possibility of the 
CEO benefitting his own interests by taking higher risk, and thus reducing the banks FF. We 
also included insider ownership (MANOWN), measured by the percentage of shares held by 
executive directors out of the total number of shares to control for equity agency costs 
(Marchica and Mura, 2010). Leaving out the ownership structure would provide a deficient 
analysis of bank risk-taking (Laeven and Levine, 2009). Chen and Hsiao (2014) find that 
insider ownership aids in determining the FF of firms. Bank age (AGE), measured by the 
difference between the sample year and the year when the bank was established, may affect a 
bank’s ability to maintain or issue funds, thus affecting its FF. Unconstrained banks are 
usually mature, which allows them to hold less cash and depend more on their ability to 
borrow from external markets. Bank size (LOGTA), measured as the natural logarithm of the 
total assets of a bank, is also included. Small banks are usually financially constrained, which 
motivates them to maintain more cash. Faulkender and Wang (2006) and Pinkowitz et al. 
                                                     
22 See Appendix 2 for variables definitions   
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(2006) find that cash holding is more valuable for firms that have higher estimated external 
financing costs (financially constrained firms). Furthermore, bank size plays a crucial role 
when structuring risk strategies. For example, large banks might be riskier because of the 
exploitation of Too-Big-To-Fail safety net subsidies. Both age and size can also control for a 
bank’s level of complexity, as they can affect the characteristics of the bank’s BOD (Boone et 
al., 2007; Coles et al., 2008; Linck et al., 2008).23 The profitability (ROAA) also plays a 
crucial role in affecting the funding and cash holding policies and, therefore, it should be 
controlled for. We also control for banks’ growth opportunities (GROWTHOPP), measured 
by Tobin’s Q, and banks’ return volatilities (RISK), measured by the standard deviation of the 
return on average assets, as both variables give incentives for banks to maintain a financially 
flexible position (DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 2007; Gamba and Triantis, 2008). However, this 
volatility might be an indication of a bank’s level of risk, where higher return volatility refers 
to the high risk that a bank is taking, thus negatively affecting the bank’s FF. Bank Tier 1 
Capital Ratio (TIER1), measured by the core capital divided by weighted risk assets, is 
included, as it has a real effect on a bank’s funding structure. Myers (1977) argues that 
regulators consider the Tier 1 ratio to be an essential indicator of a bank’s financial strength. 
Cost efficiency plays a crucial role in a bank’s ability to maintain an FF position, as higher 
inefficiency costs indicate a weak bank managing system, which increases the incentive to 
take greater risks (Kwan and Eisenbeis, 1997). This leads to a decrease in a firm’s ability to 
hold onto cash and to access external funding sources. Thus, we controlled for cost efficiency 
(COSTEFF) measured by the cost to net income ratio. The ISLAMIC dummy variable was 
also included, 1 if the bank is Islamic, 0 otherwise. 
 
We also use country-specific variables to control for differences in economic development 
and growth (Abedifar et al., 2013; Mollah et al., 2017). These include: (a) GDP per capita 
(LOGGDPPC), (b) the annual GDP growth rate (GDPGROWTH), (c) government 
effectiveness (GOVERNMENT-E), (d) the annual rate of inflation (INFL), (e) the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) concentration ratio, (f) the domestic interest rate (DIR), and (g) the 
legal system (LEGAL). We further include an indicator for country governance quality (G-
Index), as it might affect a bank’s governance system and FF. The country governance index 
was produced by (Kaufmann et al., 2009). It also can calculate cross-country differences 
which might affect a bank’s risk-taking (Cihak and Hesse, 2010). The G-index includes an 
                                                     
23 Firm leverage is also considered to be a complexity level determinant. However, we did not include it in our tests due to a 
multicollinearity problem with Tier 1. We included the leverage ratio in our complexity analysis. 
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average of the six governance indicators: voice and accountability, political stability, 
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, the rule of law, and corruption control. 
3.3.3  Estimation methods 
To control for unobservable and constant heterogeneity (i.e., business strategies and banks’ 
specific features), this study applies panel data analysis (Andres and Vallelado, 2008). The 
most popular estimation methods for panel data are the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), fixed 
effect, and random effect. OLS method is popular analysis in investigating the association in a 
regression model. However, one of the main assumptions of OLS model is that the error terms 
should not be correlated across time period (Podestà 2002). However, this correlation is not 
considered as a problem in the panel data model. In the fixed effect estimation, the 
heterogeneity between firms that results from various managerial styles or managerial 
strategies can provide different intercepts for each individual firm (Gujaratı 2004). Fixed 
effect can address outcome bias problems that arise from characteristics differences within 
observations by removing the influences of time-invariant characteristics from the predicator 
(Wooldridge, 2002). On the other hand, random effect provides variance factors for 
groups/times and errors, expecting the same intercepts and slopes. The main difference 
between these groups/times is placed in their variances of the error terms instead of in their 
intercepts. However, to decide on which estimation method should be used, the Hausman 
specification test should be run as a robustness check. The Hausman test conducts a 
comparison analysis between fixed and random effects to investigate whether the entity or 
individual effects are not correlated with the explanatory variables in the model (Hausman 
1978). If the results of this test show that there is a correlation, then null hypothesis should be 
rejected, and the fixed effect model should be used, otherwise random effect should be 
adopted.  
In this study, fixed effect is not an appropriate estimation method for several reasons. First, 
this study investigates corporate governance variables, which relatively do not vary over time 
(Hermalin and Weisbach 1998). Fixed effect requires continuous variations within the panel 
data to generate accurate results (Pathan, 2009). This study mainly has the variation arise 
from the cross section, not from the time series. Second, the degree of freedom is subject to 
large losing (Baltagi 2001). Furthermore, to determine the appropriate panel estimation 
method, the study followed Ntim (2015)’s study by accomplishing Breusch and Pagan LM 
test to decide on whether to use pooled OLS or random-effect estimation method. The result 
of this test suggests that the null hypothesis, which tests the existence of zero variance across 
individual, cannot be rejected. Therefore, OLS estimation method is an appropriate technique 
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to be employed. Moreover, due to the nature of the dependent variable in this study, there are 
some specific estimation methods being used to control for this nature. 
The study uses several sets of instruments and employed a variety of statistical tests to assess 
the impact of governance structures on FF. First, this study performs pooled Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) with robust standard errors to control for any potential heteroskedasticity 
problems. In addition to using OLS, the study conducts a Tobit-formulation for our second 
regression to account for the censored nature of the dependent variable (FFI) and to provide a 
powerful specification check. Furthermore, as the dependent variable is converted to ordinal 
data and has limited values between 0-3, this study also applies an ordered logistic regression 
for all FFI models.24 Also, for robustness check purposes, we re-estimate our model using the 
lagged approach for independent and banks-specific control variables to control for 
endogeneity (reverse causality). To further control for endogeneity problems, we re-estimate 
our model using the dynamic panel estimation, Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM). 
This technique addresses all the kinds of endogeneity problems (i.e., reverse causality, 
measurement error in the repressor, and omitted-variables bias). Also, we use the probit 
model for another FF binary measure. We test our three hypotheses by running the following 
empirical model:   
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖 = 𝑎𝑎0 + 𝑎𝑎1 ∗  𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑏1 𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑏2 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖 + γ ∗  𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖 + δ ∗  𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖       
(1)                        
where,  
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖  is the Financial Flexibility Index of bank i in country j at time t, 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖   is a matrix of the Corporate Governance of bank i in country j at time t, 
𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖 is a proxy of the dedicated Risk Committee existing of bank i in country j at time t, 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖 is a matrix of the Shari’ah supervisory board of bank i in country j at time t (only 
IBs), 
𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖     is a matrix of bank-level control variables of bank i in country j at time t, 
𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖    is a matrix of country-level macroeconomic variables, 
𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖    is the error term; α0 is the constant; and α, β, γ, and δ are the vectors of coefficient 
estimates. 
We use the above model to analyse the effects of (i) the board of directors’ structure 
(BODSIZE and BODIND), (ii) risk committee (RCE), and (iii) the Shari’ah supervisory 
                                                     
24 See appendix 3 for this results.  
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board (SSBSIZE, SSBQUAL, and SSBNULTI) variables on banks’ FFs using our financial 
flexibility index (FFI).  
3.4 Results and analysis 
3.4.1  Descriptive statistics   
The descriptive statistics are shown in Tables 3.3.a and 3.3.b. In Table 3.3.a, the mean and 
distributional characteristics of all variables are reported for the full sample as well as each 
subsample of the banks clustered according to the bank type. The FFI mean values for IBs, 
CBs, and the full sample are 1.34, 1.43, and 1.39, respectively. Unconditionally, there is no 
significant difference in financial flexibility between conventional and Islamic banks. Figure 
3.1 shows the mean value of FF for each bank type estimated by FF1. The figure shows the 
differences in mean value across years for each sample (CBs and IBs samples). The figure 
reveals that CBs are more financially flexible than IBs in the following years: 2009, 2010, 
2011, 2012, and 2015. Nevertheless, IBs are more financially flexible than CBs in the 
following years 2013 and 2014. Consistent with the statistical results, the differences in 
financial flexibility positions between CBs and IBs are slightly different. For example, the 
different mean value of FF between IBs and CBs in 2014 is only 0.2. The higher FF that CBs 
have in general might be because of their lower insolvency risk, but not from their capital 
protection level. The previous literature (Cihak and Hesse, 2010; Beck et al., 2013) finds that 
IBs are more capitalized compared to CBs. The results of the TIER1 and RISK variables in 
Table 3.3.a confirm this argument, as the t-test shows significant differences (p < 0.01) in the 
mean values of both variables between IBs and CBs. TIER1 shows the mean values of 20.8 
and 15.7 for IBs and CBs, respectively. CBs also have a lower RISK mean value (0.34) 
compared to IBs (0.98). These results are consistent with those of Mollah et al. (2017). IBs 
profitability is significantly lower than CBs, as the mean value of IBs (ROAA) is 0.856 
compared to 1.466 of CBs, and the mean value for the full sample is 1.211. Cost efficiency 
also gives an internal interpretation of the differences between IBs and CBs, where there is a 
significant difference between IBs (55.3) and CBs (42.2), indicating that IBs are less efficient 
at managing their costs, which better supports CBs’ FFs. This is also consistent with previous 
studies (Beck et al., 2013), who conclude that CBs are more cost-efficient than IBs. 
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Figure 3.1 Distribution of Financial Flexibility across years between IBs and CBs (FFI mean) 
 
The descriptives reveal that the CEO-Duality role rarely occurs in IBs compared to the CBs, 
as the t-test shows significant differences (p < 0.01) in the mean values between IBs and CBs. 
Furthermore, the mean values of MANOWN are 4.6 %, 3.5%, and 4.0% for IBs, CBs and the 
full sample respectively. The mean values of SSBSIZE, SSBQUL, and SSBMULTI are 4, 
0.25, and 0.75, respectively. Interestingly, SSBMULTI indicates that most Shari’ah advisors 
have multi-seat positions. The mean values for BODSIZE are 9.48 and 10.1 for IBs and CBs, 
respectively, and 9.82 for the full sample. The average proportion of independent members 
(BODIND) for IBs (CBs sample: full sample) is 45% (40%:42%), indicating that IBs have a 
higher percentage of independent directors than CBs, whereas CBs have more directors on 
their boards than IBs. The two-sample t-test analysis shows a significant difference between 
IBs and CBs for BODSIZE (p < 0.01) and BODIND (p <0.10). The descriptive for the RCE 
shows that there are no significant differences between the IBs and CBs mean values, where 
the IBs have a mean value of 0.762 compared to 0.820 for CBs.
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Table 3.3. Descriptive statistics for regression variables
Full Sample    
Variables Obs Mean Median SD Min. Max. 
 
IBs: Sample Mean CBs: Sample Mean Two-Sample t-test 
Panel A: dependent variables          
FFI 419 1.391 1.00 0.850 0.00 3.00 1.337 1.429 1.089 
FFI2 374 4.074 4.00 1.692 0.00 8.00 4.667 4.079 0.067 
FF-LA 429 0.494 0.00 0.501 0.00 1.00 0.513 0.479 -0.693 
Panel B: corporate governance            
BODSIZE 421 9.815 10.00 1.911 5.00 16.00 9.483 10.06 3.077*** 
BODIND 440 0.445 0.428 0.248 0.00 1.00 0.483 0.417 -2.755*** 
RCE 394 0.796 1.00 0.402 0.00 1.00 0.762 0.820 1.405 
SSBSIZE 174 4.034 4.00 1.058 1.00 6.00 4.034 - - 
SSBQUAL 174 0.247 0.20 0.225 0.00 0.80 0.247 - - 
SSBMULTI 174 0.746 0.75 0.267 0.00 1.00 0.746 - - 
SSB-Effectiveness 174 -0.013 -0.218 0.723 -0.971 1.571 -0.013 - - 
Panel C: bank and country level 
characteristics   
     
 
 
CEO-Duality 387 0.147 0.00 0.354 0.00 1.00 0.023 0.242 6.287*** 
MANOWN 421 0.040 0.00 0.088 0.00 0.399 0.046 0.035 -1.253 
AGE 419 33.76 36.00 16.87 1.00 85.00 24.22 40.81 11.37*** 
LOGTA 438 15.64 15.75 1.239 12.18 18.81 15.45 15.78 2.790*** 
GROWTHOPP 400 1.051 1.029 0.113 0.400 1.656 1.056 1.048 -0.748 
ROAA 426 1.211 1.304 1.120 -2.757 3.218 0.856 1.466 5.735*** 
RISK 430 0.608 0.291 0.885 0.022 4.469 0.982 0.339 -7.957*** 
TIER1 412 17.91 15.30 7.975 9.660 46.78 20.78 15.73 -6.692*** 
COSTEFF 423 47.61 44.66 19.50 20.27 112.1 55.33 42.18 -7.20*** 
ISLAMIC 440 0.427 0.000 0.495 0.000 1.000 - - - 
LOGGDPPC 440 9.614 9.923 1.161 7.582 11.48 - - - 
GDPGROWTH 440 4.026 3.096 4.422 -7.076 20.94 - - - 
GOVERMENT-E 440 0.207 0.116 0.558 -0.880 1.536 - - - 
G-Index 440 -0.037 -0.077 0.451 -0.921 0.790 - - - 
INFL 421 3.088 2.909 2.994 -4.863 11.76 - - - 
HHI 440 0.204 0.200 0.087 0.086 0.511 - - - 
DIR 436 2.952 2.249 1.914 0.290 7.683 - - - 
LEGAL 439 1.000 1.000 0.358 0.000 2.000 - - - 
Notes: The table presents descriptive statistics of all variables used in the regression models for the full sample and each bank type. FFI is our financial flexibility index: An ordinary variable [0,3], indicating different levels of financial flexibility 
(see Appendix 1). FFI2 and FF-LA are other proxies for banks financial flexibility FFI2 is an ordinary variable [0,8], indicating different levels of financial flexibility (see Appendix 1). FF-LA takes value of 1 if their measure is higher than the 
mean value of the full sample for the same year, otherwise 0. BODSIZE is the total number of BOD members. BODIND is % independent non-executive directors in the BOD. RCE is dummy variable take value of 1 if the bank has dedicated risk 
committee and 0 otherwise. SSBSIZE is the total numbers of Shari’ah advisors on the board. SSBQUAL is % Shari’ah advisors with financial qualifications in the SSB. SSBMULTI is % Shari’ah advisors in SSB serving two or more additional 
(outside) firms. SSB-Effectiveness is factor analysis eigenvalue obtained from three SSB characteristics mentioned before. CEO-Duality is dummy variable takes value of 1 if the CEO and the chairman of the board is the same person, and 0 
otherwise.  MANOWN is the insider ownership measured by % shares held by executive directors to total shares. AGE is the difference between the sample year and the year in which the bank was established. LOGTA is the bank’s size measured 
by natural logarithm of total assets. GROWTHOPP is banks growth opportunities measured by Tobins’ Q (Equity MV plus liability BV divided by asset BV). ROAA is return on average assets. RISK is the bank return volatility measured by the 
SD of return on average assets. TIER 1 is banks’ capital ratio measured by Core capital / Risk weighted assets. COSTEFF is the bank cost efficiency measured by cost/net income. ISLAMIC is unity if the bank is Islamic, 0 otherwise. LOGGDPPC 
is the country GDP per capita measured by Natural logarithm of GDP per capita. GDPGROWTH is the GDP growth rate. GOVERNMENT-E is the government effectiveness. G-Index is country corporate governance quality measured by six 
indicators. INFL is the annual rate of inflation. HHI is the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index measures bank market concentration. HHI is calculated as the square sum of the ratio of total assets of each bank-year to total assets of all banks each year. It 
has a value between zero and one. Higher HHI shows higher bank concentration. DIR is the deposit Interest Rate. LEGAL (legal system) is religiosity proxy which take value of 0 if the country not using Shari’ah law, 1 for countries combing both 
Shari’ah law and other legal system, and 2 for countries with only shari’ah law. We also report on the paired sample mean test (t-test). *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01 (two-tailed test). 
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Table 3.3.b shows the different levels of complexity between the two types of bank. For a 
robust analysis of the level of complexity, we use Factor Analysis to create a factor score 
based on the most commonly used variables (LEV, AGE, and LOGTA), indicating the level 
of complexity.25 Previous studies use and prove the complexity variables (Coles et al., 2008; 
Linck et al., 2008). Following Coles et al. (2008), we create a dummy variable (ADVICE) 
that has a value of 1 (COMPLEX) if the complexity score value for each bank year is higher 
than the median value of the full sample, and 0 (SIMPLE) otherwise. The different BODSIZE 
for each type of bank might be explained by the significant difference (t-test, p < 0.01) for 
ADVICE, AGE, LOGTA, and LEV. The ADVICE needed result for CBs is 61%, compared 
to 34% for IBs, confirming that CBs are more complex than IBs, so they need a larger 
BODSIZE to provide more experience, advice, and access to external sources. We also 
categorise the sample into COMPLEX and SIMPLE banks based on the ADVICE needed 
variable. Consistent with Coles et al. (2008) and Linck et al. (2008), we find that COMPLEX 
banks have a significantly larger BODSIZE at the 1% level (10.09) than SIMPLE banks 
(9.572). This additional test confirms our argument that IBs are considered to be simple 
organisations that only need a small BODSIZE to be effective. 
  
 
 
 
 
                                                     
25 We give each bank year observation a factor score based on the variables discussed above. The factor scoring mechanism is 
a liner combination of the transformed value of the complexity variables. 
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Full Sample 
 
   
Variables Obs Mean Median SD Min. Max. 
 
IBs: Sample Mean CBs: Sample 
Mean 
Two-Sample t-test 
ADVICE 419 0.496 0.00 0.500 0.00 1.00 0.337 0.614 5.815*** 
LEV 437 0.857 0.874 0.088 0.068 0.572 0.834 0.873 6.193*** 
AGE 419 33.76 36.00 16.87 1.00 85.00 24.22 40.81 11.37*** 
LOGTA 438 15.64 15.75 1.239 12.18 18.81 15.45 15.78 2.790*** 
 COMPLEXITY LEVEL SIMPLE COMPLEX  
BODSIZE         9.572 10.09 -2.784*** 
            
Notes: The table presents descriptive statistics of all variables indicating the banks group complexity level. ADVICE is a proxy for the banks advices needs measured by dummy variable take value of 1 if factor 
analysis loading score using the three complexity proxies (leverage, age, and banks size) is higher than the sample median for each bank-year. LEV is the banks financial leverage measured by total debts/total assets. 
AGE is the difference between the sample year and the year in which the bank was established. LOGTA is the bank’s size measured by natural logarithm of total assets. BODSIZE is the total number of BOD members. 
We also report on the paired sample mean test (t-test). *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01 (two-tailed test). 
Table 3.3.b. Descriptive statistics for banks complexity level 
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Table 3.4 also provide more understanding of the banks characteristics, where it provides a 
comparison between the characteristics of high financially flexibly banks and banks with low 
financially flexible position based on our main financial flexibility index (FFI) index. The 
results show that the other financial flexibility measures (FFI2 and FF-LA) are consistent with 
the main index as FFI2 and FF-LA are significantly higher with high financially flexible 
banks. The mean value of BODSIZE for high FF banks is 10.05 compare to 9.577 for low FF 
banks. This difference is significant which reveals that banks with higher financial flexibility 
position have larger board size compare to those with low position of FF. Significantly, the 
age between both high FF and low FF is different, as it shows higher age for high FF position. 
This can confirm the business cycle effect that banks in mature stage can be more financially 
flexible compare to growth stage. The results are consistent with our assumptions that bank 
with high financial flexibility position would have high investment opportunities, take lower 
risk, and have higher equity capital buffer.  
 
                            Full Sample 
Variable High FF Low FF Two sample t-test 
FFI2 4.922 3.399 -9.65*** 
FF-LA 0.727 0.294 -9.58*** 
BODSIZE 10.050 9.577 -2.75*** 
BODIND 0.420 0.469 1.45 
RCE 0.820 0.776 -0.74 
SSBSIZE 4.118 3.955 -0.91 
SSBQUAL 0.252 0.242 -0.22 
SSBMULTI 0.762 0.731 -1.14 
SSB-Effectiveness 0.070 -0.067 -1.23 
MANOWN 0.036 0.044 0.61 
AGE 36.340 31.542 -3.22*** 
LOGTA 15.664 15.618 -1.64 
GROWTHOPP 1.065 1.040 -2.46** 
ROAA 1.265 1.166 -1.36 
RISK 0.429 0.762 3.81*** 
TIER1 19.018 16.968 -1.67* 
COSTEFF 47.710 47.520 0.84 
ISLAMIC 0.428 0.427 0.75 
Notes: The table presents comparison analysis of all variables used in all the regression models for the full sample of high and low FF bank. 
FFI2 and FF-LA are other proxies for banks financial flexibility FFI2 is an ordinary variable [0,8], indicating different levels of financial 
flexibility (see table 3.3.a). FF-LA takes value of 1 if their measure is higher than the mean value of the full sample for the same year, otherwise 
0. BODSIZE is the total number of BOD members. BODIND is % independent non-executive directors in the BOD. RCE is dummy variable 
take value of 1 if the bank has dedicated risk committee and 0 otherwise. SSBSIZE is the total numbers of Shari’ah advisors on the board. 
SSBQUAL is % Shari’ah advisors with financial qualifications in the SSB. SSBMULTI is % Shari’ah advisors in SSB serving two or more 
additional (outside) firms. SSB-Effectiveness is factor analysis eigenvalue obtained from three SSB characteristics mentioned before. 
MANOWN is the insider ownership measured by % shares held by executive directors to total shares. AGE is the difference between the 
sample year and the year in which the bank was established. LOGTA is the bank’s size measured by natural logarithm of total assets. 
GROWTHOPP is banks growth opportunities measured by Tobins’ Q (Equity MV plus liability BV divided by asset BV). ROAA is return on 
average assets. RISK is the bank return volatility measured by the SD of return on average assets. TIER 1 is banks’ capital ratio measured by 
Core capital / Risk weighted assets. COSTEFF is the bank cost efficiency measured by cost/net income. ISLAMIC is unity if the bank is 
Islamic, 0 otherwise. 
Table 3.4 Univariate comparison of High vs. Low FF of banks 
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Table 3.5 shows the Pearson pairwise correlation matrix for all the variables in the model to 
test for any significant inter‐variable correlations. As the Table shows, no high degree of 
cross-correlation can be observed between the key variables. The variance inflation factors 
(VIFs) also show no multicollinearity problems among the regressors.26 The table shows that 
banks with stronger financial flexibility tend to have more populated boards. Further, banks 
with a greater proportion of independent members on the board tend not to have an 
independent risk committee. Banks with a greater number of independent members on the 
board also tend to have a greater proportion of Shari’ah advisors on the board. The number of 
independent board members is not statistically significance and a greater board size is 
associated with a smaller number of independent members on the board.
                                                     
26 The pairwise test shows no coefficient value higher than 80% between the explanatory variables. Also, the VIF 
individual value of each variable shows no value higher 10 and no VIF means higher than 6. 
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Table 3.5 Pearson pairwise correlation matrix: full sample 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) 
FFI (1) 1.000                       
BODSIZE (2) 0.168*** 1.000                      
BODIND (3) -0.054 
-
0.257*** 1.000                     
RCE (4) 0.032 0.023 
-
0.181*** 1.000                    
SSBSIZE (5) 0.087 -0.043 0.318*** -0.200** 1.000                   
SSBQUAL (6) -0.003 -0.013 0.013 0.086 -0.005 1.000                  
SSBMULTI (7) 0.079 -0.166** 0.319*** 0.120 -0.041 0.190** 1.000                 
CEO-Duality (8) 0.166*** 0.147*** 
-
0.201*** 0.161*** -0.010 -0.049 0.046 1.000                
MANOWN (9) -0.028 0.049 0.043 -0.068 0.244*** 0.114 
-
0.327*** 0.063 1.000               
AGE (10) 0.140*** 0.310*** 
-
0.164*** 0.051 0.046 
-
0.207*** 0.127 0.353*** 
-
0.138*** 1.000              
LOGTA (11) 0.088* -0.059 0.140*** 
-
0.167*** 0.286*** 
-
0.269*** 0.034 0.119** 
-
0.175*** 0.321*** 1.000             
GROWTHOPP (12) 0.135*** -0.126** 0.043 
-
0.264*** 0.223*** 
-
0.352*** -0.023 -0.038 0.099** -0.038 0.307*** 1.000            
ROAA (13) 0.092* 0.074 
-
0.135*** -0.025 -0.014 -0.044 -0.027 -0.099* -0.008 0.138*** 0.282*** 0.147*** 1.000           
RISK (14) -0.231*** 
-
0.178*** 0.211*** 
-
0.142*** 0.043 0.019 0.066 -0.094* 0.054 
-
0.345*** 
-
0.272*** 0.003 
-
0.516*** 1.000          
TIER1 (15) 0.081 -0.050 0.056 -0.088* -0.188** 0.079 0.119 
-
0.217*** 0.030 
-
0.295*** 
-
0.476*** -0.017 -0.113** 0.247*** 1.000         
COSTEFF (16) -0.002 -0.107** 0.096** 0.094* -0.036 0.028 -0.048 -0.060 0.197*** 
-
0.263*** 
-
0.425*** 
-
0.245*** 
-
0.637*** 0.390*** 0.488*** 1.000        
LOGGDPPC (17) -0.018 
-
0.452*** 0.424*** 
-
0.213*** 0.164** -0.155** 0.409*** 
-
0.338*** 
-
0.159*** 
-
0.240*** 0.462*** 0.288*** 0.002 0.161*** -0.003 -0.079 1.000       
GDPGROWTH (18) 0.051 -0.074 
-
0.154*** 0.095* -0.134* -0.018 -0.093 -0.003 0.002 
-
0.162*** -0.024 0.089* 0.136*** -0.096** 0.085* -0.018 0.133*** 1.000      
GOVERMENT-E (19) -0.002 
-
0.268*** 0.268*** -0.128** -0.007 0.222*** 0.405*** 
-
0.400*** 
-
0.131*** 
-
0.225*** 0.209*** 0.036 -0.003 0.155*** 0.005 -0.071 0.714*** 0.124*** 1.000     
INFL (20)  -0.132*** 0.106** 
-
0.168*** -0.095* -0.021 
-
0.206*** 
-
0.259*** 0.077 0.034 0.088* -0.012 0.069 0.024 -0.062 -0.119** -0.073 
-
0.413*** 
-
0.278*** 
-
0.547*** 1.000    
HHI (21) -0.014 -0.017 
-
0.181*** 0.275*** 
-
0.287*** 0.091 -0.069 -0.119** 0.152*** -0.047 
-
0.447*** 0.026 0.039 -0.087* 0.179*** 0.097* 
-
0.218*** 0.215*** 
-
0.140*** 
-
0.188*** 1.000   
DIR (22) 0.034 0.279*** 
-
0.263*** 0.187*** 
-
0.234*** -0.187** 0.022 0.473*** 
-
0.133*** 0.354*** 0.047 -0.104** 0.120** 
-
0.233*** 
-
0.220*** -0.115** 
-
0.570*** -0.085* 
-
0.512*** 0.385*** 
-
0.241*** 1.000  
LEGAL (23) -0.135*** -0.085* 0.119** 
-
0.218*** 0.385*** 
-
0.213*** 
-
0.377*** 
-
0.536*** 0.325*** 
-
0.366*** -0.024 0.240*** 0.043 0.131*** 0.171*** 0.030 0.143*** 0.031 0.117** 0.128*** 0.048 
-
0.468*** 1.000 
                        
Notes: The table presents the Pearson pairwise correlation matrix for all variables employed in the analysis. FFI is our financial flexibility index: An ordinary variable [0,3], indicating different levels of financial flexibility (Appendix 1). BODSIZE is the total number of BOD members. 
BODIND is % independent non-executive directors in the BOD.  RCE is dummy variable take value of 1 if the bank has dedicated risk committee and 0 otherwise. SSBSIZE is the total numbers of Shari’ah advisors on the board. SSBQUAL is % Shari’ah advisors with financial qualifications 
in the SSB. SSBMULTI is % Shari’ah advisors in SSB serving two or more additional (outside) firms.  CEO-Duality is dummy variable takes value of 1 if the CEO and the chairman of the board is the same person, and 0 otherwise. MANOWN is the insider ownership measured by % shares 
held by executive directors to total shares. AGE is the difference between the sample year and the year in which the bank was established. LOGTA is the bank’s size measured by natural logarithm of total assets. GROWTHOPP is banks growth opportunities measured by Tobins’ Q (Equity 
MV plus liability BV divided by asset BV).  ROAA is return on average assets. RISK is the bank return volatility measured by the SD of return on average assets. TIER 1 is banks’ capital ratio measured by Core capital / Risk weighted assets. COSTEFF is the bank cost efficiency measured 
by cost/net income.  LOGGDPPC is the country GDP per capita measured by Natural logarithm of GDP per capita. GDPGROWTH is the GDP growth rate. GOVERNMENT-E is the government effectiveness. INFL is the annual rate of inflation. HHI is the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index 
measures bank market concentration. HHI is calculated as the square sum of the ratio of total assets of each bank-year to total assets of all banks each year. It has a value between zero and one. Higher HHI shows higher bank concentration. DIR is the deposit Interest Rate. LEGAL (legal 
system) is religiosity proxy which take value of 0 if the country not using Shari’ah law, 1 for countries combing both Shari’ah law and other legal system, and 2 for countries with only shari’ah law. *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01 (two-tailed test).  
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3.4.2 Empirical tests  
3.4.2.1 BOD effectiveness and FF  
Table 3.6 presents the results for FFI (Equation: 1), where we regress FFI on the BOD, RC, 
and SSB monitoring mechanisms. The full-sample results are presented in Models 1-2 (Panel 
A). Models (3-6) are for IBs (Panel B), and Models 7-8 are for CBs (Panel C). In Models 1, 3, 
5 and 7, the FFI is regressed on our primary independent variables (BOD, RC, and SSB 
structures) and other controls using the OLS technique for the full sample, IBs, and CBs, 
respectively. A different estimation method, Tobit, is also included in columns (2,4, 6, and 8).  
 
In the full-sample tests, Panel A shows that BODSIZE is significantly and positively related 
to the banks’ FF levels across all the estimation models. Dalton et al. (1999) assert that a 
larger BODSIZE offers better advice to the CEO, which helps make appropriate decisions. 
The proportion of outsider directors (BODIND) is not significant. These results suggest that 
having an effective BOD structure tends to increase the FF level, as proposed by agency and 
resource dependence theories. In terms of control variables, RISK reveals a significant and 
negative relationship with the FFI. This indicates that banks taking a lot of risks in their 
investment strategies tend to have higher profit volatility and reduce the available reserves of 
financial sources, and thus lower FF positions. This is consistent with Mollah et al. (2017a), 
who find that higher return volatility negatively affects a bank’s financial stability. 
Furthermore, the GROWTHOPP result shows that growth opportunity affects a bank’s FF 
positively, as banks with high growth opportunities tend to maintain higher FF levels to 
undertake future investments. The results also show consistency with previous literature, 
where firms with high profitability may lower their FF level (financial reserves) to decrease 
their costs, and because of their ability to access external funding. Another argument in the 
literature discusses that firms may use their funding reserves (taking a high risk) to achieve 
high profit.27 As expected, we find that TIER1 affects banks’ FFIs significantly and 
positively. The results also show that cost inefficiency affects FF negatively. LOGGDPPC, 
HHI, DIR, and LEGAL are also negatively associated with the FFI. The HHI and DIR results 
indicate that a lot of competition and high-interest rates would motivate banks to use their 
financial reserves (i.e., decreasing FF) to achieve more profits. The IBs’ dummy variable 
(ISLAMIC) has a significant positive relationship with FFI across all the estimation models. 
This suggests that IBs have a stronger FF position than CBs. IBs are more prone to liquidity 
                                                     
27 This might assure the existing of reverse causality problem (endogeneity). However, our robustness-check section controls 
for this problem.  
  
78 
 
risks, thus making them reserve higher liquidity and more stable funding due to their 
restricted access to external financing. The Government-E shows a positive effect on the 
banks FFI across all samples, which assures that countries with more government control 
mitigate risk-taking, thus enhancing the banks’ FF.  
On comparing IBs and CBs, we find the BOD structure has different effects on banks’ FFIs. 
While BODSIZE affects the IBs’ FFIs negatively (β = -0.127, p < 0.05), the CBs’ BODSIZE 
has a positive impact (β = .147, p .01). These results support Hypothesis 1. The differences in 
BODs effectiveness might be explained by the arguments that we discussed in the hypothesis 
section, a lack of Shari’ah experts on the BOD, a BOD’s motivation to take greater risks, and 
the level of a bank’s complexity. Accordingly, a large BODSIZE can be costly for IBs, 
affecting their performance negatively, which can cause depositors and investors to withdraw 
their money, thus lowering their FF. In other words, BOD becomes less effective in setting 
financial policies in compliant with IBs clients’ interests, and less effective in monitoring the 
management from exploiting the reserve funds. Furthermore, The IBs’ characteristics exhibit 
a lower level of complexity than CBs. This indicates they have less need for advice, thus a 
small BOD size is more effective for IBs. Moreover, AGE, ROAA, COSTEFF, LOGGDPPC, 
HHI, and DIR have significant negative associations with FFI for IBs, but not for CBs. 
Younger banks can be more financially flexible because they are financially constrained. 
They have more cash and are more conservative when making investment decisions. A higher 
LOGGDPPC is associated with lower FF, which is consistent with Abedifar et al. (2013). 
Tier1 has a significant and positive effect on IBs’ FFIs. We also find that investment 
opportunities have a significant positive effect on CBs’ FFIs. Banks with more growth 
opportunities maintain higher FF levels. Interestingly, we find that the legal system has a 
negative effect on CBs’ FFIs, indicating that CBs operating in countries with Shari’ah legal 
systems suffer from lower FF level.  
3.4.2.2 Dedicated RC and FF 
The results of Table 3.6 also show that the RCE is positively and significantly (β = 0.358, p < 
0.05) related to the FFI at the 5% level across all the estimation models. This indicates that 
the existence of a separate risk committee to manage and mitigate the risk-taking on banks 
funding and liquidity policies increases the banks’ FF levels. Furthermore, the results are 
consistent across all sub-samples (IBs and CBs) using both estimation methods. Overall, these 
results suggest that having a stronger risk governance tends to reduce risk-taking, increasing 
the bank’s FF.   
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3.4.2.3 SSB effectiveness and FF 
Panel B in Table 3.6 shows the IBs results with the effects of their SSB characteristics on 
their FF. We find that SSBSIZE (β = 0.225, p < 0.05) and SSBMULTI (β = 0.697, p < 0.10) 
have a positive effect on IBs’ FFIs. These findings are supported by the resource dependence 
theory and reputation hypothesis, whereby a board is more efficient by having more expert 
outsiders in Islamic banking and Shari’ah law. Members with multi-memberships have more 
experience, as they can learn about other firms’ strategies and managerial systems (Carpenter 
& Westphal, 2001). Mollah & Zaman (2015) also find similar results for SSBSIZE and 
Islamic banks’ performances when Shari’ah advisors have supervisory roles. Table 3.6 
(Columns 5-6) also presents the results testing for SSB effectiveness after aggregating all 
measures of SSB. The results are consistent with our main regressions and show a positive (β 
= 0.237) and significant (p < 0.05) association between SSB effectiveness and the IBs’ FF 
positions. Overall, the results of the SSB characteristics support each other, as more demand 
for Shari’ah expertise from members increases the number of members on the board. A bank 
may seek to raise the number of board seats to bring in more expertise. Overall, the additional 
governance layer that SSB provides plays a crucial role in assuring investors’ and depositors’ 
interests, and in enhancing client trust in banks, thus leading to the increased FF.  
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Table 3.6  Regression results on banks' governance & banks’ financial flexibility 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Panel A: Full Sample  Panel B: Islamic Banks Panel C: Conventional Banks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES OLS Tobit OLS Tobit OLS Tobit OLS Tobit 
           
BODSIZE 0.068** 0.086** -0.078* -0.127** -0.078* -0.126** 0.104*** 0.147*** 
 (0.029) (0.037) (0.045) (0.055) (0.042) (0.056) (0.033) (0.040) 
BODIND -0.035 -0.001 -0.33 -0.444 -0.0962 -0.171 0.074 0.162 
 (0.197) (0.239) (0.321) (0.357) (0.289) (0.339) (0.324) (0.349) 
RCE 0.300** 0.358** 0.449** 0.425* 0.501** 0.488** 0.372** 0.473** 
 (0.143) (0.182) (0.197) (0.219) (0.198) (0.220) (0.179) (0.238) 
SSBSIZE    0.163* 0.225**      
    (0.091) (0.108)      
SSBQUAL    -0.468 -0.564      
    (0.391) (0.445)      
SSBMULTI    0.646** 0.697*      
    (0.321) (0.359)      
SSB-Effectiveness      0.188* 0.237**   
      (0.108) (0.117)   
CEO-Duality 0.365* 0.416        
 (0.191) (0.267)        
MANOWN 0.391 0.456 0.259 0.249 0.103 0.096 -0.322 -0.53 
 (0.566) (0.691) (0.807) (0.746) (0.837) (0.727) (0.796) (1.037) 
AGE -0.001 -0.001 -0.018*** -0.024*** -0.012** -0.015** 0.001 0.001 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) 
LOGTA 0.011 0.028 -0.155 -0.216* -0.168 -0.220* 0.026 0.061 
 (0.063) (0.085) (0.112) (0.124) (0.106) (0.120) (0.093) (0.119) 
GROWTHOPP 1.240*** 1.522** 0.783 0.832 0.897* 1.05 2.818** 2.971** 
 (0.473) (0.653) (0.584) (0.686) (0.531) (0.652) (1.205) (1.436) 
ROAA -0.187** -0.252** -0.349*** -0.453*** -0.372*** -0.477*** 0.103 0.138 
 (0.073) (0.103) (0.085) (0.106) (0.083) (0.106) (0.111) (0.138) 
RISK -0.426*** -0.556*** -0.383*** -0.480*** -0.345*** -0.433*** -1.282*** -1.622*** 
 (0.072) (0.106) (0.095) (0.102) (0.090) (0.101) (0.258) (0.317) 
TIER1 0.019** 0.024** 0.038*** 0.048*** 0.039*** 0.048*** -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.017) 
  
81 
 
 
Table 3.6 (Continue) 
 
 
 
  Panel A: Full Sample  Panel B: Islamic Banks 
Panel C: Conventional 
Banks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES OLS Tobit OLS Tobit OLS Tobit OLS Tobit 
           
COSTEFF -0.014** -0.017*** -0.035*** -0.046*** -0.036*** -0.047*** -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) 
ISLAMIC 0.218* 0.266*        
 (0.117) (0.154)        
LOGGDPPC -0.324*** -0.422*** -0.552*** -0.672*** -0.423*** -0.544*** -0.149 -0.171 
 (0.092) (0.125) (0.167) (0.181) (0.138) (0.159) (0.123) (0.164) 
GDPGROW
TH 0.017 0.029 0.009 0.028 0.008 0.025 -0.022 -0.024 
 (0.016) (0.018) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) 
GOVERME
NT-E 0.346** 0.428** 0.394* 0.434* 0.355* 0.390 0.492** 0.550** 
 (0.157) (0.191) (0.203) (0.253) (0.203) (0.254) (0.216) (0.258) 
INFL -0.033 -0.035 0.002 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.033 -0.033 
 (0.021) (0.029) (0.039) (0.045) (0.039) (0.044) (0.028) (0.038) 
HHI -3.280*** -4.116*** -4.352** -5.490*** -3.424** -4.531*** -1.610 -1.912 
 (0.762) (0.991) (1.796) (1.754) (1.623) (1.657) (1.078) (1.457) 
DIR -0.236*** -0.298*** -0.200*** -0.233*** -0.170** -0.206** -0.113 -0.135 
 (0.046) (0.064) (0.074) (0.089) (0.070) (0.083) (0.071) (0.092) 
LEGAL -0.548*** -0.692*** -0.109 -0.13 0.119 0.153 -0.867*** -0.993** 
 (0.197) (0.253) (0.360) (0.383) (0.310) (0.357) (0.317) (0.395) 
Constant 5.151*** 6.083*** 11.64*** 14.93*** 10.71*** 13.88*** 0.416 -0.149 
 (1.296) (1.697) (2.429) (2.527) (2.254) (2.328) (2.053) (2.522) 
           
YEAR 
EFFECTS YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 295 295 126 126 126 126 191 191 
R2/Pseudo 0.307 0.121 0.519 0.271 0.50 0.25 0.49 0.202 
log 
likelihood  -369.7  -126.8  -129  -223 
         
Note: The table presents regression results for banks’ governance structure and Financial Flexibility Index (FFI) for all samples for the 
period 2009-2015. FFI is our financial flexibility index: An ordinary variable [0,3], indicating different levels of financial flexibility 
(Appendix 1). BODSIZE is the total number of BOD members. BODIND is % independent non-executive directors in the BOD. RCE is 
dummy variable take value of 1 if the bank has dedicated risk committee and 0 otherwise. SSBSIZE is the total numbers of Shari’ah advisors 
on the board. SSBQUAL is % Shari’ah advisors with financial qualifications in the SSB. SSBMULTI is % Shari’ah advisors in SSB serving 
two or more additional (outside) firms. SSB-effectiveness is factor analysis eigenvalue obtained from three SSB characteristics mentioned 
before. CEO-Duality is dummy variable takes value of 1 if the CEO and the chairman of the board is the same person, and 0 otherwise 
MANOWN is the insider ownership measured by % shares held by executive directors to total shares. AGE is the difference between the 
sample year and the year in which the bank was established. LOGTA is the bank’s size measured by natural logarithm of total assets. 
GROWTHOPP is banks growth opportunities measured by Tobins’ Q (Equity MV plus liability BV divided by asset BV). ROAA is return 
on average assets. RISK is the bank return volatility measured by the SD of return on average assets. TIER 1 is banks’ capital ratio measured 
by Core capital / Risk weighted assets. COSTEFF is the bank cost efficiency measured by cost/net income. ISLAMIC is unity if the bank 
is Islamic, 0 otherwise. LOGGDPPC is the country GDP per capita measured by Natural logarithm of GDP per capita. GDPGROWTH is 
the GDP growth rate, GOVERNMENT-E is the government effectiveness. INFL is the annual rate of inflation. HHI is the Hirschman-
Herfindahl Index measures bank market concentration. HHI is calculated as the square sum of the ratio of total assets of each bank-year to 
total assets of all banks each year. It has a value between zero and one. Higher HHI shows higher bank concentration. DIR is the deposit 
Interest Rate. LEGAL (legal system) is religiosity proxy which take value of 0 if the country not using Shari’ah law, 1 for countries combing 
both Shari’ah law and other legal system, and 2 for countries with only shari’ah law. Models (1, 3,5 and 7) use FFI as the dependent variable 
and adopt robust pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) technique. Model (2, 4, 6 and 8) use FFI dependent variables and adopt Tobit 
regression as robustness check to control for censored nature of the dependent variable. We exclude CEO-Duality from IBs and CBs 
samples due to the shortage variation in the values. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; 
***p < 0.01. 
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3.4.3  Robustness checks 
3.4.3.1 Endogeneity  
Previous governance literature raises a concern about potential simultaneity and/or 
endogeneity problems. Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) declare that corporate governance 
empirical studies are complicated by the fact that “almost all variables of interests are 
endogenous” (p.8). Of particular concern in this paper is the possibility of reverse causality 
between corporate governance mechanisms and FF positions. Therefore, we assume that 
BODSIZE, BODIND, RCE, and SSB-Effectiveness are endogenous variables that might 
affect our results. We also assume that our banks-specific control variables can be affected by 
the FF positions; thus, we consider them as endogenous variables.28 To control for 
endogeneity, we employ two techniques. First, consistent with the literature (i.e., Ivashina, 
2009 and Fields et al., 2012), we use the lagged variables technique to control for reverse 
causality. In addition, following Wintoki et al. (2012), we use dynamic panel GMM estimator 
to alleviate endogeneity problems. Wintoki et al. (2012) highlight that the GMM estimator 
takes into consideration the dynamic natures of internal governance options to introduce valid 
and strong instruments that address unobserved heterogeneity and simultaneity.  
 
Table 3.7 shows the results for FFI (Equation: 1), where we regress FFI on the one-year 
lagged value of BOD, RC, and SSB monitoring mechanisms and banks-specific control 
variables. The first technique results are presented in Models 1-3 for the full sample, IBs, and 
CBs, respectively. Different estimation methods, GMM, are also included in columns 4-6. 
The results of both estimators are consistent with the other applied estimations presented in 
table 3.6. More interestingly, we find that after we control for endogeneity, the RCE has no 
significant effect on the IBs FF, showing that the committee (i.e., SSB) that considers the 
costumers moral and religious beliefs is more important for IBs. This also could indicate that 
IBs FF leads them to create RC to mitigate the risk, possibly because IBs with low FFs seek 
to strengthen their risk governance by creating RCs, which help reduce risk-taking. To check 
the validity of our GMM estimations, we report a number of specification tests. First, the first-
order serial correlation (AR(1)) shows significant results which mean that we can reject the 
null hypothesis, confirming that the residuals in first differences are correlated. We also report 
the second-order correlation (AR(2)) and Sargan test of over-identification restrictions. The 
AR(2) test yields a p-value of 0.738, 0.638, and 0.306 for full, IBs, and CBs respectively. This 
means that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation of second differences. 
                                                     
28 We exclude the bank age of our endogeneity assumption as number of previous studies consider the firm age as 
exogenous variable with risk taking.   
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Also, the Sargan results show that we cannot reject the hypothesis that our instruments are 
valid. Furthermore, table 3.7 reveals the exogeneity tests of a subset of our instruments. The 
results of this test are 0.232, 0.216 and 0.657 for full, IBs, and CBs, respectively, showing 
that the additional subset of instruments (as lagged differences) are exogenous.    
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Table 3.7 Robustness check: relationship between banks’ governance and banks’ financial flexibility after control for endogeneity 
  Full  IBs CBs Full  IBs CBs 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Tobit lag(t-1) of independent and control variables GMM 
FFI (t-1)    0.235*** 0.207** 0.126 
    (0.086) (0.100) (0.096) 
FFI (t-2)    0.089  -0.106     (0.083)  (0.091) 
BODSIZE 0.093** -0.170*** 0.112** 0.136** -0.099* 0.133***  (0.041) (0.059) (0.044) (0.065) (0.060) (0.051) 
BODIND 0.081 -0.234 0.362 0.410 -0.248 0.457  (0.267) (0.368) (0.400) (0.340) (0.380) (0.403) 
RCE 0.418** 0.153 1.028*** 0.589** 0.331 0.705**  (0.197) (0.224) (0.258) (0.286) (0.239) (0.329) 
SSB-Effectiveness  0.293**   0.295**    (0.131)   (0.134)  
CEO-Duality 0.503*   0.688    (0.288)   (0.478)   
MANOWN 0.418 -0.108 -0.677 2.599** -0.056 -0.108  (0.787) (0.837) (1.174) (1.228) (0.917) (1.607) 
AGE 0.001 -0.006 0.010 -0.004 -0.017** 0.012*  (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) 
LOGTA 0.006 -0.255* -0.030 0.123 -0.006 -0.026  (0.097) (0.132) (0.132) (0.136) (0.127) (0.151) 
GROWTHOPP 1.672** 1.233 4.099** -0.250 0.437 1.196  (0.808) (0.800) (1.590) (0.936) (0.743) (2.125) 
ROAA -0.269** -0.425*** -0.005 -0.241* -0.320*** 0.262*  (0.112) (0.114) (0.148) (0.141) (0.108) (0.159) 
RISK -0.401*** -0.376*** -1.473*** -0.254* -0.206** -0.784**  (0.112) (0.107) (0.375) (0.151) (0.104) (0.378) 
TIER1 0.031*** 0.061*** -0.034* 0.032** 0.024* 0.022  (0.011) (0.013) (0.019) (0.015) (0.013) (0.025) 
COSTEFF -0.025*** -0.048*** -0.037*** -0.021** -0.026*** 0.007  (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.007) (0.012) 
ISLAMIC 0.355**   0.433    (0.178)   (0.265)   
LOGGDPPC -0.469*** -0.665*** -0.425** -0.212 -0.336** -0.057  (0.146) (0.189) (0.188) (0.174) (0.151) (0.195) 
GDPGROWTH 0.013 -0.012 -0.009 -0.009 -0.003 -0.040  (0.022) (0.025) (0.028) (0.027) (0.024) (0.029) 
GOVERMENT-E 0.531** 0.762*** 0.742** 0.389* 0.251 0.748*** 
 (0.219) (0.285) (0.289) (0.216) (0.250) (0.270) 
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  Full  IBs CBs Full  IBs CBs 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Tobit lag(t-1) of independent and control variables GMM 
INFL -0.059 -0.047 -0.041 0.015 0.012 0.050 
 (0.037) (0.055) (0.046) (0.040) (0.055) (0.043) 
HHI -4.309*** -4.016** -4.109** -0.007 -1.598 -1.251 
 (1.167) (1.794) (1.672) (1.523) (1.840) (1.740) 
DIR -0.269*** -0.090 -0.222** -0.153 -0.045 -0.062 
 (0.077) (0.100) (0.104) (0.098) (0.097) (0.110) 
LEGAL -0.598** 0.477 -1.217*** -0.583* 0.302 -1.318*** 
 (0.299) (0.389) (0.448) (0.350) (0.421) (0.485) 
Constant 6.425*** 14.85*** 5.272* 0.896 6.681*** -0.824 
 (1.885) (2.534) (2.721) (2.686) (2.292) (3.447) 
       
YEAR EFFECTS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 249 106 161 216 112 140 
R2/Pseudo 0.122 0.262 0.226    
log likelihood -317.5 -109.4 -184.63    
AR (1) test (p-value)    0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR (2) test (p-value)    0.738 0.638 0.306 
Sargan test of over-identification (p-value)    0.184 0.26 0.631 
Diff-in- Sargan test of exogeneity (p-value)    0.232 0.216 0.657 
       
Note: The table presents regression results for banks’ governance structure and Financial Flexibility Index (FFI) for all samples for the period 2009-2015 after controlling for endogeneity. FFI is our financial flexibility 
index: An ordinary variable [0,3], indicating different levels of financial flexibility (Appendix 1). FFI(t-1) and FFI(t-2) is the lone year and two years lagged respectively. BODSIZE is the total number of BOD 
members. BODIND is % independent non-executive directors in the BOD. RCE is dummy variable take value of 1 if the bank has dedicated risk committee and 0 otherwise. SSBSIZE is the total numbers of Shari’ah 
advisors on the board. SSBQUAL is % Shari’ah advisors with financial qualifications in the SSB. SSBMULTI is % Shari’ah advisors in SSB serving two or more additional (outside) firms. CEO-Duality is dummy 
variable takes value of 1 if the CEO and the chairman of the board is the same person, and 0 otherwise MANOWN is the insider ownership measured by % shares held by executive directors to total shares. AGE is 
the difference between the sample year and the year in which the bank was established. LOGTA is the bank’s size measured by natural logarithm of total assets. GROWTHOPP is banks growth opportunities measured 
by Tobins’ Q (Equity MV plus liability BV divided by asset BV). ROAA is return on average assets. RISK is the bank return volatility measured by the SD of return on average assets. TIER 1 is banks’ capital ratio 
measured by Core capital / Risk weighted assets. COSTEFF is the bank cost efficiency measured by cost/net income. ISLAMIC is unity if the bank is Islamic, 0 otherwise. LOGGDPPC is the country GDP per capita 
measured by Natural logarithm of GDP per capita. GDPGROWTH is the GDP growth rate. GOVERNMENT-E is the government effectiveness. INFL is the annual rate of inflation. HHI is the Hirschman-Herfindahl 
Index measures bank market concentration. HHI is calculated as the square sum of the ratio of total assets of each bank-year to total assets of all banks each year. It has a value between zero and one. Higher HHI 
shows higher bank concentration. DIR is the deposit Interest Rate. LEGAL (legal system) is religiosity proxy which take value of 0 if the country not using Shari’ah law, 1 for countries combing both Shari’ah law and 
other legal system, and 2 for countries with only shari’ah law. Models (1-3) regress the main explanatory and control variables as one year lagged value of the FFI adopting Tobit technique. Model (4-6) use FFI 
dependent variables and adopt GMM regression as robustness check to control for all endogeneity types. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. 
Table 3.7 (Continued)
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3.4.3.2 Extending the analysis sections 
We use two alternative measures of FF. First, we add five other ratios that are used in 
Doumpos et al. (2016)’s study in addition to our three primary ratios (Stable funding, liquid 
assets to total assets, and Z-score). These are capital adequacy ratio, loan losses provision 
ratio, cost-to-income ratio, liquid assets to deposits and short-term funding ratio, and 
profitability ratio. Doumpos et al. (2016) use these ratios to create an overall financial 
strength index for banks based on CAMEL framework categories. Following our previous 
mechanism to create a FF index (see Appendix A), we create FFI2 to measure each banks FF 
position. We also use a different measure of FF, liquid assets to total assets (FF-LA). We 
create a dummy variable for this proxy, taking a value of 1 if the value of that proxy was 
higher than the mean value of the full sample in the same year, 0 otherwise.  
 
Table 3.8 presents the regression, examining the relationship between the corporate 
governance structure (BOD, RCE and SSB) on the banks’ FFs using the two different 
measures. The full sample results are presented in Models 1-2. Models 3-4 are for the IBs 
(Panel B), and Models 5-6 are for the CBs (Panel C). We use Tobit model for FFI2 across all 
samples, and we use the Probit model to control for the binary dependent variable (FF- LA). 
We find that the results still hold across all our main explanatory variables. Interestingly, the 
results using both new measures for FF show that BODIND has a negative and significant 
effect on the IBs’ FFs, whereas it has a positive impact on the CBs’ FFs when the FFI2 is 
used. The RCE results are also consistent with our results after controlling for endogeneity, 
that RCE affects the CBs’ FFs positively across both measures, but it does not affect IBs’ 
FFs. Furthermore, the SSB qualification also has a negative and significant relationship with 
the IBs’ FFs, thus showing that members with financial qualifications take higher risks for 
IBs, resulting in a decrease of their FF.  
 
We also include the G-Index to control for the corporate governance level in each country 
after removing the Government-E. Table 3.8 reports this test, which shows consistent results 
with our main base-line regressions. However, even though the G-Index has no significant 
effect on the FFI2 for the full and CBs samples, it has a significant and positive impact on the 
IBs’ FFI2s.
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Table 3.8 Robustness check: banks’ governance and banks’ financial flexibility using alternative measures of financial flexibility 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Panel A: Full Sample  Panel B: Islamic Banks Panel C: Conventional Banks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES FFI2 FF-LA FFI2 FF-LA FFI2 FF-LA 
       
BODSIZE 0.087** 0.101* -0.152** -0.252** 0.085* 0.148* 
 (0.041) (0.053) (0.075) (0.100) (0.045) (0.081) 
BODIND -0.103 -0.243 -0.982* -1.663** 0.644* -0.912 
 (0.272) (0.354) (0.525) (0.815) (0.384) (0.659) 
RCE 0.566*** 0.638**  0.198   0.169  0.755*** 0.764* 
 (0.210) (0.277) (0.329) (0.466) (0.267) (0.395) 
SSBSIZE    0.190  0.587**   
   (0.154) (0.245)   
SSBQUAL   -0.592 -2.470***   
   (0.623) (0.892)   
SSBMULTI   0.973* 2.688***   
   (0.512) (0.937)   
CEO-Duality 0.742**  0.079      
 (0.313) (0.403)     
MANOWN 1.340*  1.365   0.726  -0.230  1.134   0.750  
 (0.783) (1.126) (1.061) (1.551) (1.162) (1.678) 
AGE -0.013**  0.000  -0.026** -0.039** -0.017***  0.011  
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.011) (0.016) (0.006) (0.013) 
LOGTA 0.163*  0.182  -0.255 -0.872*** 0.632*** 0.677*** 
 (0.096) (0.126) (0.178) (0.283) (0.133) (0.213) 
GROWTHOPP -0.069  0.562   1.421  3.425** -1.757 -7.154*** 
 (0.739) (0.962) (0.964) (1.493) (1.633) (2.344) 
ROAA -0.326*** -0.489*** -0.529*** -0.219 0.523*** -0.513** 
 (0.124) (0.171) (0.164) (0.220) (0.148) (0.226) 
RISK -0.772*** -0.386** -0.597*** -0.863*** -1.604*** -0.415 
 (0.135) (0.160) (0.160) (0.231) (0.345) (0.526) 
TIER1 0.106*** 0.027* 0.097***  0.031  0.111*** 0.047* 
 (0.011) (0.014) (0.017) (0.025) (0.019) (0.028) 
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  Panel A: Full Sample  Panel B: Islamic Banks Panel C: Conventional Banks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES FFI2 FF-LA FFI2 FF-LA FFI2 FF-LA 
       
COSTEFF -0.070*** -0.020** -0.085*** -0.029* -0.055*** -0.010 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.011) (0.015) (0.010) (0.015) 
ISLAMIC 0.368** 0.490**     
 (0.175) (0.228)     
LOGGDPPC -0.886*** -0.379* -1.533*** -1.111*** -1.061*** -0.432 
 (0.162) (0.212) (0.288) (0.423) (0.214) (0.314) 
GDPGROWTH 0.054**  -0.006 0.057* -0.024  0.013  0.076** 
 (0.021) (0.028) (0.030) (0.039) (0.026) (0.033) 
INFL -0.064* -0.183*** -0.063 -0.073 -0.097** -0.172 
 (0.034) (0.047) (0.066) (0.086) (0.042) (0.070) 
HHI -5.352*** -0.604 -7.972*** -9.526** -4.844***  2.367  
 (1.209) (1.526) (2.378) (3.802) (1.726) (2.180) 
DIR -0.413*** -0.127 -0.308** -0.273 -0.441*** -0.163 
 (0.073) (0.097) (0.126) (0.181) (0.102) (0.146) 
G-Index  0.479  -0.506 1.429***  0.507   0.333  -0.300 
 (0.309) (0.417) (0.522) (0.783) (0.436) (0.581) 
LEGAL -0.675** -0.403  0.246  -0.574 -1.189** -0.707 
 (0.288) (0.387) (0.529) (0.809) (0.496) (0.672) 
Constant 15.301***  2.200  28.540*** 27.500*** 10.440***  1.089  
 (2.126) (2.762) (3.914) (6.708) (3.054) (4.275) 
       
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 286 300 119 131 189 203 
R-squared 0.226 0.22 0.2887 0.343 0.264 0.35 
Wald Chi2 236.98 88.44 129.76 74.62 179.17 73.68 
Log likelihood -405.79 -162 -159.85 -59.61 -249 -91.404 
Note: The table presents regression results for banks’ governance and different measures of bank's Financial Flexibility Index (FFI2 and Liquid assets) for all full and sub samples for the period 2009-2015. FFI2 and FF-LA are other proxies for banks financial flexibility FFI2 is an ordinary 
variable [0,8], indicating different levels of financial flexibility (see Appendix 1). FF-LA takes value of 1 if their measure is higher than the mean value of the full sample for the same year, otherwise 0. BODSIZE is the total number of BOD members. BODIND is % independent non-
executive directors in the BOD. RCE is dummy variable take value of 1 if the bank has dedicated risk committee and 0 otherwise. SSBSIZE is the total numbers of Shari’ah advisors on the board. SSBQUAL is % Shari’ah advisors with financial qualifications in the SSB. SSBMULTI is 
% Shari’ah advisors in SSB serving two or more additional (outside) firms. SSB-effectiveness is factor analysis eigenvalue obtained from three SSB characteristics mentioned before. CEO-Duality is dummy variable takes value of 1 if the CEO and the chairman of the board is the same 
person, and 0 otherwise. MANOWN is the insider ownership measured by % shares held by executive directors to total shares. AGE is the difference between the sample year and the year in which the bank was established. LOGTA is the bank’s size measured by natural logarithm of total 
assets. GROWTHOPP is banks growth opportunities measured by Tobins’ Q (Equity MV plus liability BV divided by asset BV). ROAA is return on average assets. RISK is the bank return volatility measured by the SD of return on average assets. TIER 1 is banks’ capital ratio measured 
by Core capital / Risk weighted assets. COSTEFF is the bank cost efficiency measured by cost/net income. ISLAMIC is unity if the bank is Islamic, 0 otherwise. LOGGDPPC is the country GDP per capita measured by Natural logarithm of GDP per capita. GDPGROWTH is the GDP 
growth rate, INFL is the annual rate of inflation. HHI is the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index measures bank market concentration. HHI is calculated as the square sum of the ratio of total assets of each bank-year to total assets of all banks each year. It has a value between zero and one. Higher 
HHI shows higher bank concentration. DIR is the deposit Interest Rate. G-Index is country corporate governance quality measured by six indicators. LEGAL (legal system) is religiosity proxy which take value of 0 if the country not using Shari’ah law, 1 for countries combing both 
Shari’ah law and other legal system, and 2 for countries with only shari’ah law. Model (1,3 and 5) use FFI2 dependent variables and adopt Tobit regression to control for censored nature of the dependent variable. Model (2, 4,and 6) use FF-LA dependent variables and adopt Probit 
regression to control for Binary nature of the dependent variable. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. 
Table 3.8 (continued
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3.5 Conclusion 
This study examines how governance structure differences between Islamic and conventional 
banks affect their financial flexibility positions. More specifically, the study investigates how 
board of directors’ structures and its sub-committee (specifically the risk committee) affect 
the financial flexibility of conventional and Islamic banks. Furthermore, the additional 
governance layer of Islamic banks, the SSB, is also studied. The sample consists of 65 listed 
banks from 11 Middle East and North Africa countries between 2009-2015. The results of the 
full sample suggest that large board of directors size increases the banks financial flexibility. 
This implies that large board size enhances the BOD advising and monitoring roles, which in 
turn help in making appropriate decisions and preventing manager from exploiting the bank 
financial resources, thus the banks financial flexibility should be enhanced. The BOD roles 
can be made to be more efficient by adjusting BOD structure (Boone et al., 2007; Coles et al., 
2008; Linck et al., 2008). Yun (2008) and Caprio et al. (2011) argue that an effective 
corporate governance guides efficient financial policies. Furthermore, La Porta et al. (1997) 
argue that an effective board might inhibit managers from exploiting the firm’s financial 
resources and maintain a good financial reserve position. As proposed by agency and 
resources dependence theories, BOD that provides effective monitoring and advisory roles 
can help in making efficient decisions toward financial policies. Based on the perspectives of 
the resource dependence theory, large board size provides access to external sources in other 
firms and bring better advice to the firm’ management which in turn enhances the firm 
decision making process (Dalton et al., 1999).     
Comparing between IBs and CBs, the study reveals a positive relationship between board size 
and financial flexibility for conventional banks. However, for Islamic banks, board size is 
negatively associated with financial flexibility. This implies that large board size is only 
effective for CB, whereas small board size is relatively more effective for IBs. The arguments 
that were discussed section 3.2.2 might explain the differences in BOD size effect between 
CBs and IBs. Specifically, a lack of Shari’ah experts on the BOD, BOD’s motivations to take 
greater risks, and the level of a bank’s complexity can make large board size on IBs less 
effective. Thus, the board abilities to set financial policies in compliance with IBs clients’ 
interests, and monitor the management from exploiting the reserve funds would be reduced. 
Accordingly, large board for IBs will not be able to outweigh their costs, which in turn might 
affect the bank performance negatively, which can cause depositors and investors to withdraw 
their money, thus lowering their FF. This study provides evidences that dissimilarities in 
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governance structures, business models, and complexity between the two types of banks are 
responsible for the differences in effectiveness of their boards of directors regarding financial 
flexibility. This is consistent with (Mollah et al., 2017a and Mollah et al., 2017b), who found 
differences in the effects of governance strucutre on risk-taking between CBs and IBs.  
In term of independent directors on the board, the study shows insignificant associations 
between the proportion of outsider directors on the board and banks financial flexibility for 
both banking systems. This findings are consistent with other studies (e.g. Adams and 
Mehran, 2012), who find no significant relationship between outsider on the board and 
financial performances under very high regulated sectors. The reason for this might be 
because of regulatory restrictions in the financial sectors, that limit the roles of outsider 
directors. Regulators provides extensive regulations toward stability of financial institutions, 
which makes monitoring to be continued in the financial sector (Pathan, 2009).  
Similarly, as regulators recommend the creation of a separate risk committee to monitor and 
mitigate risk-taking in banks, we study this suggestion and find that a dedicated board risk 
committee can play a positive role in affecting both conventional and Islamic bank’s financial 
flexibility. This indicates that the existence of dedicated risk committee that monitors and 
mitigates risk-taking regarding funding and liquidity policies can enhance banks financial 
flexibility. The findings are consistent with Ames et al. (2018) who find that higher financial 
strength rating is associated with board risk committee existance.  
Moreover, as an additional governance layer of Islamic banks, the Shari’ah supervisory board 
has shown to have a positive effect on the banks’ financial flexibility positions. Particularly, 
Shari’ah supervisory board size and fraction of members with multi-directorships positively 
impact the financial flexibility. Mollah & Zaman (2015) also find similar results for SSB size 
and performances of IBs. Besides, the findings are supported theoretically by the resources 
dependence theory and reputation hypothesis, whereby large shai’ah supervisory board size 
tend to have more expert outsiders in Islamic banking and Shari’ah laws, which make SSB 
more effective. Members with multi-memberships conduct effective monitoring because of 
their experiences, which can enhance IBs clients trust and bring more depositors, which in 
turn increase the IBs financial flexibility. SSB results support the argument that traditional 
governance mechanism (i.e. shareholder view) is dominated in the IB section besides the 
adoption of the additional layer SSB as governance mechanism in meeting other stakeholder 
interests.  
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Our evidence shows that Islamic banks’ governance structures enhances financial flexibility 
by favouring conservative funding and liquidity policies. This is supported by our results, 
which show a positive association between Islamic bank and financial flexibility. One reason 
of why IBs might reserve higher financial flexibility level is because of the Shari’ah 
restrictions on IBs access to external short wholesales funds. Moreover, this study brings new 
evidence to the banking industry by showing that Islamic banks are considered simple firms 
that need less advice from their boards while conventional banks are complex, requiring more 
advice from their boards. This study provides useful knowledge that can be used by regulators 
and policymakers in the banking industry. Future research can extend the investigation of 
corporate governance effect on financial flexibility by employing a global sample. Further 
research also needs to be developed in this particular area to investigate the effectiveness of 
risk committees by considering their characteristics and their effect on banks’ financial 
flexibilities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
92 
 
Chapter 4. Do Banks Effectively Manage their Risks? The Role of Risk 
Governance 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Risk-taking has traditionally been a serious issue in the financial industry, and the recent 
financial crisis of 2008 raised its profile significantly. Shareholders are interested in the high 
risk-taking behaviour that can be taken by the management with the aim of maximising their 
wealth. However, in practice, high risk-taking does not necessarily mean high returns unless 
the risk-taking action is undertaken effectively. Nevertheless, an effective board can protect 
the shareholder’s interests by preventing the management from taking excessive risks for their 
own benefit rather than for shareholders’. Directors may also worry about the reputational and 
monetary loss which can be a consequence of a lawsuit, which is quite likely happen if a bank 
takes high risks (Sun and Liu, 2014). Therefore, a highly effective board may impose 
constraints on management risk-taking in order to protect their reputation. As a result, an 
effective board can mitigate risk-taking.  
 
Research on the relationship between board governance effectiveness and risk-taking is still 
limited, and existing studies provide inconclusive results. Minton et al. (2014) find that 
having independent directors with financial experience, as an indicator of a high-quality 
board, leads to an increase in a bank’s risk-taking. Pathan (2009) concludes that stronger 
board is negatively associated with bank’s risk-taking. However, other researchers have found 
no relationship between board quality and risk-taking. Notably, Erkens et al. (2012) document 
that independent members on the board do not affect banks’ risk-taking. Also, Sila et al. 
(2016) find no significant association between board diversity and risk-taking.  
Interestingly, boards oversee risk through their committees. Sun and Liu (2014) find that 
banks with busy members and short tuner audit committees tend to undertake higher risks. 
However, In the wake of the recent financial crisis, many economists, public policy makers, 
regulators and scholars have strived to put in place the implementation of enterprise risk 
management (ERM), i.e., addressing all the risks comprehensively and coherently (Bromiley 
et al. 2015), to enhance the governance of the risk management system (Lundqvist, 2015). 
This comprises a dedicated committee (termed a board risk committee)29 that is specifically 
                                                     
29 In practice, firms can form their risk committees either at the management level or at the board level. In this study, all risk 
committees refer to the one formed at the “board level”. We only consider banks are having a stand-alone board-level risk 
committee if their annual reports include the term of “risk” in their board committee such as “Board Risk Committee”, “Risk 
Policy Committee”, “Risk Management Committee”, or “Risk and Assets Committee”. 
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responsible for the bank’s risk assessment and management. The significance of the board 
risk committee (RC) is that it is explicitly instituted to manage and monitor risks issues. This 
critical ‘risk supervising’ function of the board risk committee has received much attention 
from both academics and practitioners as a result of the crisis. Another important risk 
governance mechanism that has been recently assigned by the regulators is the position of 
Chief Risk Officer (CRO). Many banks have adopted the appointment of a CRO as the person 
responsible for risk management overall. Although the RC and the CRO have been proposed 
to bear the accountability for the oversight of risk management, there are only few studies, i.e. 
(Lingel and Sheedy, 2012; Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013; Tao and Hutchinson, 2013), which 
provide evidence on how these two mechanisms affect a bank’s risk management. Besides, 
these studies only investigate the influences of risk governance on specific type of risks (e.g. 
market risk and credit risk). However, according to the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (BCBS) regulation, the rigorous corporate governance is responsible for all the 
material risks banks face (e.g., credit, market, liquidity, operational risks) (BCBS, 2001; 
2008b). The Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) and previous literature also consider 
these risk perspectives as major risks that financial institutions encounter (IFSB, 2005; Sun 
and Chang, 2011; Iqbal, 2013; Acharya and Mora, 2015). Therefore, risk governance’s 
influence should be spread out over a great deal more than just specific risks that the existing 
literature has studied. Therefore, this paper aims to provide further investigations concerning 
this research gap.  
In particular, first, this study investigates whether risk governance mechanisms (board RC and 
CRO) have a relationship with the risk-taking of banks, focusing on five critical risk 
perspectives in terms of banking activities: market risk, credit risk, operational risk, liquidity 
risk, and insolvency risk. Given that regulators have been putting pressure on banks to 
strengthen their corporate governance-related to risk management monitoring since the 
financial crisis, we take 2009 to 2015 as our sample period. We employ a sample of 28 CBs 
and 37 IBs pertaining to this period and found a negative association between the risk 
governance index and all five investigated bank risk perspectives. Our findings suggest that 
board RC and CRO mechanisms might be effective in lowering all aspects of banks’ risk-
taking. Second, this study is the first to take into consideration the risk governance 
mechanisms of IBs; these have different operational systems, and their governance structure 
is different from that of the CBs.30 However, to our knowledge, only one previous study, 
                                                     
30 Islamic banks have to be compliant with Shari’ah principles and have additional governance layer, so-called 
Shari’ah Supervisory board. 
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Mollah et al. (2017a), investigate the different relationships between board governance and 
risk-taking across both Conventional and Islamic banks. They find that high-quality board 
governance leads to higher risk-taking in Islamic banks as compared to Conventional banks 
— due to the IBs more complicated operational systems and their different governance 
structure. Nevertheless, their study do not consider how a sub-committee responsible for risk-
management monitoring can affect the banks’ risk-taking. Thus, this study will provide 
additional work on the impacts of corporate governance mechanisms on risk-taking for both 
types of banks by investigating the risk governance’s role in affecting banks risk-taking. 
Overall, we find that the impacts of risk governance mechanisms within IBs are relatively 
similar to those created by the risk governance mechanisms within CBs across all aspects of 
risk except for that of credit risks — for which the effects virtually disappear. In other words, 
board RCs and CROs in IBs seem not as influential to credit risks as those in CBs. Third, our 
study examines whether risk governance mechanisms (board RCs and CROs) moderate the 
relationship between bank risk-taking and performance. Through this investigation, the study 
can provide indications about the role of risk governance on the effectiveness of bank risk 
management. To the best of our knowledge, no study has investigated this important matter. 
Overall, we find stronger risk governance has a positive influence on risk management 
effectiveness (i.e., this is the positive relationship between performance and risk-taking). 
However, this improvement in terms of risk-taking management which is caused by stronger 
risk governance is almost undetectable in IBs.  
 
This study contributes to the previous literature in several ways. First, it extends the limited 
literature on the relationship between the effectiveness of the board of directors and risk-
taking. Previous studies (e.g., Pathan, 2009; Erkens et al., 2012; Minton et al., 2014; Sila et 
al., 2016) take only board characteristics (e.g. BOD size and independence) into account 
when examining the board quality’s effects on bank risk-taking. However, in our study, we 
focus on two particular mechanisms of risk governance, i.e. the board risk committee and the 
Chief Risk Officer. The rationale for this focus is their direct roles in assessing and 
monitoring bank risks and risk management per se, and the growing literature on the role in 
risk governance mechanisms of both RCs and CROs. Previous studies in this area such as 
(Aebi et al., 2012; Baxter et al., 2013; Al‐Hadi et al., 2016; Nahar et al., 2016; Ames et al., 
2018) investigate the role of both/or one of these risk governance mechanism in monitoring 
and affecting the firms’ performance, value, financial strength rating, and risk disclosure. 
Despite such trends, only a few studies investigate how risk governance might affect risk-
taking (Lingel and Sheedy, 2012; Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013; Hines and Peters, 2015). These 
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studies only focus on specific risk-taking perspectives, whereas our study takes a 
comprehensive picture of risk-taking by looking at five main risk aspects: market, credit, 
operational, liquidity, and insolvency risks. As a methodological contribution, our study not 
only examines these five risk aspects separately but also constructs one single index that 
includes all of them using factor analysis approach. Furthermore, in creating our risk 
governance index, unlike Ellul and Yerramilli (2013)’s study, we consider more RC 
characteristics when capturing the board RC oversight role in risk management. Another 
contribution of our study is the investigation of the matter in relation to IBs; this has not been 
covered before. Specifically, we examine and contrast the findings across both banking 
systems, CBs and IBs. Finally, unlike prior studies, we are not only interested in how risk 
governance influences risk-taking, but also, we attempt to explore whether the risk 
governance mechanisms can improve the effectiveness of bank risk management. Since 
greater scrutiny regarding the risk oversight of board governance has recently been imposed 
by regulators, especially after the financial crisis, it is important to discover how RC and CRO 
can effectively manage and monitor bank risks.      
   
The remained of this paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 provides a review of related 
literature and hypothesis development. The data and the methodology are presented in section 
4.3. Section 4.4 demonstrates the empirical results and discusses them. Section 4.5 concludes 
the paper.  
 
4.2 Literature review and hypothesis development 
4.2.1 Risk Governance and risk-taking 
The 2007-2008 financial crisis motivated many parties (including researchers and 
commissions) to investigate the causes behind it. Recent literature discusses the significant 
influences of risk management on the extent to which firms were affected by the financial 
crisis (Brunnermeier, 2009). In particular, the US financial crisis inquiry commission 
published reports stating that the main reason for the crisis was that some financial firms were 
embedded with many excessive risk-taking strategies. As a result, many changes to the 
pertinent regulations have been made which emphasise the importance of developing and 
enhancing risk management functions. 
 
Previous studies e.g. (Kashyap et al., 2008; Stulz, 2008; Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013; Meidell 
and Kaarbøe, 2017), emphasise the important functions of risk management and the need for 
risk identification as well as the avoidance of excessive risk-taking, as these cannot be 
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managed entirely by external market discipline or supervisory regulators. Meidell and 
Kaarbøe (2017) assure that constructing a risk technology function enhances a firm’s 
decision-making process. Baxter et al. (2013) investigate the determinants of high-quality 
(ERM) of 165 US financial firms from 2006 to 2008, and how ERM affected their risks and 
performances. They find that firms with low-quality enterprise risk management encounter 
higher risks. Regulatory supervision, i.e. (BCBS, 2011), also enhances the roles of risk 
management by forcing financial institutions to put in place a comprehensive risk 
management mechanism. The BCBS defines risk management as a structured approach to the 
recognition and understanding of the risks which may be encountered by institutions and their 
outcomes. Mokni et al. (2015) state that an effective risk management framework can reduce 
bank risks and promote a bank’s ability to compete in the market.  
 
To improve the risk management function, corporate governance codes globally emphasise 
the importance of enhancing the risk governance mechanism. Typically, they recommend 
creating a dedicated board risk committee and assign a Chief Risk Officer to oversee and be 
responsible for the overall risk-taking management of the firms (Brown et al., 2009; 
Lundqvist, 2015). Lundqvist (2015) argues that enterprise risk management encompasses two 
factors, traditional risk management and risk governance mechanisms, with the latter being 
more important than the former. Ames et al. (2018) state that risk governance should integrate 
with firm-wide risk management. Many countries update their corporate governance codes to 
include risk governance practices.31  
 
Other studies assure the important roles of board RCs and CROs in enhancing risk 
management quality. Baxter et al. (2013) find that a higher quality of ERM is associated with 
better corporate governance (including the presence of RCs and CROs). However, a growing 
debate concentrates on whether the board should be fully responsible for risk oversight, or 
whether risk oversight should be assigned to either an Audit Committee (AC) or a dedicated 
Risk Committee (Protiviti, 2011). Many firms have the Audit Committee as the responsible 
                                                     
31 For example, many MENA countries released an amendment of principles related to more effective 
governance mechanisms for both types of banks. These include: The Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (2014, 
Principle 4, Article 78), The Central Bank of Bahrain (2018, Principle 1, Section1), Kuwait Capital Market 
Authority (2013, Principle 5.1), The Qatar Central Bank (2015, Principle 4), The Central Bank of Jordan (2016, 
Article 10), The Central Bank of Egypt (2016, Principle 5, article 5.2.30), The Central Bank of Tunisia (2016), 
The Central Bank of the UAE (2010), and The Palestine Monetary Authority (2014). These amendments note 
that a sub-board committee (i.e. a Risk Committee) explicitly focusing on risk matters can represent a stronger 
governance mechanism, assisting the full board in conducting its responsibility of risk oversight more 
effectively. 
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body for the oversight of risks, based on the argument that AC members possess sufficient 
financial experience to manage the risks. Nevertheless, taking into consideration the 
complexity of the risks that are faced by financial firms and the other responsibilities of AC 
members (i.e., monitoring and processing the financial reports), the latter might not have 
enough time to adequately exert their skills and expertise in order to assess and manage a 
firm’s overall risks (Field et al., 2013). On the other hand, separate board RCs can give more 
effort and time to the investigation and management of firm-wide risks (Brown et al., 2009). 
Andres and Vallelado (2008) state that because of the high exposure to different types of risk 
in the financial sector (e.g. market, credit, liquidity, trading, regulatory, capital, and 
compliance risk), a separate board RC has become more prevalent and popular in this sector. 
Consequently, corporate governance literature start to pay more attention to the Risk 
Committee roles (Aebi et al., 2012; Lingel and Sheedy, 2012; Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013; Al‐
Hadi et al., 2016). 
 
According to the institutional theory, the adoption of risk management practices and policies 
may be driven by the institutional framework within which an organisation operates (Brown 
et al. 2009). Specifically, firms may apply specific governance mechanisms in order to 
monitor specific activities. Our argument is consistent with this theory since we expect that 
specific risk governance mechanisms can enhance a bank’s risk-taking behaviour. 
Specifically, the existence of a board Risk Committee and a Chief Risk Officer can enhance 
all aspects of a bank’s risk-taking. Therefore, we build our hypothesis based on the idea that 
banks can use a board Risk Committee along with a CRO as a substantive monitoring 
mechanism in order to create positive change within their organisations.   
 
Though previous works in the literature (Laeven & Levine, 2009; Pathan, 2009; Minton et al., 
2014; Mollah et al., 2017) focus on the corporate governance’s (e.g. BOD, CEO, and 
ownership) effects on the control and mitigation of a firm’s risk-taking behaviours, there is 
still a window of opportunity for further investigation of risk governance mechanisms (RCs 
and CROs) in the banking system. A few studies investigate the ways in which risk 
management systems, overall, influence risk-taking decisions. Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) 
construct a risk management index (RMI), which included both board RC and CRO 
dimensions, to measure the risk governance mechanism’s effects on the risk-taking within 
100 of the US’s largest banks in the period 1995-2010. They find that banks with a higher 
RMI have a lower tail risk before crises, lower non-performing loans, and better accounting 
and marking stock performance during crises. Overall, their results suggest that a stronger 
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RMI can mitigate the banks’ risk level. Using a sample of 60 financial institutions over the 
period 2004-2010, Lingel and Sheedy (2012) discover that Risk Committee activities, 
members with risk management expertise in the risk committee, the presence of a CRO in the 
executive team, and a CRO ranked within the highest five paid are determinants of risk 
outcomes. Tao and Hutchinson (2013) investigate the influences of Risk Committees and 
compensation committees on firms’ risk behaviours and found that the compositions of risk 
and compensation committees are positively associated with firm’s market risks. Hines and 
Peters (2015) investigate financial institutions which have a voluntary Risk Committee. The 
results of their study show significant effects from the RCs on risk outcomes. This confirms 
that the creation of an RC reduced the gravity of egregious risk outcomes and used as a 
governance mechanism to monitor the risk activities.  
 
Despite the number of studies on the association between risk governance mechanisms (RCs 
and CROs) and risk-taking, the focus has remained on certain type of risks (e.g. market risks 
and credit risks). Other types of risks (e.g., liquidity and insolvency) have not been 
investigated. In fact, after reviewing the regulations and many banks’ reports, we find that the 
RC’s responsibilities are not only limited to any particular type of risk. Instead, the 
responsibilities refer to the establishment of effective policies and monitoring for all type of 
risks. For instance, the annual report of Ithmaar Bank (2015) indicate that “The primary 
objectives of the Risk Policy Committee are to make recommendations to the Board in 
relation to the Bank’s overall risk appetite and tolerances and the policies within which to 
manage the aforementioned [risks polices]. These policies are defined as credit risk, market 
risk, operational risk and liquidity risk in addition to any other risk category the Bank faces in 
carrying out its activities. The Risk Policy Committee also recommends and monitors the 
Bank’s overall risk management framework which involves developing across all business 
activities and operations policies, internal controls, methods of risk management, compliance 
procedures and methods of reporting to the Board” (p.35). Furthermore, Moore and Brauneis 
(2008) and Schlich and Prybylski (2009) state that the role of a board Risk Committee is to 
monitor and oversee a firm’s comprehensive risk management. Comprehensive risk 
management should focus on, but not be limited to, financial risks, credit risks, market risks, 
operational risks, and liquidity risks. Consequently, this study adds to the literature by 
covering five main risks: market, credit, liquidity, operational, and insolvency, to capture a 
better picture of board RC and CRO influences on bank risks.  
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The board is more sensitive to regulatory compliance regarding the management of risk-
taking (i.e., regulators place more pressure on the board in regard to managing and accessing 
risks), and so the BOD will tend to act more conservatively than the other bodies, so as to 
reduce the legal liability and/or the reputational loss which would result from the bank’s 
failure (Sun and Liu, 2014). Pathan (2009) finds a negative relationship between a strong 
board and risk-taking.32 Other studies (Cheng et al., 2010; Sun and Liu, 2014) find that an 
effective audit committee reduces the market risk at the level of the bank as a whole. Since 
recently the board of directors manage and monitor management’s risk-taking activates 
through its risk committee, it can be argued that an effective board risk committee might also 
act to reduce a bank’s risk-taking activates regarding regulatory compliance. Supporting this 
argument, Ellul and Yerramilli, (2013) find that a stronger risk management index, 
encompassing the Risk Committee and the Chief Risk Officer, lowers a bank’s market risks.  
Consequently, based on the findings of previous literature and the arguments above, we 
hypothesise that an effective risk governance mechanism can mitigate all types of risk.  
 
 H1a: There is a significant and negative association between risk governance mechanisms 
and all type of risks.   
 
4.2.2 IBs and risk management 
Another gap in previous studies is that all of the empirical studies investigate this matter using 
only samples involving conventional banks. However, Islamic banks have different 
characteristics, driven by their compliance with Shari’ah principles33. Thus, the risk 
management concepts and practices in IBs vary as well because of the unique requirement for 
Shari'ah compliance and the nature of Islamic financial products. The IFSB and the relevant 
banking literature state that IBs are exposed to significant risks in the course of business 
transactions with customers (Iqbal, 2013; Safiullah and Shamsuddin, 2018). Furthermore, IBs 
are exposed to additional source of risk beside the conventional types of risk- that is Shari’ah 
risk (Shari’ah compliancy risk). Iqbal (2013) defines Shari’ah risk as the risks that occur as a 
result of violating the shari’ah principles. Shari’ah risk is also defined as the risk of being 
default as consequences of breaking the Shari’ah principles (Archer and Haron, 2007). It is 
important to note that breaking up the Shari’ah principles can lead to various problems, 
                                                     
32 Pathan (2009) defines strong board as having small board size, high proportion of independent member, and 
less restrictions on shareholders right (measured by staggered board and poison pill).   
33 Shari’ah principles prohibit charging interest on money, investing in prohibited projects (i.e. gambling, alcohol, 
and pork), taking excessive risk, and all investment should rely on real economic assets.   
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including liquidity, stability, and profitability. IFSB (2005) argues that not being complaint 
with Shari’ah requirements may strongly affect the bank’s liquidity, solvency, profitability, 
and market position. Ginena (2014) argues that IBs may be exposed to a veaious of issues 
such as higher cost of attracting depostir, withdrwal of fund, financial loss, liqudity risk, bank 
failures, and financial instability if they are being not compliant with Shari’ah principles. 
 
Although IBs operate in a competitive environment with their conventional counterparts, it is 
evident that the difference between them is apparent in the area of risks because of 
unique financial characteristics of IBs and Shari’ah compliance related to these banks. 
Notably, by comparing both types of banks, it is pertinent to point out that the empirical 
literature findings on banks’ risks are mixed (Safiullah and Shamsuddin, 2018). Čihák and 
Hesse (2010) and Beck et al. (2013) find that IBs face greater insolvency risk. Abedifar et al. 
(2013) report less credit risk in IBs while Kabir et al. (2015) show that IBs are at greater 
credit risk compared to their conventional counterparts. Abedifar et al. (2013) and Mollah et 
al. (2017a) find that IBs’ insolvency risk does not differ from that of CBs. More recently, 
Safiullah and Shamsuddin (2018) find that IBs exhibit lower credit risk, lower insolvency 
risk, higher liquidity risk, but similar operational risk relative to their conventional 
counterparts. Furthermore, El Alaoui et al. (2016) find that Shri’ah compliant stock have 
lower market risk than Conventional stock. Notably, the majority of previous banking 
literature concentrates on credit and insolvency risks and whereas other risks (market and 
operational risks) only received little attention (Abdullah et al. 2011; Hassan and Aliyu, 
2018).  
As discussed previously, IBs have different characteristics, driven by their compliance with 
Shari’ah principles. Therefore, risk governance mechanisms (e.g. RC and CRO) in IBs have 
an additional responsibility to ensure that their activities are compliant with Shari’ah 
principles. This might add more constraints (e.g. not using hedging) on their ability to manage 
risk leading to different effects on risk-taking actions. This different system provides room for 
further investigation into the RC’s roles concerning risk-taking strategies. The following 
hypothesis, thus, is proposed: 
H1b: There is a significant difference in the influence of risk governance on risk-taking 
between Islamic and Conventional banks.     
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4.2.3 Risk governance and risk management effectiveness 
It is noteworthy that levels of risk-taking do not impact a firm’s risk management 
effectiveness unless financial performance is considered. The fact that a firm undertakes a 
low-risk strategy does not necessarily indicate that it exhibits good practice. According to the 
risk-return trade-off, effective risk management means that risk-taking should be positively 
related to a firm’s financial performance. In other words, under effective risk management, 
higher risks should only be accepted for higher returns (higher financial outcomes). In the 
previous section, our study focused on the influences of risk governance on banks’ risk-
taking. Extending the topic further, we attempt to understand whether the existence of 
advanced risk governance mechanisms (i.e., the appointment of a CRO and the existence of a 
board RC) improves the effectiveness of a bank’s risk management. As risk governance 
mechanisms (i.e., the RC and the CRO) are responsible for overseeing the risk assessment and 
risk management of firms, their presence could affect the management’s risk-taking decisions. 
Based on the option theory, the management of a bank may form the intention of taking on a 
risky project in order to be compliant with the shareholders’ interests but may not have 
considered the project’s possible returns. Therefore, the management might end up taking 
some high-risk, low-return investments. On the other hand, it is also possible that 
management becomes excessively conservative in their risk-taking due to the board of 
directors being more assertive in regard to limiting risk. Directors (especially independent 
directors34) have increased their concern about damaging their reputations or jeopardising 
their positions as regulators have increased the pressure that they place on the board of 
directors to enhance risk oversight (Sun and Liu, 2014). Such over-conservative risk-taking 
positions by management under BOD monitoring pressure, i.e. refusing an investment that 
yields marginal increases in returns for a less marked marginal increase in risk, also indicates 
ineffective risk management. However, as we have discussed, risk governance mechanisms 
which include a dedicated Risk Committee and/or the appointment of a fully-responsible 
Chief Risk Officer might reduce the management’s motivation to make risky decisions and 
hence, might prevent irrational risky decisions. Therefore, we expect that more effective risk 
governance would improve risk management effectiveness. 
 
Nevertheless, as has been discussed, IBs have different operational systems, different sources 
of funding, and different governance structures. Islamic banks must fully comply with 
shari’ah principles in order to be able to keep the majority of their clients (i.e. religious clients 
                                                     
34 Outside directors are more likely to be more concerned with losses related to reputation more than money that 
caused by lawsuits as a result to the small risk derived from directors’ out-of-pocket liability (Black et al.,2006). 
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– investment account holders). Despite their major stake, these clients are still under-protected 
by the board as the focus is on the interests of shareholders. Hence, such banks might end up 
adopting high risk-taking strategies and causing other stakeholders (i.e. IAHs) to bear the 
risks. It should be noted that religious clients tend to be highly risk-averse (Hilary and Hui, 
2009). Therefore, the risk governance mechanisms within IBs should specifically consider 
this major client group by overseeing and mitigating the risks that such banks undertake. 
However, as risk governance mechanisms in IBs are already subject to many restrictions on 
risky investment choices which result from Shari’ah’ compliance, management may well 
experience more pressures (than their CB counterparts) to make less risky decisions and forgo 
high-risk high-return investments. For this reason, we expect that risk governance 
mechanisms in Islamic banks may not effectively influence the risk management (the positive 
relationship between risk-taking and performance). Based on the previous arguments, we set 
our hypotheses as follows:  
 
H2a: Risk governance mechanisms are significantly positively associated with the 
relationship between risk-taking and a firm’s performance.  
H2b: There is a significant difference in the moderating effect of risk governance on the 
relationship between risk-taking and a firm’s performance across the two bank types. 
 
4.3 Research design and data 
4.3.1  Sample 
The initial sample of this study consists of 360 banks: 94 Islamic banks (IBs) and 266 
conventional banks (CBs) operating in 22 MENA countries for the period 2009 to 2015.35 
The investigation is conducted during this period for several reasons. First, the selection of the 
sample period allows the study to avoid potential effects of the exogenous macroeconomic 
shock that banks experienced during the financial crisis of 2007-2008. This may distort the 
effects of corporate governance obtained. Second, corporate governance mechanisms (e.g., 
board of directors and its committees) have received significant reforms after the recent 
financial crisis. Furthermore, IBs experience a peaked flourish, which dramatically increased 
the global awareness towards IBs during this period. All the banks in our sample require to 
have a full annual reports, published as the financial year ends on the 31st of December. We 
also filtered the sample following three criteria that were used in the previous literature e.g. 
(Abedifar et al., 2013; Beck et al., 2013; Abdelsalam et al., 2016; Mollah et al., 2017a): (1) 
                                                     
35 The majority of IBs are based in the Middle East & North Africa (MENA) region as Islam is the dominant religion (Ernst 
and Young, 2012; Abdelsalam et al., 2016) 
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both types of banks need to be currently operating in each country; (2) banks in the sample 
need to be fully-fledged commercial banks. Therefore, CBs with Islamic windows and full 
investment banks were erased from the sample36; (3) banks also need to be commercial, 
listed, and have more than two consecutive years of data. The final sample contains 65 listed 
banks. Table 4.1 presents the sample distribution by bank and country, with 188 observations 
for IBs and 252 observations for CBs. Bahrain and Kuwait have the highest proportions of 
IBs, while the highest proportion of CBs is concentrated in Jordan. 
 
 
Table 4.1 Sample distribution 
The consolidated financial data (in US dollars) were obtained from the BankScope and 
Bloomberg databases. Market risk data were collected from the Datastream database. The 
governance-level data were manually collected from the banks’ annual reports that are 
available on their official websites. The country-level variables (macroeconomic and 
governance indicators) were retrieved from the World Bank website. 
                                                     
36 CBs with Islamic windows are banks providing products compliant with Shari’ah (Beck et al., 2013). CBs with Islamic 
windows were excluded, as there is no separate financial data for these banks that allow us to distinguish them from the full 
CBs (e.g., Cihak & Hesse, 2010). 
 
Country Observations 
(IBs) 
Observations 
(CBs) 
Observations 
(Full 
Sample) 
IBs  
Percentage 
CBs  
Percentage 
Full 
Sample 
Percentage 
Bahrain 35 14 49 18.62% 5.56% 11.14% 
Egypt 14 21 35 7.45% 8.33% 7.95% 
Jordan 14 70 84 7.45% 27.78% 19.09% 
Kuwait 35 28 63 18.62% 11.11% 14.32% 
Lebanon 0 28 28 0.00% 11.11% 6.36% 
Oman 6 21 27 3.19% 8.33% 6.14% 
Palestine 14 7 21 7.45% 2.78% 4.77% 
Qatar 21 35 56 11.17% 13.89% 12.73% 
Saudi 
A bi  
28 0 28 14.89% 0.00% 6.36% 
Tunisia  0 14 14 0.00% 5.56% 3.18% 
UAE 21 14 35 11.17% 5.56% 7.95% 
       
TOTAL 188 252 440 43.00% 57.00% 100.00% 
Number of 
Banks 
28 37 65    
       
Notes: The final sample employs an unbalanced panel data of 65 listed banks (440 bank year-observations), 
i  i  11 MENA i  
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4.3.2 Measures 
4.3.2.1 Risk-taking measures 
Some of the previous literature considers only market risk as a measure of risk-taking (i.e. 
Pathon, 2009; Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013; Sun and Liu 2014). Abedifar et al. (2013) consider 
insolvency, credit, and interest rate risks when measuring bank risk-taking. Nevertheless, no 
studies have considered five different perspectives of measuring risk-taking and its 
association with risk governance functions. Thus, we measure risk-taking by considering five 
different perspectives of risk. These are: market risk, credit risk, operational risk, liquidity 
risk, and insolvency risk (see Appendix 2 for variables definitions). We also measure risk-
taking by calculating one single index to represent the overall risk-taking of the bank. The 
overall risk index is gained by calculating the factor analysis eigenvalue obtained from the 
five risks perspectives mentioned above.37 
 
Following previous literature on bank market risk (Anderson and Fraser, 2000; Chen et al., 
2006; Pathan, 2009; Sun and Liu, 2014), we measure market risk by total risk (TR). Total risk 
reflects the total stock return volatility. Pathan (2009) states that regulators and firm 
executives usually observe the total risk as it provides a full picture of the riskiness of assets, 
liabilities, and off-balance sheet positions. Following previous studies (Jin, 2002; Armstrong 
and Vashishtha, 2012; Vieito and Khan, 2012; Baixauli-Soler et al., 2015), we measure the 
total risk as the standard deviation of monthly stock returns, based on 60 months’ consecutive 
returns with a minimum number of 36 months.38 We use return index data type RI to measure 
the banks’ monthly returns.39 In line with Soares and Stark (2009), we calculate the banks’ 
monthly stock returns using the following equation.    𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗  = 𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗−1 − 1                                                                                                                            (1) 
Where 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 is the monthly stock return of bank i at month t, in country j, 𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 is the return 
index for bank i at month t in country j, and 𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗−1 is the previous month’s return index for 
bank i in country j. For robustness check purposes, we also measure the market risk using 
idiosyncratic risk (IDR). Following (Anderson and Fraser, 2000; Chen et al., 2006; Pathan, 
                                                     
37 Yeh (1996) used factor analysis to produce 4 strong factors that are based on 12 financial ratios.  
38 Alford and Boatsman (1995) report that adopting monthly stock return over a five-year period is more 
accurate for estimating the volatility. 
39 The RI type data is obtained from the DataStream database, which defined it as the theoretical growth in value 
of shareholders over a specified period. In calculating the RI, the dividend is assumed to be re-invested to 
purchase additional unite of equity or unit trust at the closing price. 
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2009; Sun and Liu, 2014), we measure IDR by taking the natural logarithm of the standard 
deviation of the residual of the following equation40: 
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 =  𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽1𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗                                                              (2) 
 
Where Ritj is the stock return for the bank i at month t in country j, Rmtj is the market return of 
country j at month t. INTEREST is the yield on the three-month Treasury-bill rate. Stock and 
market returns are measured by calculating the natural logarithm of monthly stock return Ritj 
= In(Pitj/ Pitj-1), where Pitj is the stock price.41 
 
Our second perspective of risk-taking is the credit risk. Credit risk is related to bank loan 
quality. Following Abedifar et al. (2013), we measure the banks’ credit risk (IMPALOAN) by 
calculating the impaired loan to the total loans. We also measure the credit risk by calculating 
the loan losses reserve to the gross loan (LLR) for robustness check purposes. Our next risk-
taking perspective is the operational risk. Operational risk is inherent risk that is related to 
business risk activities. Thus, operating profit indicators are the most appropriate measure for 
banks’ operational risk as risky activities may cause volatility in their income. Therefore, 
following (John et al., 2008; Sun and Chang, 2011), the standard deviation of the return on 
average assets (SDROAA) has been calculated. Furthermore, we estimated the standard 
deviation of the operating income to total assets (SDOI) as another robust operational risk 
measure. 
 
Liquidity risk is one of the most important perspectives that banks need to manage accurately. 
This provides a clear picture of a bank’s financial position as this risk perspective is 
monitored by a number of regulators (i.e. BSBC). We measure the liquidity risk by 
calculating the cash holding to the bank’s total assets (CTA). Further to this measure, we also 
measure the liquidity risk using the liquid assets to total assets ratio (LA). 
 
Another important risk aspect that provides an insight into the banks’ financial strength is the 
insolvency risk. We measure the insolvency risk by estimating the inverse direction of the 
natural logarithm of Z-score value (InZscore1). The Z-score has an inverse relationship with 
the probability of banks’ failure. When the asset value of the banks drops below their debt 
value, they become insolvent as a higher Z-score means a lower insolvency risk. Both interest 
                                                     
40 We estimated this model for each year for each bank. 
41 We also consider the capital adjustment in the stock price including stock splits and dividends. 
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and fee-based income can be calculated by Z-score, which has been frequently utilised to 
capture banks’ financial stabilities (Cihak and Hesse, 2010; Abedifar et al., 2013; Beck et al., 
2013; Mollah et al., 2017a). Following previous literature (i.e., Abedifar et al., 2013; Beck et 
al., 2013; Cihak and Hesse, 2010; Mollah et al., 2017), we measure the Z-score as the 
expected return on assets E(ROA)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 plus the equity capital to total assets ratio (CAR)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 divided 
by the standard deviation of return on assets σ(ROA)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖.42 To have a more robust check, we 
also measure Z-score using a different formula (InZscore2). This is obtained by taking the 
inverse of the natural logarithm of the equity to total assets (CAR) to the standard deviation of 
return on average assets. 
4.3.2.2 Accounting and market-based performance measures 
When measuring the banks’ performance, we use both accounting and market-based 
measures. The ratio of return on average assets (ROAA) and the ratio of return on average 
equity (ROAE) have been considered to reflect the accounting-based measures. The market-
based measures include both Tobin’s Q (TOBINQ), computed as the ratio of equity market 
value plus liability book value divided by asset book value, and the market value of equity to 
its book value (MTB). 
4.3.2.3 Measures of explanatory variables 
Our main explanatory variable for risk-taking models is the risk governance index (RGI). 
Following Ellul and Yerramilli (2013), we create an RGI to measure the risk governance 
function’s strength and independence for each bank in each year. The risk committee (RC) 
and the Chief Risk Officer (CRO), the official exclusively responsible for managing the 
entire-price risk across all business segments of the bank, are considered when measuring our 
RGI. Therefore, we use two sets of variables to reflect each mechanism’s characteristics. The 
first set of variables captures the risk oversight quality that is provided by the bank’s RC. In 
this regard, we investigate five characteristics of banks’ RCs: (1) RC size (RCSIZE), a 
dummy variable that identifies whether the bank’s risk committee size is larger than the mean 
RC size of the country. (2) RC independence (RCIND), a dummy variable taking the value of 
1 if the percentage of independent members on the RC is higher than the mean value of the 
RCIND of the country. (3) RC frequency meeting (RCMEETING), a dummy variable that 
takes the value of 1 if the bank’s RC met more frequently during the year than the average of 
the RCMEETIMNG across all bank in the country. (4) RC multi-membership (RCMULTI), a 
                                                     
42 We use the natural logarithm to capture Z-score to control for any high skewness and outliers of the distribution. 
We use three consecutive years (current + two previous year) to measure the standard deviation of ROA. 
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dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the proportion of independent members of the RC 
who are also serving on another firm’s board is higher than the mean value of the RCMULIT 
of the country. (5) Expert accounting and/or financial members of the RC (RCFINQ), a 
dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the percentage of members who have financial or 
accounting experience and/or academic qualifications on the RC is higher than the average 
RCFINQ across all banks in the country. According to Forbes and Milliken (1999), the 
frequency of meetings, independency, and skills and knowledge are very important factors 
that determine how effective board members are in making decisions. Our next set of 
variables captures the importance of the CRO. In more detail, we construct the following 
variables: (CROPRESENT), a dummy variables that takes the value of 1 if the CRO (or an 
equivalent function) is responsible for the entire-price risk management in the bank;43 
(CROEXECUTIVE), a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the CRO is an executive 
officer in the bank; (CROMEMEBER), a dummy variable that identifies whether the CRO is 
a member of the RC; and (CROREPOERTOBOD), a dummy variable that identifies whether 
the CRO reports to the board of directors directly. 
We measure the RGI by taking the first principal component of the following nine risk 
governance variables: RCSIZE, RCIND, RCMEETING, RCMULTI, RCFINQ, CROPRESENT, 
CROEXECUTIVE, CROMEMEBER, and CROREPOERTOBOD. Using principal components 
analysis, we can effectively perform a decomposition value of the correlation matrix of risk 
management characteristics (Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013). We take the eigenvector in the 
decomposition as our main single factor in this study. The main benefit of using principal 
components analysis for measuring risk governance mechanisms is that it avoids eliminating 
any characteristic subjectively, or subjectively judging the importance of these categories 
(Tetlock, 2007). Our second explanatory variable is the interaction variable between RGI and 
the Islamic bank dummy variable (RGI_IB). This allows us to measure the risk governance 
effectiveness in managing risk-taking in IBs. 
 
For the performance model, we take the interaction between the risk governance index and 
the overall risk measure (RGI_OVERRISK) and (RGI_OVERRISK_IB) for Islamic banks as 
our main explanatory variables. As having high risk governance effectiveness leads to high 
                                                     
43 In some of the banks in our sample, the chief credit officer or the risk general manager may be responsible for 
the risk management department. Thus, we allocate them the same coding as CRO in order to not miss out these 
alternative designations.  
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(low) risk management effectiveness, the coefficients on (RGI_OVERRISK) and 
(RGI_OVERRISK_IB) are expected to be positive (negative). 
4.3.2.4 Controls 
As mentioned before, we consider the number of risk perspectives to investigate the banks’ 
risk-taking quality. We estimate five models for risk-taking, these are: market risk, credit risk, 
operation risk, liquidity risk and insolvency risk. We also take the overall risk of the five risks 
perspectives for greater robustness. For all our models, we control for a number of corporate 
governance variables. These are: board of directors size (BODSIZE), percentage of 
independent members of the board (BODIND), and CEO-Duality. Previous literature (Pathan, 
2009; Abedifar et al., 2013; Sun and Liu, 2014; Mollah et al., 2017a) suggests that board 
composition and CEO-Duality might affect a firm’s risk-taking. As the relationship between 
the board structure and risk-taking is not consistent across prior literature,44 the signs on these 
variables are not assigned. 
We also control for the ownership structure. We consider two important ownership 
characteristics in our analysis. These are INSTITOWN and MANGOWN. Laeven and Levine 
(2009) state that the analysis of risk-taking would be inefficient if the ownership structure 
were not included. Erkens et al. (2012) find that firms with higher institutional ownership 
(INSTITOWN), measured by the percentage of shares held by institutional firms to the total 
outstanding shares, had higher stock return volatility before the crisis. Therefore, we include 
the institution ownership for all our models except for the liquidity risk model. Insider 
ownership (MANGOWN), measured as the percentage of shares held by executive directors 
to the total outstanding shares, is included in our liquidity risk model as managers might be 
able to exploit the firm’s financial reserves (i.e. cash). 
Bank size and age play a crucial role in determining the firm’s risk-taking level. Small firms 
are very likely to be more conservative due to their limited access to external funds. Also, 
large banks might take advantage of their too-big-to-fail reputation, which might give them 
more incentive to take more risks. Bank age (AGE) is measured by the difference between the 
sample year and the established year for the bank. We take the natural logarithm of the bank’s 
total assets as a measure for bank size (LOGTA). Following previous studies (Saunders et al., 
1990; Demsetz et al., 1997; Anderson and Fraser, 2000; Pathan, 2009; Ellul and Yerramilli, 
                                                     
44 Pathan (2009) finds a negative relationship between BODSIZE and BODIND and risk-taking. Also, he found 
that CEO-Duality affects risk-taking negatively. Whereas, Sun and Liu (2014) find positive relationship between 
risk-taking and BODSIZE. 
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2013; Sun and Liu, 2014; Mollah et al., 2017a), we also control for bank’s profitability 
(ROAA), deposit to assets ratio (Deposit), Tier 1 ratio (TIER1), equity to total assets (LEV), 
and income diversification (NONINT).45 Myers and Majluf (1984) discuss that some firms 
may maintain conservative risk strategies to support investment, thus we include Tobin’s Q to 
control for banks’ growth opportunities (GROWTHOPP). However, banks also might take 
higher risk if they have higher investment opportunities. We expect to have a positive impact 
of growth opportunity on our risk measures. Also, loan to total assets ratio (LOANTA) and 
loan growth might have an effect on the banks’ loan quality since a high credit-accepting 
policy might be an indicator of weak loan investigations (Abedifar et al., 2013). Thus we 
control for LOANTA and LOANGROWTH for our credit risk model. We also include an 
ISLAMIC bank dummy variable. 
Furthermore, country-specific variables are included to control for economy and growth 
differences. These are: (a) the annual GDP growth rate (GDPGROWTH), (b) the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) concentration ratio, (c) the domestic interest rate (DIR), (d) the legal 
system (LEGAL), and (e) the country governance quality (G-Index).46 We also control for 
years and countries’ dummy effects. 
4.3.3  Estimation models 
Panel data analysis is the adopted approach in this study to control for constant and 
unobservable heterogeneity (Andres and Vallelado, 2008). To control for heteroskedasticity, 
we apply Pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with robust standard error. We run regression 
for our models using different classifications of control variables, including bank-specific 
variables, country-specific variables interchanged with country dummies, and year dummies. 
This step assures the sensitivities of our results. For a further robustness check, we control for 
endogeneity problems. Thus, we re-estimate our models by utilising the Two Steps System 
Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM). GMM can solve a number of endogeneity 
problems (i.e., reverse causality and omitted-variables bias). To test our hypotheses (H1 – 
H2), we use the following models (3) – (4): 
For risk-taking, we use: 
                                                     
45 We also control for trade frequency for our market risk model. The results are consistent with our main models. 
However, we did not include it in our main model due to the missing data issue. 
46 Kaufmann et al. (2009) produced the country governance index. G-Index can capture cross-country 
differences that might affect the bank’s risk-taking (Cihak and Hesse, 2010). The G-index is measured by taking 
an average of the six governance indicators: voice and accountability, political stability, government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, the rule of law, and corruption control. 
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𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅_𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖 = 𝑎𝑎0 + 𝑎𝑎1 ∗  𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑏1 𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖 +  𝑏𝑏2 𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹_𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖 + γ ∗  𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖 + δ ∗ 𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖                                                                                                                  (3) 
For bank performance, we use: 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖 = 𝑎𝑎0 + 𝑎𝑎1 ∗  𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑏1 𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖 +  𝑏𝑏2 𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹_𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖  +
𝑏𝑏3 𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹_𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑏4 𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹_𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂_𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑏5 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖 +
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂_𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖 + γ ∗  𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖 + δ ∗  𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖                                                                                           
(4) 
 
where, 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅_𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖  is the risk-taking of bank i in country j at time t, 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖  is the performance of bank i in country j at time t, 
𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖  is the Risk Governance index of bank i in country j at time t, 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖  is the overall risk-taking index of bank i in country j at time t, 
𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖  is a matrix of bank-level control variables of bank i in country j at time t, 
𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖  is a matrix of country-level macroeconomic variables, 
𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖  is the error term; α0 is the constant; and α, β, γ, and δ are the vectors of 
coefficient estimates. 
4.4 Results and analysis 
4.4.1  Descriptive statistics 
The summary statistics for the main risk perspectives, risk governance variables, financial 
characteristics, governance characteristics, and country-level characteristics are presented in 
Table 4.2. We also report the mean value of all variables for each subsample of the banks, 
categorised by the bank type. The results suggest that IBs following higher risk strategies in 
TR, SDROAA, and CTA than CBs. In more detail, IBs’ risk indicators are 0.1, 7.54, 0.98, 
9.46, and 0.33 for TR, IMPLOAN, SDROAA, CTA, and INZSCORE1 respectively. In 
contrast, the CBs’ risk indicators are 0.06, 8.89, 0.33, 11.46, and 0.26. However, the two-
sample t-test shows significant differences between the two samples for only TR, SDROAA, 
CTA, and INZSCORE1. Furthermore, the OVERRISK confirms our previous results – that 
IBs are riskier than CBs, as the value for IBs is 0.194 compared to -0.18 for CBs. Figure 
4.1shows the differences between IBs and CBs risk-taking, where it is obvious that CBs 
banks have lower risk level than IBs across the years in our sample. Moreover, the figure 
reveals that both CBs and IBs reduce their risk-taking level across the years of the study 
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sample. The full sample mean values of these risk indicators are 0.082, 8.325, 0.609, 10.64, 
0.228, and -0.02 for TR, IMPLOAN, SDROAA, CTA, INZSCORE1, and OVERRISK 
respectively. The performance accounting-based measures ROAA (ROAE) show a mean 
value of 1.21(10.30) for the full sample, 0.85(7.57) for IBs, and 1.46(12.08) for CBs. 
Moreover, the performance market-based measures TOBINQ (MTB) show a mean value of 
1.05 (1.43) for the full sample with no significant differences between IBs and CBs. However, 
CBs achieve higher accounting performance compared to IBs, whereas the IBs’ market 
performance is higher than that of the CBs. 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Distribution of overall risk-taking across years between IBs and CBs (OVERRISK mean) 
 
The mean values of the RGI full sample are -0.012 and -0.136 (0.109) for IBs (CBs), which 
indicates that the low RGI index score for the full sample is derived from the IB subsample. 
The summary statistics results also suggest that the CBs are following a better approach in 
adopting a strong risk governance mechanism, compared to their counterparts. Investigating 
the components of RGI, we find that around 79% of banks in the final sample have a stand-
alone board-level risk committee. However, there is no significant difference on the risk 
committee existing between IBs and CBs. Furthermore, only 45% of banks in our full sample 
have higher RC members than the average sample in each year. Interestingly, the T-tests show 
significant differences between IBs’ and CBs’ mean values for RCIND, RCMEETING, 
RCMULTI, and RCFINQ. While the IBs have mean values of 0.363, 0.433, 0.401, and 0.625 
for RCIND, RCMEETING, RCMULTI, and RCFINQ respectively, the CBs’ mean values for 
these RC characteristics are 0.471. 0.586, 0.303, and 0.335. The RCIND result shows that 
only 36% of IBs have a higher percentage of independent directors on the RC than the 
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average, whereas the percentage of CBs with such a percentage is 47%. The RCMEETING 
results show that CBs’ RCs are more active than those of IBs, as their meeting frequency is 
higher. However, the overall results of the RC characteristics show that CBs have stronger 
risk governance mechanisms compare to IBs. Nevertheless, the full sample mean value of 
0.346 on RCMULTI indicates that approximately 65.4% of the banks in our sample have a 
lower percentage of members with multi-directorships on the RC than the average of the full 
sample. Moving to another risk governance mechanism, the CRO, we find that on average 
47.7% of banks in our sample assign a Chief Risk Officer (or equivalent) to be the body 
responsible for the entire risk management of the bank. However, the IBs’ mean value of 
CROPRESENT (57%) is higher than that of CBs (44%). In contrast, CBs are more practical 
in assigning the CRO to be a member of the executive team, as the CROEXECUTIVE mean 
value of CBs is 75%, compared to 60.8% in IBs. Also, the results indicate that the percentage 
of CROs reporting directly to the BOD in CBs is higher than in IBs. The CROMEMEBER 
result shows that only 16% of banks’ year observations in our full sample have a CRO who is 
also a member of the RC.    
 
The summary statistics results also provide a full picture of our banks’ samples by 
considering other governance and financial characteristics. The mean values of board size 
(BODSIZE) and board independence (BODIND) are 9 members and 44.6% for the full 
sample respectively. Only 41.6% of IBs have CEOs who also have the BOD chairman 
position, compared to CBs (47.6%). The mean value of the banks’ size is 15.63 for the full 
sample. The t-test results for the banks’ size (LOGTA) show that CBs are significantly larger 
than IBs in our sample. 
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                                                                                      Full Sample       
Variables Obs Mean Median SD Min. Max. IBs: Sample Mean 
CBs: Sample 
Mean Two-Sample t-test 
Risk and Return Characteristics          
TR 423 0.082 0.075 0.045 0.000 0.282 0.100 0.068 -7.420*** 
IMPALOAN 329 8.325 4.920 13.67 0.090 81.980 7.540 8.890 0.884 
SDROAA 430 0.609 0.291 0.885 0.022 4.469 0.982 0.339 -7.95*** 
CTA 370 10.64 9.129 6.750 1.281 29.378 9.640 11.466 2.608*** 
INZSCORE1 424 0.289 0.261 0.120 0.161 0.766 0.334 0.262 -2.531** 
OVERRISK 318 -0.029 -0.223 0.570 -0.721 1.759 0.194 -0.181 -6.097*** 
ROAA 425 1.212 1.306 1.121 -2.757 3.218 0.856 1.466 5.73*** 
ROAE 425 10.30 10.849 7.244 -7.994 25.476 7.573 12.081 6.26*** 
TOBINQ 400 1.051 1.030 0.113 0.400 1.656 1.056 1.048 -0.748 
MTB 416 1.435 1.235 0.775 0.174 6.687 1.489 1.393 -1.252 
Characteristics of the Risk Governance Function          
RCE 394 0.796 1.000 0.402 0.000 1.000 0.762 0.820 1.405 
RCSIZE 375 0.451 0.000 0.498 0.000 1.000 0.415 0.475 1.138 
RCIND 341 0.425 0.000 0.495 0.000 1.000 0.363 0.471 2.01** 
RCMEETING 329 0.517 1.000 0.500 0.000 1.000 0.433 0.586 2.79*** 
RCMULTI 350 0.346 0.000 0.476 0.000 1.000 0.401 0.303 -1.920* 
RCFINQ 349 0.461 0.000 0.499 0.000 1.000 0.625 0.335 -5.611*** 
CROPRESENT 376 0.497 0.000 0.501 0.000 1.000 0.570 0.445 -2.401** 
CROEXECUTIVE 377 0.692 1.000 0.462 0.000 1.000 0.608 0.751 2.97*** 
CROMEMEBER 376 0.160 0.000 0.367 0.000 1.000 0.198 0.131 -1.797* 
CROREPOERTOBOD 376 0.101 0.000 0.302 0.000 1.000 0.057 0.131 2.36** 
RGI 289 -0.012 0.319 1.624 -2.742 2.238 -0.136 0.109 1.291 
            
Table 4.2 Descriptive statistics 
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                                                                                      Full Sample       
Variables Obs Mean Median SD Min. Max. IBs: Sample Mean 
CBs: Sample 
Mean Two-Sample t-test 
Governance, Financial, and Country Characteristics          
BODSIZE 421 9.800 10.000 1.903 5.000 16.000 9.483 10.06 3.07*** 
BODIND 440 0.446 0.429 0.248 0.000 1.000 0.483 0.417 -2.75*** 
CEO-Duality 387 0.147 0.000 0.355 0.000 1.000 0.023 0.242 6.28*** 
INSTOWN 371 0.452 0.442 0.262 0.000 0.996 0.416 0.476 2.172** 
MANOWN 421 0.040 0.000 0.089 0.000 0.399 0.046 0.035 -1.253 
LOGTA 438 15.63 15.747 1.239 12.182 18.813 15.45 15.78 2.79*** 
AGE 419 33.76 36.000 16.86 1.000 85.000 24.22 40.81 11.3*** 
NONINT 396 0.305 0.282 0.141 0.074 0.726 0.271 0.329 4.18*** 
TIER1 412 17.91 15.300 7.976 9.660 46.780 20.78 15.73 -6.69*** 
LEV 425 14.28 12.577 6.741 6.856 42.757 16.527 12.687 -6.024*** 
DEPOTA 437 0.686 0.713 0.148 0.002 0.920 0.658 0.706 3.36*** 
LOANTA 366 0.590 0.601 0.156 0.261 0.884 0.572 0.605 2.032** 
LOANGROW 365 12.022 9.310 17.226 -19.610 63.070 15.211 9.771 -3.00*** 
ISLAMIC 440 0.427 0.000 0.495 0.000 1.000 - - - 
GDPGROWTH 440 4.026 3.096 4.422 -7.076 20.941 - - - 
G-Index 440 -0.037 -0.078 0.451 -0.921 0.790 - - - 
DIR 436 2.952 2.249 1.914 0.290 7.683 - - - 
HHI 440 0.204 0.200 0.087 0.086 0.511 - - - 
LEGAL 439 1.000 1.000 0.358 0.000 2.000 - - - 
Notes: The table presents descriptive statistics of all variables used in all the regression models for the full sample. TR is total risk measured by the standard deviation of 60 monthly stock return consecutively with a minimum of 36 months to reflect 
the market risk. IMPILOAN is the impaired loan to total loans to measure the credit risk. SDROAA is the standard deviation of the return on average assets to measure the operational risk. CTA is the cash to total assets to measure the liquidity risk. 
InZscore1 is the invers of the logzscore to measure the insolvency risk. OVERRISK is factor analysis eigenvalue obtained from five risks measures mentioned before. ROAA is return on average assets. ROAE is return on average equity. TOBINQ is 
Equity MV plus liability BV divided by asset BV. MTB is market value to book value of equity. RGI is risk governance index measured using the first principal component of the risk committee and chief risk officer characteristics. BODSIZE is the 
total number of BOD members. BODIND is % independent non-executive directors in the BOD. CEO-Duality is dummy variable takes value of 1 if the CEO and the chairman of the board is the same person, and 0 otherwise. INSTOWN is the 
institutional ownership measured by % shares held by institutions firms to total shares. MANOWN is the insider ownership measured by % shares held by executive directors to total shares. LOGTA is the bank’s size measured by natural logarithm of 
total assets. AGE is the difference between the sample year and the year in which the bank was established.  NONIT is non-interest income to total income. TIER 1 is banks’ capital ratio measured by Core capital / Risk weighted assets. LEV is leverage 
ratio measured by total equity to total assets. DEPOTA is total deposit to total assets. LOANTA is total loan total assets. LOANGROWTH is loan growth measured by the difference between current loan and the previous loan divided by previous loans.  
ISLAMIC is unity if the bank is Islamic, 0 otherwise. GDPGROWTH is the GDP growth rate. G-Index is country corporate governance quality measured by six indicators. DIR is the deposit Interest Rate. HHI is the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index 
measures bank market concentration. HHI is calculated as the square sum of the ratio of total assets of each bank-year to total assets of all banks each year. It has a value between zero and one. Higher HHI shows higher bank concentration. LEGAL 
(legal system) is religiosity proxy which take value of 0 if the country not using Shari’ah law, 1 for countries combing both Shari’ah law and other legal system, and 2 for countries with only shari’ah law. We also report on the paired sample mean test 
(t-test). *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01 (two-tailed test). 
Table 4.2 (Continued) 
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Table 4.3 shows the different characteristics between banks with effective risk governance 
mechanisms (high RGI) and banks with no effective risk governance mechanisms (low RGI). 
We create a dummy variable for each bank that takes the value of 1 if the bank’s RGI is 
greater than the median value of the RGI across all the banks during the year, otherwise it 
takes a value of 0. We then run a comparison test of the mean value of various banks’ 
characteristics between the subsample, grouped by high RGI = 1 and low RGI = 0. We also 
report the two-sample t-test to know whether the differences between these two subsamples 
are significant or not. 
 
The results in Table 4.3 suggest that banks with high RGI have less market, operational, and 
liquidity risks. Moreover, the overall risks indicator for banks with high RGI is -0.143 
compared to 0.05 for banks with low RGI. This difference is significant at 1% level. 
However, this is consistent with our hypothesis that stronger risk governance mechanisms are 
expected to be more effective in managing the banks’ risk activities. The performance 
accounting measures (i.e. ROAA and ROAE) show no significant differences between banks 
with high and low RGI. In contrast, performance market measures (i.e. TOBINQ and MTB) 
indicate that banks with high RGI achieve lower market performance compared to banks with 
low RGI. Whereas banks with high RGI have a mean value of 1.34 (1.033) for TOBINQ 
(MTB), banks with low RGI have values of 1.69 (1.087) for the same period. These 
differences are significant at 1% level. These differences between the two groups might be 
because of the weak risk managing function that banks with low RGI have, which gives 
management the opportunity to take higher risks, thus achieving higher returns. 
 
The BODIND is significantly higher for banks with high RGI (50%) than for banks with low 
RGI (42.5%). Consistent with Ellul and Yerramilli (2013), we find that banks with high RGI 
have significantly lower Tier1 and higher LOANTA, as banks with high RGI have a mean 
value of 17.33 for Tier1 and 61.3% for LOANTA, compared to 20.22 and 57% for banks with 
low RGI. However, this is consistent with the hedging channel view as banks open to higher 
risk should embrace more effective risk management functions (Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013). 
Furthermore, although the Islamic variable is not significantly different between banks with 
high RGI and low RGI, we find only 46% of banks with high RGI are Islamic. This might 
indicate that larger and older banks usually adopt more advanced risk governance 
mechanisms, and most of these are CBs rather than IBs. 
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Notes: The table presents comparison analysis of all variables used in all the regression models for the full sample of high and low RGI banks. TR is total risk measured by the 
standard deviation of 60 monthly stock return consecutively with a minimum of 36 months to reflect the market risk. IMPILOAN is the impaired loan to total loans to measure 
the credit risk. SDROAA is the standard deviation of the return on average assets to measure the operational risk. CTA is the cash to total assets to measure the liquidity risk. 
InZscore1 is the invers of the logzscore to measure the insolvency risk. OVERRISK is factor analysis eigenvalue obtained from five risks measures mentioned before. ROAA 
is return on average assets. ROAE is return on average equity. TOBINQ is Equity MV plus liability BV divided by asset BV. MTB is market value to book value of equity. 
RGI is risk governance index measured using the first principal component of the risk committee and chief risk officer characteristics (see appendix A for CR and CRO 
characteristics definitions). AVERC is the average value of risk committee characteristics. AVECRO is the average value of CRO characteristics. BODSIZE is the total number 
of BOD members. BODIND is % independent non-executive directors in the BOD. CEO-Duality is dummy variable takes value of 1 if the CEO and the chairman of the board 
is the same person, and 0 otherwise. INSTOWN is the institutional ownership measured by % shares held by institutions firms to total shares. MANOWN is the insider 
ownership measured by % shares held by executive directors to total shares. LOGTA is the bank’s size measured by natural logarithm of total assets. AGE is the difference 
between the sample year and the year in which the bank was established.  NONIT is non-interest income to total incomeTIER 1 is banks’ capital ratio measured by Core capital 
/ Risk weighted assets. LEV is leverage ratio measured by total equity to total assets. DEPOTA is total deposit to total assets. LOANTA is total loan total assets. 
LOANGROWTH is loan growth measured by the difference between current loan and the previous loan divided by previous loans.  ISLAMIC is unity if the bank is Islamic, 0 
otherwise. We also report on the paired sample mean test (t-test). *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01 (two-tailed test). 
Table 4.3 Univariate comparison of High vs. Low RGI of banks 
 
Table 4.4 reports the Pearson pairwise correlation matrix for all our variables in the model to 
investigate any multicollinearity problems. However, the table reveals that there is no high 
degree of correlation between the key variables. The variance inflation factors (VIFs) also 
show no multicollinearity problems among the regressors.47 
 
                                                     
47 There is no coefficient value higher than 80% between the explanatory variables, as the pairwise test shows. 
Also, there is no VIF value of each individual variable that has a value higher than 10. 
 
Full Sample 
Variables High RGI Low  RGI Two-Sample t-test 
TR 0.081 0.09 2.069** 
IMPALOAN 6.886 5.205 -1.53 
SDROAA 0.58 0.774 1.709* 
CTA 11.37 8.803 -3.200*** 
INZSCORE1 0.294 0.285 -2.24 
OVERRISK -0.143 0.05 2.717*** 
ROAA 10.094 10.055 -0.0435 
ROAE 1.266 1.263 -0.02 
TOBINQ 1.347 1.691 3.651*** 
MTB 1.0336 1.087 3.728*** 
BODSIZE 9.662 9.978 1.451 
BODIND 0.500 0.425 -2.439** 
CEO-Duality 0.101 0.067 -1.025 
INSTOWN 0.466 0.406 -1.921 
MANOWN 0.007 0.009 -0.817 
LOGTA 15.683 15.688 0.034 
AGE 31.598 30.817 -0.396 
NONINT 0.273 0.297 1.609 
TIER1 17.333 20.22 2.987*** 
LEV 14.589 15.729 1.335 
DEPOTA 0.657 0.685 1.558 
LOANTA 0.613 0.571 -2.491** 
LOANGROW 12.731 12.487 -0.113 
ISLAMIC 0.466 0.524 0.993 
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Table 4.4 Pearson pairwise correlation matrix: full sample 
 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
TR (1) 1              
IMPALOAN (2) 0.141* 1             
SDROAA (3) 0.247* 0.250* 1            
CTA (4) -0.059 0.037 -0.181* 1           
INZSCORE1 (5) 0.261* 0.265* 0.860* -0.173* 1          
OVERRISK (6) 0.497* 0.461* 0.819* -0.297* 0.872* 1         
ROAA (7) -0.071 -0.221* -0.523* -0.015 -0.469* -0.417* 1        
TOBINQ (8) -0.051 -0.256* 0.003 -0.101* -0.048 -0.094* 0.251* 1       
RGI (9) -0.177* 0.109* -0.113* 0.2115* -0.094 -0.168* -0.013 -0.270* 1      
BODSIZE (10) -0.031 0.143* -0.178* 0.265* -0.227* -0.143* 0.133* -0.126* -0.076 1     
BODIND (11) 0.129* -0.022 0.211* 0.015 0.2117* 0.181* -0.247* 0.043 0.057 -0.257* 1    
CEO-Duality (12) -0.219* 0.108* -0.094* 0.285* -0.176* -0.184* 0.058 -0.038 0.097 0.147* -0.201* 1   
INSTOWN (13) -0.295* -0.104* -0.142* 0.318* -0.108* -0.168* -0.032 -0.116* 0.190* 0.144* -0.234* -0.085 1  
MANOWN (14) 0.087* 0.133* 0.054 0.066 0.060 0.053 -0.040 0.099* -0.067 0.049 0.043 0.063 -0.275* 1 
LOGTA (15) -0.033 -0.276* -0.272* 0.039 -0.188* -0.256* 0.409* 0.307* -0.045 -0.059 0.140* 0.119* -0.162* -0.175* 
AGE (16) -0.281* -0.127* -0.345* 0.339* -0.271* -0.363* 0.147* -0.038 0.040 0.310* -0.164* 0.353* 0.095* -0.138* 
NONINT (17) 0.085* 0.517* 0.091* 0.039 0.058 0.251* -0.053 -0.157* -0.098 0.308* -0.173* 0.215* -0.153* 0.144* 
TIER1 (18) -0.148* -0.104* 0.247* -0.124* 0.047 0.097* -0.280* -0.017 -0.187* -0.050 0.056 -0.217* 0.080 0.030 
LEV (19) 0.073 0.080 0.446* -0.288* 0.189* 0.334* -0.253* -0.130* -0.096 -0.188* 0.189* -0.180* -0.171* 0.086* 
DEPOTA (20) -0.141* -0.215* -0.460* 0.264* -0.260* -0.394* 0.356* 0.192* -0.059 0.225* -0.150* 0.248* 0.095* 0.067 
LOANTA (21) -0.110* -0.265* -0.127* -0.117* -0.023 -0.092 0.163* 0.243* 0.137* -0.177* 0.264* -0.320* -0.202* 0.091* 
LOANGROW (22) -0.082 -0.162* 0.021 -0.154* -0.007 -0.005 0.041 0.103* -0.028 -0.046 0.000 0.036 0.000 -0.067 
ISLAMIC (23) 0.340* -0.049 0.359* -0.134* 0.329* 0.324* -0.268* 0.038 -0.076 -0.145* 0.130* -0.305* -0.112* 0.061 
GDPGROWTH (24) 0.179* -0.124* -0.096* -0.029 -0.103* -0.051 0.234* 0.089* 0.022 -0.074 -0.154* -0.003 -0.105* 0.002 
G-Index (25) 0.230* -0.080 0.141* -0.262* 0.125* 0.133* 0.077 0.172* 0.141* -0.333* 0.303* -0.471* -0.211* -0.128* 
DIR (26) -0.194* 0.037 -0.233* 0.414* -0.188* -0.263* 0.150* -0.104* 0.040 0.279* -0.263* 0.473* 0.365* -0.133* 
HHI (27) -0.138* 0.017 -0.087* 0.059 -0.125* -0.158* 0.034 0.026 0.144* -0.017 -0.181* -0.119* 0.059 0.152* 
LEGAL (28) 0.203* -0.067 0.131* -0.261* 0.133* 0.125* 0.078 0.240* -0.186* -0.085* 0.119* -0.536* -0.279* 0.325* 
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Notes: The table presents pair-wise correlation between all variables used in all the regression models for the full sample. TR is total risk measured by the standard deviation of 60 monthly stock return consecutively with a minimum of 36 months to 
reflect the market risk. IMPILOAN is the impaired loan to total loans to measure the credit risk. SDROAA is the standard deviation of the return on average assets to measure the operational risk. CTA is the cash to total assets to measure the liquidity 
risk. InZscore1 is the invers of the logzscore to measure the insolvency risk. OVERRISK is factor analysis eigenvalue obtained from five risks measures mentioned before. ROAA is return on average assets. TOBINQ is Equity MV plus liability BV 
divided by asset BV. RGI is risk governance index measured using the first principal component of the risk committee and chief risk officer characteristics.  BODSIZE is the total number of BOD members. BODIND is % independent non-executive 
directors in the BOD. CEO-Duality is dummy variable takes value of 1 if the CEO and the chairman of the board is the same person, and 0 otherwise. INSTOWN is the institutional ownership measured by % shares held by institutions firms to total 
shares. BLOCOWN is the block holder ownership measured by the % shares for owner how own 5% and above to total shares. MANOWN is the insider ownership measured by % shares held by executive directors to total shares. LOGTA is the bank’s 
size measured by natural logarithm of total assets. AGE is the difference between the sample year and the year in which the bank was established.  NONIT is non-interest income to total income. EBIT is earning before interest and tax to total assets. 
TIER 1 is banks’ capital ratio measured by Core capital / Risk weighted assets. LEV is leverage ratio measured by total equity to total assets. DEPOTA is total deposit to total assets. LOANTA is total loan total assets. LOANGROWTH is loan growth 
measured by the difference between current loan and the previous loan divided by previous loans.  COSTEFF is the bank cost efficiency measured by cost/net income. ISLAMIC is unity if the bank is Islamic, 0 otherwise. GDPGROWTH is the GDP 
growth rate. G-Index is country corporate governance quality measured by six indicators. DIR is the deposit Interest Rate. HHI is the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index measures bank market concentration. HHI is calculated as the square sum of the ratio 
of total assets of each bank-year to total assets of all banks each year. It has a value between zero and one. Higher HHI shows higher bank concentration. LEGAL (legal system) is religiosity proxy which take value of 0 if the country not using Shari’ah 
law, 1 for countries combing both Shari’ah law and other legal system, and 2 for countries with only shari’ah law.. *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01 (two-tailed test). 
Table 4.4 (Continued) 
 
 
  
(15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) 
LOGTA (15) 1              
AGE (16) 0.321* 1             
NONINT (17) -0.054 0.031 1            
TIER1 (18) -0.476* -0.295* -0.137* 1           
LEV (19) -0.315* -0.440* -0.051 0.746* 1          
DEPOTA (20) 0.277* 0.290* -0.017 -0.439* -0.726* 1         
LOANTA (21) 0.306* 0.102* -0.271* -0.260* -0.193* 0.204* 1        
LOANGROW (22) -0.088* -0.247* -0.020 0.325* 0.225* -0.008 -0.059 1       
ISLAMIC (23) -0.132* -0.486* -0.206* 0.313* 0.281* -0.159* -0.105* 0.158* 1      
GDPGROWTH (24) -0.024 -0.162* -0.064 0.085* 0.152* -0.077 -0.080 0.096* 0.011 1     
G-Index (25) 0.201* -0.213* -0.272* 0.038 0.230* -0.305* 0.403* -0.020 0.040 0.147* 1    
DIR (26) 0.047 0.354* 0.141* -0.220* -0.309* 0.368* -0.1123* -0.055 -0.362* -0.085* -0.478* 1   
HHI (27) -0.447* -0.047 -0.195* 0.179* 0.074 -0.150* 0.077 0.112* -0.059 0.215* 0.039 -0.2418* 1  
LEGAL (28) -0.024 -0.366* -0.092* 0.171* 0.236* -0.105* 0.296* 0.034 0.360* 0.031 0.146* -0.4682* 0.048 1 
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4.4.2 Empirical Results  
4.4.2.1 RGI and risk-taking 
Tables 4.5- 4.9 show the results from regressing our five risk-taking perspectives on our 
RGI variables and other control variables. Column 1 in the tables shows the regression 
specification, including only the banks’ financial and governance characteristics. The 
regression specification results in column 2 include the country fixed effect in addition to 
the variables that were included in column 1. Column 3 additionally includes the country 
characteristics and year fixed effect in our regression for more sensitivity tests. Columns 4 
and 5 report more robustness checks for our main regression results, which will be 
discussed more in a later section. The standard errors are robust in all of our specifications 
to control for heterogeneity. 
4.4.2.2 RGI and market risk 
Table 4.5 shows the results from regressing market risk (TR) on our RGI variables and 
other control variables. The results of our estimations indicate that the coefficients on RGI 
in columns 1-3 are negative and statistically significant, demonstrating that banks with 
stronger risk governance mechanisms have lower total risk. Furthermore, our interaction 
variable RGI_IB is not significant, indicating that there is no moderating effect of IBs. 
This implies that the relationship between risk governance and risk-taking is relatively 
similar in both CBs and IBs, i.e. effective risk governance is associated with lower total 
risk. 
 
In terms of the controlling variables’ coefficients, we find that BODIND affects the total 
risk positively, which indicates that independent members of the board seek to maximise 
the shareholders’ wealth by taking excessive risks. The results also show that bank size 
(LOGTA) has a negative and significant relationship with banks’ market risk. This points 
out that larger banks have lower total risk, which is consistent with the concept that larger 
banks adopt a stronger risk management function that leads to a decrease in the banks’ 
risk-taking. The negative sign of the Tier1 coefficient might indicate that banks with 
higher capital are more capable of absorbing financial shocks, leading to lower volatility 
in their stock returns. NONINT is positively correlated with banks’ total risk. One 
important variable that has a strong positive and significant relationship with total risk is 
ISLAMIC, which indicates that IBs have a higher total risk than CBs. This might be a 
result of the obligation on IBs to be Shari’ah compliant. Country characteristic variables 
also show a significant effect on banks’ total risk. We find that GDPGROWTH, G-Index 
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and DIR have a positive effect on banks’ total risk, whereas HHI shows a negative effect 
on it. 
 
 
 Baseline estimation Robustness check 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES TR TR TR Residual GMM 
      
TR -lag     0.875*** 
     (0.079) 
RGI -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.004** -0.242*** -0.004* 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.079) (0.002) 
RGI_IB 0.002 0.004 0.000 0.161* 0.005 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.093) (0.003) 
BODSIZE 0.000 0.002 0.000 -0.072 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.050) (0.002) 
BODIND 0.012 0.045*** 0.021** 0.810** 0.008 
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.008) (0.333) (0.013) 
CEO-Duality 0.005 -0.014 -0.006 -0.249 0.013 
 (0.008) (0.012) (0.009) (0.467) (0.013) 
INSTOWN -0.015 -0.010 -0.010 -0.194 -0.006 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.415) (0.018) 
LOGTA -0.007*** -0.014*** -0.007*** -0.098 -0.005 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.093) (0.003) 
AGE 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.003 0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) 
ROAA 0.001 -0.002 0.000 0.203* 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.117) (0.004) 
DEPOTA -0.043 -0.059 -0.072* -2.069* -0.016 
 (0.038) (0.047) (0.038) (1.143) (0.027) 
TIER1 -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.043* 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.023) (0.001) 
LEV 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.035) (0.001) 
NONINT 0.039* 0.036* 0.041* -0.652 -0.025 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.709) (0.024) 
GROWTHOPP -0.011 0.004 -0.001 -1.277 -0.005 
 (0.025) (0.026) (0.023) (1.197) (0.021) 
ISLAMIC 0.019*** 0.016** 0.022*** 0.281 -0.003 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.204) (0.007) 
Table 4.5 Regression results on banks' risk governance and banks’ market risk 
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 Baseline estimation Robustness check 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES TR TR TR Resudial GMM 
      
GDPGROWTH   0.001** 0.011 0.000 
   (0.001) (0.018) (0.000) 
G-Index   0.025** -0.545* -0.002 
   (0.010) (0.307) (0.006) 
DIR   0.008** -0.021 -0.001 
   (0.003) (0.089) (0.002) 
HHI   -0.228*** -1.263 -0.043 
   (0.049) (1.690) (0.032) 
LEGAL   0.008 0.178 0.002 
   (0.010) (0.302) (0.008) 
Constant 0.255*** 0.316*** 0.282*** 4.375* 0.132** 
 (0.050) (0.059) (0.052) (2.317) (0.061) 
      
YEAR EFFECTS NO NO YES YES YES 
COUNTRY EFFECTS NO YES NO NO NO 
Observations 225 225 225 197 208 
R-squared 0.381 0.561 0.539 0.332  
AR (1) test (p-value)     0.001 
AR (2) test (p-value)     0.416 
Hansen test of over-identification (p-value)     0.725 
Diff-in- Hansen test of exogeneity (p-value)         0.31 
Notes: The table presents regression results for banks’ risk governance index and market risk for all samples for the period 2009-2015. TR is total risk measured 
by the standard deviation of 60 monthly stock return consecutively with a minimum of 36 months to reflect the market risk. IDR is the idiosyncratic risk measured 
by the log of the residual of the market model. RGI is risk governance index measured using the first principal component of the risk committee and chief risk 
officer characteristics. RGI_IB is the interaction between risk governance index and Islamic bank. BODSIZE is the total number of BOD members. BODIND is 
% independent non-executive directors in the BOD. CEO-Duality is dummy variable takes value of 1 if the CEO and the chairman of the board is the same person, 
and 0 otherwise. INSTOWN is the institutional ownership measured by % shares held by institutions firms to total shares. LOGTA is the bank’s size measured by 
natural logarithm of total assets. AGE is the difference between the sample year and the year in which the bank was established. ROAA is return on average assets. 
DEPOTA is total deposit to total assets. TIER 1 is banks’ capital ratio measured by Core capital / Risk weighted assets. LEV is leverage ratio measured by total 
equity to total assets. NONIT is non-interest income to total income. GROWTHOPP is Equity MV plus liability BV divided by asset BV. ISLAMIC is unity if the 
bank is Islamic, 0 otherwise. GDPGROWTH is the GDP growth rate. G-Index is country corporate governance quality measured by six indicators. DIR is the 
deposit Interest Rate. HHI is the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index measures bank market concentration. HHI is calculated as the square sum of the ratio of total assets 
of each bank-year to total assets of all banks each year. It has a value between zero and one. Higher HHI shows higher bank concentration. LEGAL (legal system) 
is religiosity proxy which take value of 0 if the country not using Shari’ah law, 1 for countries combing both Shari’ah law and other legal system, and 2 for countries 
with only shari’ah law. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. 
Table 4.5 (Continued) 
4.4.2.3 RGI and credit risk 
Table 4.6 shows the results from the regression of credit risk (IMPALOAN) on our RGI 
variable and other controlling variables. Consistent with the market risk, we find that 
stronger risk governance mechanisms also mitigate the credit risk, as the coefficient of 
IMPALOAN is negative and statistically significant. However, the significantly positive 
coefficient of the interaction term RGI_IB indicates that the effect of risk governance on 
risk-taking may be different in the Islamic bank system. As the absolute value of the 
interaction is 1.948 compared with 1.793 for the risk governance variable (RGI), this 
implies that risk governance may have no effect on credit risk in IBs. The rationale for 
this finding is likely to be because IBs do not take interest on loans; instead they have a 
different operating system for providing their loans that is based on Shari’ah law. 
Therefore, risk governance mechanism in IBs may encounter difficulties in managing 
credit risk if they use the conventional risk management strategies. Hassan and Aliyu 
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(2018) argue that IBs need to have different risk management strategies that are compliant 
with Shari’ah principles. 
 
In terms of other governance control variables, the BODSIZE negatively and significantly 
affects the banks’ credit risks, showing that a smaller board is stronger in reducing the 
banks’ credit risks. Consistent with the market risk, the fraction of independent members 
on the BOD affects the credit risk positively. INSTOWN has a positive effect on banks’ 
credit risk, which supports findings from previous literature that institutional ownership 
supports risk-taking at banks. Also, bank size has a negative relationship with bank credit 
risk, whereas age shows a positive effect on bank credit risk. This indicates that banks 
reaching growth and the mature stages of their lifecycle take higher credit risks to increase 
their performance. The negative coefficients of Tier1 and DEPOSTTA indicate that higher 
capital adequacy and core deposits might lead to a decrease in credit risk. Furthermore, 
the positive coefficient of the LEV variable assures that higher debts would lead to a 
lower credit risk. This may be because assigning higher equity capital may encourage 
banks to take risky strategies in their lending policies. Consistent with our market risk 
analysis we find that NONINT and ISLAMIC affect the credit risk positively. Loans and 
loan growth are negatively associated with credit risk, which was also identified by 
Abedifer et al. (2013). 
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  Baseline estimation Robustness check 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES   IMPALOAN IMPALOAN IMPALOAN LLR GMM 
       
IMPALOAN_lag      0.332*** 
      (0.112) 
RGI  -1.793*** -1.192** -2.249*** -0.258* -2.253*** 
  (0.496) (0.483) (0.582) (0.144) (0.750) 
RGI_IB  1.948*** 1.141 1.837** 0.101 1.995** 
  (0.713) (0.725) (0.734) (0.182) (0.874) 
BODSIZE  -1.136*** -1.361*** -1.174*** 0.023 -0.843 
  (0.375) (0.422) (0.385) (0.099) (0.546) 
BODIND  6.183*** 7.497*** 7.421*** 0.724 1.947 
  (2.184) (2.602) (2.504) (0.587) (2.995) 
CEO-Duality  5.010** 3.281 4.676 1.954*** 1.91 
  (2.367) (3.997) (3.231) (0.558) (2.262) 
INSTOWN  4.726*** 1.548 5.235*** 1.430*** -6.29 
  (1.624) (1.499) (1.647) (0.531) (4.356) 
LOGTA 
 -3.244*** -1.170* -3.675*** -0.722*** -5.122*** 
  (0.696) (0.660) (0.749) (0.179) (1.341) 
AGE  0.176*** 0.132*** 0.171*** 0.050*** 0.106* 
  (0.051) (0.050) (0.047) (0.011) (0.059) 
ROAA 
 -0.436 -0.640 -0.682 -0.586*** 0.458 
  (0.667) (0.645) (0.730) (0.221) (0.489) 
DEPOTA  -17.31** -13.07 -15.78** -6.864*** -27.20*** 
  (6.791) (8.518) (6.462) (1.580) (9.504) 
TIER1  -0.796*** -0.743*** -0.861*** -0.118*** -0.435* 
  (0.172) (0.165) (0.168) (0.037) (0.247) 
LEV  0.731*** 0.809*** 0.809*** -0.0393 0.0208 
  (0.242) (0.246) (0.243) (0.053) (0.333) 
NONINT  17.85*** 21.56*** 20.46*** 2.303 24.80** 
  (6.721) (8.188) (6.479) (1.424) (11.200) 
GROWTHOPP  0.546 4.225 4.663 0.98 9.857 
  (3.511) (4.177) (4.653) (1.464) (9.522) 
LOANTA  -10.32** -10.00* -11.30** 0.7 -5.106 
  (4.132) (5.103) (4.451) (1.288) (6.006) 
Table 4.6 Regression results on banks' risk governance and banks’ credit risk 
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  Baseline estimation Robustness check 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES   IMPALOA
 
IMPALOA
 
IMPALOA
 
LLR GMM 
       
LOANGROW  -0.047 -0.034 -0.051* -0.02*** -0.039** 
  (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.007) (0.015) 
ISLAMIC  5.195*** 5.717*** 5.339*** 0.680** 3.191* 
  (1.231) (1.461) (1.396) (0.341) (1.714) 
GDPGROWTH    -0.169 -0.039 -0.148** 
    (0.108) (0.029) (0.057) 
G-Index    1.793 -0.036 3.386 
    (1.890) (0.664) (3.283) 
DIR    0.594 0.214 0.119 
    (0.539) (0.147) (0.922) 
HHI    0.446 -7.025 -21.15 
    (12.720) (4.252) (19.940) 
LEGAL    0.003 1.173 -2.638 
    (2.118) (0.740) (2.799) 
Constant  73.58*** 38.41*** 68.43*** 17.28**
 
111.0**
   (11.980) (13.220) (12.070) (3.525) (34.620) 
       
YEAR EFFECTS  NO NO YES YES YES 
COUNTRY EFFECTS  NO YES NO NO NO 
Observations  203 203 203 204 185 
R-squared  0.692 0.739 0.727 0.649  
AR (1) test (p-value)      0.05 
AR (2) test (p-value)      0.502 
Hansen test of over-identification (p-
 
     0.624 
Diff-in- Hansen test of exogeneity (p-
 
          0.393 
Notes: The table presents regression results for banks’ risk governance index and credit risk for all samples for the period 2009-2015. IMPILOAN is the impaired 
loan to total loans to measure the credit risk. LLR is loan losses reserve to gross loans. RGI is risk governance index measured using the first principal component 
of the risk committee and chief risk officer characteristics. RGI_IB is the interaction between risk governance index and Islamic bank. BODSIZE is the total number 
of BOD members. BODIND is % independent non-executive directors in the BOD. CEO-Duality is dummy variable takes value of 1 if the CEO and the chairman 
of the board is the same person, and 0 otherwise. INSTOWN is the institutional ownership measured by % shares held by institutions firms to total shares. LOGTA 
is the bank’s size measured by natural logarithm of total assets. AGE is the difference between the sample year and the year in which the bank was established. 
ROAA is return on average assets. DEPOTA is total deposit to total assets. TIER 1 is banks’ capital ratio measured by Core capital / Risk weighted assets. LEV is 
leverage ratio measured by total equity to total assets. NONIT is non-interest income to total income. GROWTHOPP is Equity MV plus liability BV divided by asset 
BV. LOANTA is total loan total assets. LOANGROWTH is loan growth measured by the difference between current loan and the previous loan divided by previous 
loans.  GDPGROWTH is the GDP growth rate. G-Index is country corporate governance quality measured by six indicators. DIR is the deposit Interest Rate. HHI 
is the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index measures bank market concentration. HHI is calculated as the square sum of the ratio of total assets of each bank-year to total 
assets of all banks each year. It has a value between zero and one. Higher HHI shows higher bank concentration. LEGAL (legal system) is religiosity proxy which 
take value of 0 if the country not using Shari’ah law, 1 for countries combing both Shari’ah law and other legal system, and 2 for countries with only shari’ah law. 
Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. 
Table 4.6 (Continued) 
4.4.2.4 RGI and operational risk 
Table 4.7 reports the results from regressing operational risk (SDROAA) on our RGI variable 
and other controlling variables. Consistent with the results found for market risk, significant 
negative RGI and non-significant RGI_IB imply that risk governance has the ability to 
mitigate the operational risks for both CBs and IBs. Furthermore, we find that BODSIZE 
affects SDROAA negatively, supporting the concept that larger board size is more effective in 
reducing banks’ operational risks. Interestingly, the results in Table 4.7 show that the CEO-
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Duality has a positive and significant relationship with SDROAA. This is consistent with the 
sign direction that was predicted in the previous literature, that a CEO who is also the 
chairman of the BOD can benefit from his power and take more risks at the banks (Minton et 
al., 2014). As with credit risk, we find that bank size (LOGTA) and (Tier1) affect the 
operational risk negatively, while NONINT is positively associated with the credit risk. We 
also find that ROAA is positively associated with the operational risk as higher returns should 
lower the operational risk. Lev also has the same effect on the operational risk. Furthermore, a 
high investment growth might encourage banks to take higher risks as the GROWTHOPP is 
positively associated with SDROAA. Notably, the coefficient of ISLAMIC has a positive and 
significant relationship with operational risk. 
 
 
 Baseline estimation Robustness check 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES SDROAA SDROAA SDROAA SDOI GMM 
      
SDROAA_lag     0.468*** 
     (0.078) 
RGI -0.124*** -0.100*** -0.100** -0.100*** -0.101* 
 (0.029) (0.033) (0.038) (0.017) (0.045) 
RGI_IB 0.043 0.017 0.023 0.100*** 0.134* 
 (0.051) (0.060) (0.056) (0.023) (0.072) 
BODSIZE -0.118*** -0.103*** -0.108*** -0.0314*** -0.013 
 (0.031) (0.032) (0.029) (0.012) (0.023) 
BODIND 0.044 0.054 -0.009 0.029 0.134 
 (0.150) (0.194) (0.170) (0.066) (0.341) 
CEO-Duality 0.197** 0.287* 0.241 0.204* 0.697** 
 (0.098) (0.149) (0.150) (0.106) (0.340) 
INSTOWN 0.282 0.335* 0.260 0.033 0.258 
 (0.181) (0.191) (0.178) (0.071) (0.293) 
LOGTA -0.288*** -0.280*** -0.290*** -0.039 -0.171*** 
 (0.048) (0.059) (0.058) (0.027) (0.061) 
AGE 0.005 0.010* 0.006 -0.004** 0.003 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.006) 
ROAA -0.222*** -0.229*** -0.203*** -0.100*** -0.100 
 (0.073) (0.078) (0.072) (0.020) (0.070) 
DEPOTA -0.136 -0.270 -0.069 -0.878*** -0.346 
 (0.468) (0.695) (0.540) (0.214) (0.826) 
TIER1 -0.040*** -0.040*** -0.040*** -0.007 -0.050*** 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.005) (0.012) 
LEV 0.077*** 0.075*** 0.074*** 0.026*** 0.062*** 
 (0.016) (0.019) (0.016) (0.008) (0.017) 
NONINT 1.146** 1.081* 1.045* 0.415** -0.348 
 (0.542) (0.625) (0.557) (0.180) (0.615) 
GROWTHOPP 1.068** 1.458*** 1.020** -0.229 0.880* 
 (0.436) (0.478) (0.473) (0.215) (0.440) 
ISLAMIC 0.400*** 0.470*** 0.418*** 0.138*** 0.056 
 (0.097) (0.111) (0.098) (0.041) (0.141) 
Table 4.7 Regression results on banks' risk governance and banks’ operation risk 
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 Baseline estimation Robustness check 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES SDROAA SDROAA SDROAA SDOI GMM 
      
GDPGROWTH   0.010 0.002 0.0127* 
   (0.011) (0.004) (0.007) 
G-Index   0.031 -0.020 0.048 
   (0.152) (0.075) (0.128) 
DIR   -0.049 0.060*** -0.045 
   (0.042) (0.017) (0.043) 
HHI   -0.914 -0.956*** -0.154 
   (0.745) (0.354) (0.755) 
LEGAL   -0.170 0.480*** 0.223 
   (0.170) (0.085) (0.201) 
Constant 4.385*** 3.807*** 4.994*** 1.365*** 2.014 
 (0.874) (1.060) (1.076) (0.420) (1.222) 
      
YEAR EFFECTS NO NO YES YES YES 
COUNTRY EFFECTS NO YES NO NO NO 
Observations 224 224 224 225 207 
R-squared 0.618 0.64 0.643 0.772  
AR (1) test (p-value)     0.014 
AR (2) test (p-value)     0.124 
Hansen test of over-identification (p-value)     0.910 
Diff-in- Hansen test of exogeneity (p-value)     0.635 
Notes: The table presents regression results for banks’ risk governance index and operational risk for all samples for the period 2009-2015. SDROAA is the 
standard deviation of the return on average assets to measure the operational risk. SDOI is the standard deviation of the operating income to total assets. RGI is 
risk governance index measured using the first principal component of the risk committee and chief risk officer characteristics. RGI_IB is the interaction between 
risk governance index and Islamic bank. BODSIZE is the total number of BOD members. BODIND is % independent non-executive directors in the BOD. CEO-
Duality is dummy variable takes value of 1 if the CEO and the chairman of the board is the same person, and 0 otherwise. INSTOWN is the institutional ownership 
measured by % shares held by institutions firms to total shares. LOGTA is the bank’s size measured by natural logarithm of total assets. AGE is the difference 
between the sample year and the year in which the bank was established. ROAA is return on average assets. DEPOTA is total deposit to total assets. TIER 1 is 
banks’ capital ratio measured by Core capital / Risk weighted assets. LEV is leverage ratio measured by total equity to total assets. NONIT is non-interest income 
to total income. GROWTHOPP is Equity MV plus liability BV divided by asset BV. ISLAMIC is unity if the bank is Islamic, 0 otherwise. GDPGROWTH is the 
GDP growth rate. G-Index is country corporate governance quality measured by six indicators. DIR is the deposit Interest Rate. HHI is the Hirschman-Herfindahl 
Index measures bank market concentration. HHI is calculated as the square sum of the ratio of total assets of each bank-year to total assets of all banks each year. 
It has a value between zero and one. Higher HHI shows higher bank concentration. LEGAL (legal system) is religiosity proxy which take value of 0 if the country 
not using Shari’ah law, 1 for countries combing both Shari’ah law and other legal system, and 2 for countries with only shari’ah law. Heteroscedasticity-robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01 
Table 4.7 (Continued) 
 
4.4.2.5 RGI and liquidity risk 
Table 4.8 shows the results from regressing the liquidity risk (CTA) on the RGI and other 
controlling variables. The results revealed in Table 4.8 show that the RGI affects the banks’ 
liquidity risk (CTA) negatively and this effect stays relatively intact across the two bank 
types.48 This is consistent with other risk aspects, market risk and operational risk. Consistent 
with other risk aspects, we find that the BODSIZE reduces the liquidity risk. Unlike other risk 
perspectives, we find that the coefficient of BODIND is positive and statistically significant. 
This indicates that the fraction of independent members on the board helps to increase the 
                                                     
48 Our measure for liquidity risk is cash to total assets, thus the positive sign of RGI’s coefficient means that risk 
governance mitigates the liquidity risk. 
  
127 
 
liquidity in the banks (decrease the liquidity risk). Similar to operational risk, we find that 
CEO-Duality affects the liquidity risk positively. Importantly, the percentage of shares held 
by directors increases the liquidity at banks. This might be explained by the interests of 
directors, as they would pay more attention and engage in stronger monitoring if they own a 
higher percentage of shares in the bank. Similar to the other risk perspective, we find that 
LOGTA and Tier1 negatively affect the liquidity risk. The LEV coefficient shows a negative 
relationship with liquidity. That means that higher debt leads to a lower liquidity risk. 
Regarding the country characteristic variables, we find a positive relationship with liquidity 
for DIR only. 
 
 
 Baseline estimation Robustness check 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES CTA CTA CTA LA GMM 
      
CTA lag     0.659***      (0.092) 
RGI 1.222** 0.792** 1.007** 0.010* 1.316**  (0.537) (0.385) (0.413) (0.005) (0.497) 
RGI IB -0.404 -0.134 -0.173 -0.003 -0.986 
 (0.645) (0.531) (0.541) (0.008) (0.669) 
BODSIZE 0.907*** 0.666** 0.671** 0.011*** 0.754**  (0.301) (0.259) (0.262) (0.003) (0.370) 
BODIND 2.183 3.983*** 3.633*** -0.010 4.455* 
 (1.443) (1.277) (1.371) (0.020) (2.273) 
CEO-Duality 0.344 -7.532*** -7.713*** -0.028 -5.691  (1.816) (2.847) (2.844) (0.029) (3.499) 
MANOWN 3.498 17.18*** 17.82*** 0.0958 3.293 
 (4.874) (5.706) (5.861) (0.076) (6.378) 
LOGTA -0.067 0.844 1.139* -0.006 0.041  (0.538) (0.522) (0.635) (0.008) (0.521) 
AGE 0.010 -0.001 -0.011 -0.001 0.020 
 (0.041) (0.036) (0.036) (0.000) (0.046) 
ROAA 0.046 -0.699 -0.470 0.001 -0.408  (0.534) (0.544) (0.521) (0.009) (0.516) 
DEPOTA 5.196 4.357 4.264 0.040 -12.750 
 (5.041) (5.497) (5.255) (0.079) (8.376) 
TIER1 0.266* 0.254** 0.282** 0.001 -0.073  (0.145) (0.117) (0.117) (0.001) (0.218) 
LEV -0.527*** -0.368** -0.387** -0.003* -0.067 
 (0.198) (0.176) (0.177) (0.002) (0.283) 
NONINT 3.568 6.439** 6.479** -0.003 3.559  (3.260) (3.127) (3.108) (0.048) (9.657) 
GROWTHOPP -6.086 -5.822 -8.189 -0.052 5.728 
 (5.948) (4.250) (4.988) (0.070) (5.873) 
ISLAMIC 0.543 1.234 1.307 0.007 1.204  (1.132) (1.061) (1.068) (0.015) (0.944) 
Table 4.8 Regression results on banks' risk governance and banks’ liquidity risk 
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 Baseline estimation Robustness check 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES CTA CTA CTA LA GMM 
      
GDPGROWTH  0.021 0.001 0.001 0.035   (0.106) (0.115) (0.001) (0.068) 
G-Index  -0.130 -1.170 0.015 2.770*   (1.674) (1.985) (0.021) (1.600) 
DIR  2.586*** 2.350*** 0.015** 1.831***   (0.421) (0.511) (0.007) (0.586) 
HHI  -8.364 -6.372 -0.244* -31.36***   (11.410) (12.320) (0.132) (4.448) 
LEGAL  -2.266 -2.950 0.003 1.671   (1.852) (1.945) (0.021) (1.907) 
Constant 7.91 -11.15 -11.9 0.322** -3.369  (9.637) (10.320) (10.660) (0.139) (11.730) 
      
YEAR EFFECTS NO NO YES YES YES 
COUNTRY EFFECTS NO YES NO NO NO 
Observations 223 223 223 240 200 
R-squared 0.35 0.473 0.494 0.31  
AR (1) test (p-value)     0.001 
AR (2) test (p-value)     0.131 
Hansen test of over-identification (p-value)   0.631 
Diff-in- Hansen test of 
  
    0.373 
Notes: The table presents regression results for banks’ risk governance index and liquidity risk for all samples for the period 2009-2015. CTA is the cash to total 
assets to measure the liquidity risk. LA is the liquid assets to total assets. RGI is risk governance index measured using the first principal component of the risk 
committee and chief risk officer characteristics. RGI_IB is the interaction between risk governance index and Islamic bank. BODSIZE is the total number of BOD 
members. BODIND is % independent non-executive directors in the BOD. CEO-Duality is dummy variable takes value of 1 if the CEO and the chairman of the 
board is the same person, and 0 otherwise. MANOWN is the insider ownership measured by % shares held by executive directors to total shares.  LOGTA is the 
bank’s size measured by natural logarithm of total assets. AGE is the difference between the sample year and the year in which the bank was established. ROAA 
is return on average assets. DEPOTA is total deposit to total assets. TIER 1 is banks’ capital ratio measured by Core capital / Risk weighted assets. LEV is leverage 
ratio measured by total equity to total assets. NONIT is non-interest income to total income. GROWTHOPP is Equity MV plus liability BV divided by asset BV. 
ISLAMIC is unity if the bank is Islamic, 0 otherwise. GDPGROWTH is the GDP growth rate. G-Index is country corporate governance quality measured by six 
indicators. DIR is the deposit Interest Rate. HHI is the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index measures bank market concentration. HHI is calculated as the square sum of 
the ratio of total assets of each bank-year to total assets of all banks each year. It has a value between zero and one. Higher HHI shows higher bank concentration. 
LEGAL (legal system) is religiosity proxy which take value of 0 if the country not using Shari’ah law, 1 for countries combing both Shari’ah law and other legal 
system, and 2 for countries with only shari’ah law. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. 
Table 4.8 (Continued) 
4.4.2.6 RGI and insolvency risk 
Table 4.9 presents the results from regressing the insolvency risk (InZscore1) on the RGI and 
other controlling variables. Just like other risk perspectives (i.e. market risk, operational risk 
and liquidity risk), we find a negative and significant relationship between RGI and banks’ 
insolvency risk for both CBs and IBs. This supports our first hypothesis, that risk governance 
mechanisms mitigate all bank risk perspective, and our second hypothesis that such an effect 
remains across both banking systems. Furthermore, BODSIZE has a negative relationship 
with bank insolvency risk, confirming the results of our previous tables (5-7) that a larger 
board size is more effective in mitigating risks. We also find that bank size affects the 
insolvency risk negatively, which is consistent with the concept that larger banks usually 
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adopt a more effective risk governance function due to the high risks that they are involved in. 
The coefficient of age shows a positive and significant relationship with banks’ insolvency 
risk, which is consistent with other risk perspectives – banks in their growth stages take on 
more risks. This can be confirmed by looking at the banks’ investment opportunities, where 
we find that GROWTHOPP is positively and significantly associated with banks’ insolvency 
risk. This indicates that banks with high investment opportunities have higher insolvency 
risks. As we discussed before, banks in their growth stages would have higher investment 
opportunities, leading them to increase their risk-taking. Just consistent with other risk 
aspects, we find a negative association with insolvency risk for ROAA and Tier, while 
NONINT and LEV affect the insolvency risk positively. Lastly, ISLAMIC is positively 
associated with insolvency risk, confirming that IBs have higher insolvency risks. We also 
find that stronger country governance affects insolvency risk positively. 
 
 
 Baseline estimation Robustness check 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES InZscore1 InZscore1 InZscore1 InZscore2 GMM 
      
InZscore1_lag     -0.145* 
     (0.074) 
RGI -0.029*** -0.027** -0.029*** -0.028** -0.041** 
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.020) 
RGI_IB 0.007 0.001 0.005 0.014 0.033 
 (0.019) (0.022) (0.021) (0.015) (0.026) 
BODSIZE -0.036*** -0.034*** -0.033*** -0.027*** -0.018 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.010) (0.007) (0.014) 
BODIND 0.010 0.025 0.020 0.048 -0.008 
 (0.046) (0.046) (0.053) (0.036) (0.048) 
CEO-Duality 0.071 0.140 0.138* 0.125 0.057 
 (0.055) (0.087) (0.081) (0.079) (0.066) 
INSTOWN 0.033 0.073 0.064 0.081** 0.068 
 (0.045) (0.053) (0.047) (0.039) (0.058) 
LOGTA -0.068*** -0.063*** -0.076*** -0.074*** -0.068*** 
 (0.015) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.021) 
AGE 0.002** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002** 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
ROAA -0.070** -0.081** -0.079** -0.035*** -0.047** 
 (0.029) (0.032) (0.031) (0.013) (0.023) 
DEPOTA -0.067 -0.104 -0.030 -0.124 -0.263 
 (0.148) (0.202) (0.158) (0.137) (0.230) 
TIER1 -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.023*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) 
LEV 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.015** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) 
NONINT 0.206* 0.242* 0.261** 0.307*** 0.009 
 (0.122) (0.127) (0.125) (0.115) (0.197) 
GROWTHOPP 0.331*** 0.408*** 0.349*** 0.260** 0.263** 
 (0.119) (0.128) (0.124) (0.103) (0.104) 
ISLAMIC 0.103*** 0.129*** 0.109*** 0.106*** 0.077 
 (0.026) (0.031) (0.026) (0.024) (0.053) 
Table 4.9 Regression results on banks' risk governance and banks’ insolvency risk 
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 Baseline estimation Robustness check 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES InZscore1 InZscore1 InZscore1 InZscore2 GMM 
      
GDPGROWTH   0.003 0.001 0.004 
   (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
G-Index   0.087** 0.065 -0.022 
   (0.044) (0.041) (0.053) 
DIR   -0.003 0.000 -0.012 
   (0.009) (0.008) (0.012) 
HHI   -0.163 -0.182 -0.413 
   (0.182) (0.171) (0.366) 
LEGAL   0.023 0.031 0.005 
   (0.043) (0.038) (0.056) 
Constant 1.395*** 1.195*** 1.377*** 1.389*** 1.724*** 
 (0.301) (0.294) (0.280) (0.258) (0.425) 
      
YEAR EFFECTS NO NO YES YES YES 
COUNTRY EFFECTS NO YES NO NO NO 
Observations 223 223 223 224 203 
R-squared 0.531 0.566 0.56 0.591  
AR (1) test (p-value)     0.000 
AR (2) test (p-value)     0.975 
Hansen test of over-identification (p-value)    0.442 
Diff-in- Hansen test of 
  
    0.579 
Notes: The table presents regression results for banks’ risk governance index and insolvency risk for all samples for the period 2009-2015. InZscore1 is the invers 
of the logzscore to measure the insolvency risk. Zscore is measured by taking equity to total assets plus ROAA divided by SDROAA. InZscore2 is invers of another 
measure of Zscore using the equity to total assets divided by SDROAA. SDROAA is the standard deviation of the return on average assets. RGI_IB is the interaction 
between risk governance index and Islamic bank. BODSIZE is the total number of BOD members. BODIND is % independent non-executive directors in the BOD. 
CEO-Duality is dummy variable takes value of 1 if the CEO and the chairman of the board is the same person, and 0 otherwise. INSTOWN is the institutional 
ownership measured by % shares held by institutions firms to total shares. LOGTA is the bank’s size measured by natural logarithm of total assets. AGE is the 
difference between the sample year and the year in which the bank was established. ROAA is return on average assets. DEPOTA is total deposit to total assets. 
TIER 1 is banks’ capital ratio measured by Core capital / Risk weighted assets. LEV is leverage ratio measured by total equity to total assets. NONIT is non-
interest income to total income. GROWTHOPP is Equity MV plus liability BV divided by asset BV. ISLAMIC is unity if the bank is Islamic, 0 otherwise. 
GDPGROWTH is the GDP growth rate. G-Index is country corporate governance quality measured by six indicators. DIR is the deposit Interest Rate. HHI is the 
Hirschman-Herfindahl Index measures bank market concentration. HHI is calculated as the square sum of the ratio of total assets of each bank-year to total assets 
of all banks each year. It has a value between zero and one. Higher HHI shows higher bank concentration. LEGAL (legal system) is religiosity proxy which take 
value of 0 if the country not using Shari’ah law, 1 for countries combing both Shari’ah law and other legal system, and 2 for countries with only shari’ah law. 
Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. 
Table 4.9 (Continued) 
 
4.4.2.7 Risk governance mechanism (RGI) and risk management effectiveness 
Table 4.10 reports the results on the moderating effects of risk governance mechanisms on the 
relationship between banks’ performance and overall risk-taking. We control for governance, 
financial and country characteristics across all our specification models. We also control for 
year fixed effects for all our performance specification models. Columns 1-2 show the results 
after regressing the performance accounting measures on the interaction variables 
(RGI_OVERRISK and RGI_OVERRISK _IB). Columns 3-4 show the performance 
regression using market-based measures (TOBINQ and MTB). The standard errors are robust 
in all of our specifications to control for heterogeneity. 
 
In detail, this moderating effect provides an indication of whether risk governance 
mechanisms can improve the effectiveness of banks’ risk management. There are four main 
variables in this investigation: (1) overall risk-taking variable (OVERRISK); (2) the 
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interaction term between overall risk-taking and Islamic bank (OVERRISK_ IB); (3) the 
interaction term between the risk governance index and overall risk-taking 
(RGI_OVERRISK); and (4) the three-way interaction between the risk governance index, 
overall risk-taking, and Islamic bank (RGI_OVERRISK_IB). First, the overall risk variable 
(OVERRISK) captures the general effect of risk-taking on banks’ financial performance. This 
relationship indicates the effectiveness of bank risk management. Specifically, the risk-return 
trade-off states that a higher return can be achieved by taking higher risks. Therefore, a 
significant positive coefficient of OVERRISK signifies the effective risk management of 
banks. Other than that, insignificant or significantly negative coefficients of OVERRISK 
imply that bank risk management is ineffective. Second, the interaction term OVERRISK_IB 
provides a comparison of risk management effectiveness between CBs and IBs. Third, the 
interaction RGI_OVERRISK indicates whether risk governance mechanisms influence the 
effectiveness of bank risk management. Finally, the three-way interaction 
RGI_OVERRISK_IB implies whether the influences of risk governance mechanisms on risk 
management effectiveness are different across the two bank types. 
 
As explained, the obtained insignificant OVERRISK and OVERRISK_IB coefficients for 
both accounting and market performances imply that CBs and IBs do not perform effective 
risk management due to their false risk judgements. However, risk governance mechanisms 
positively influence this. Basically, the significantly positive interaction between the risk 
governance index and risk-taking (RGI_OVERRISK) is likely to make the insignificant 
OVERRISK positive and statistically significant, as the absolute value of the interaction term 
coefficient is much higher than that of the OVERRISK coefficient (0.437 vs 0.057). This 
indicates that stronger risk governance effectively improves banks’ risk management. 
Furthermore, taking into account Islamic banks in the three-way interaction 
RGI_OVERISK_IB, its significantly negative coefficient has an absolute value similar to the 
positive coefficient of RGI_OVERISK (0.421 vs 0.437). This implies that the improvement in 
risk management brought about by strong risk governance virtually disappears in IBs. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that risk governance in IBs is not effectively managing the 
risks. 
 
Combining these findings with all the findings from Tables 4.5-4.9, the results on both 
accounting and market performance measures suggest that stronger risk governance 
mechanisms can enhance the risk management effectiveness, besides mitigating the banks’ 
risk-taking activities. However, in the case of IBs, whilst risk governance mechanisms reduce 
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risk-taking, they do not improve the effectiveness of the banks’ risk management. This is an 
interesting finding to be explored. As emphasised earlier, lower risk does not necessarily 
mean better risk management if the lower risk is monitored without any consideration of 
returns. For example, the RC can put pressure on management to lower the risk they take 
through stricter monitoring. However, if the RC does not consider the change of returns, 
management may end up forgoing high-risk high-return projects. As a result, risk governance 
may not improve or even worsen the risk management effectiveness. This is likely to be the 
case with IBs, as they have more pressures from many other restrictions such as Shari’ah 
compliance. Furthermore, most Islamic clients are religious clients, who tend to be risk 
averse. Therefore, risk governance focuses more on reducing risk than on effective risk 
management for higher returns. 
  
The coefficient of CEO-Duality has a positive and significant relationship with ROAA, 
ROAE, TOBINQ, and MTB, confirming the idea that a CEO with a BOD chairman position 
would achieve high performance because of their ability to take higher risk. The results 
suggest that higher debt decreases the ROAA, but increases market performance. LOANTA 
shows a positive and significant relationship with ROAA, ROAE, and MTB, which indicates 
that higher risk would lead to higher performance. Consistent with previous literature, we find 
that cost efficiency is related with performance negatively for both accounting and market 
measures. Importantly, we find that IBs have a lower accounting performance but a stronger 
market performance than CBs. LOGGDP is negatively related to accounting performance, but 
positively related to market performance. We also find that the G-Index is negatively related 
to market performance, but is positively related to accounting performance. While the HHI is 
negatively related to accounting performance, it has a positive relationship with market 
performance. This shows that high competition in the market causes banks to take higher 
risks, leading to lower profits for banks. However, this is not the case for the bank market 
value, as the market value can be increased if banks take higher risks. Also, we find that 
LEGAL has a positive impact on both accounting and market performance. This indicates that 
countries with a strict Islamic legal system have a higher performance. 
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 Accounting performance Market performance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES ROAA ROAE TOBINQ MTB 
     
RGI 0.180*** 0.839* -0.005 -0.040 
 (0.065) (0.501) (0.005) (0.042) 
RGI_IB -0.065 -0.119 -0.011 -0.084 
 (0.081) (0.593) (0.008) (0.060) 
RGI_OVERRISK 0.437** 3.674*** 0.050*** 0.480*** 
 (0.177) (1.342) (0.017) (0.126) 
RGI_OVERRISK_IB -0.421* -3.515** -0.045** -0.454*** 
 (0.219) (1.533) (0.021) (0.155) 
OVERRISK 0.057 -0.042 -0.043 -0.248 
 (0.254) (2.031) (0.027) (0.210) 
OVERRISK_IB -0.278 -0.687 0.025 0.060 
 (0.278) (2.082) (0.029) (0.225) 
BODSIZE 0.087*** 0.332 0.000 -0.027 
 (0.033) (0.248) (0.003) (0.025) 
BODIND -0.336 -2.092 -0.023 -0.155 
 (0.206) (1.434) (0.019) (0.149) 
CEO-Duality 0.368* 3.172* 0.070*** 0.567*** 
 (0.221) (1.724) (0.025) (0.169) 
LOGTA 0.026 -0.048 0.002 -0.008 
 (0.058) (0.432) (0.008) (0.052) 
DEPOTA 0.291 3.792 0.115 0.118 
 (0.835) (4.971) (0.075) (0.495) 
LEV 0.050*** 0.056 -0.002* -0.024*** 
 (0.013) (0.082) (0.001) (0.009) 
NONINT 0.977 6.649* -0.003 0.015 
 (0.619) (3.789) (0.057) (0.400) 
LOANTA 0.985* 10.95*** 0.059 0.673* 
 (0.567) (4.137) (0.052) (0.388) 
COSTEFF -0.047*** -0.282*** -0.001*** -0.012*** 
 (0.005) (0.033) (0.000) (0.003) 
Table 4.10 The effective of the risk governance effectiveness on the association between risk-taking and 
performance 
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 Accounting performance Market performance  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES ROAA ROAE TOBINQ MTB 
     
ISLAMIC -0.127 -1.858** 0.066*** 0.563*** 
 (0.120) (0.874) (0.013) (0.101) 
LOGGDP -0.203** -1.593** 0.048*** 0.337*** 
 (0.081) (0.620) (0.012) (0.094) 
G-Index 0.493** 2.498* -0.097*** -0.879*** 
 (0.195) (1.485) (0.028) (0.229) 
HHI -2.369* -21.26** 0.629*** 4.507*** 
 (1.294) (9.856) (0.143) (1.288) 
LEGAL 0.516*** 2.685** 0.042** 0.224 
 (0.189) (1.301) (0.020) (0.159) 
Constant 2.423* 26.21*** 0.377** -2.208* 
 (1.354) (9.605) (0.159) (1.296) 
     
YEAR EFFECTS YES YES YES YES 
Observations 228 228 223 228 
R-squared 0.749 0.693 0.613 0.587 
Notes: The table presents regression results for banks’ risk governance effectiveness in managing the risk and its effect on the bank’ performance for full samples 
for the period 2009-2015. ROAA is return on average assets. ROAE is return on average equity. Both of ROAA and ROAE measures provide accounting based 
performance measures. TOBINQ is Equity MV plus liability BV divided by asset BV, and MTB is market to book value of equity. Both of TOBINQ and MTB 
measures provide market based performance measures. RGI is risk governance index measured using the first principal component of the risk committee and chief 
risk officer characteristics. RGI_IB is the interaction between risk governance index and Islamic bank. RGI_OVERRISK is the interaction between risk governance 
index and overall risk. RGI_OVERRISK_IB is the interaction between risk governance index and overall risk and Islamic banks. OVERRISK is factor analysis 
eigenvalue obtained from five risks aspects that tested before. OVERRISK_IB is the interaction variable between overall risk and Islamic bank dummy variable. 
BODSIZE is the total number of BOD members. BODIND is % independent non-executive directors in the BOD. CEO-Duality is dummy variable takes value of 
1 if the CEO and the chairman of the board is the same person, and 0 otherwise. INSTOWN is the institutional ownership measured by % shares held by institutions 
firms to total shares. LOGTA is the bank’s size measured by natural logarithm of total assets. DEPOTA is total deposit to total assets. LEV is leverage ratio 
measured by total equity to total assets. NONIT is non-interest income to total income. LOANTA is total loan total assets. . COSTEFF is the bank cost efficiency 
measured by cost/net income. ISLAMIC is unity if the bank is Islamic, 0 otherwise. LOGGDP is the country GDP per capita measured by Natural logarithm of 
GDP per capita.  G-Index is country corporate governance quality measured by six indicators. HHI is the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index measures bank market 
concentration. HHI is calculated as the square sum of the ratio of total assets of each bank-year to total assets of all banks each year. It has a value between zero 
and one. Higher HHI shows higher bank concentration. LEGAL (legal system) is religiosity proxy which take value of 0 if the country not using Shari’ah law, 1 
for countries combing both Shari’ah law and other legal system, and 2 for countries with only shari’ah law. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. 
Table 4.10 (Continued) 
 
4.4.3 Robustness checks 
As mentioned earlier, we conducted several tests for our robustness check. First, in all the 
result tables for the five investigated risk perspectives (Tables 4.5-4.9, columns 1-3), we used 
different sets of control variables and different dummy fixed effects (year and countries) to 
examine the relationship between risk governance mechanisms and risk-taking aspects. 
Intriguingly, our results hold across all specification models (1-3). Second, for each risk 
aspect we employed an alternative measure to test if the findings would hold. These 
alternative measures were: idiosyncratic risk (IDR) for market risk, loan losses reserve (LLR) 
for credit risk, standard deviation of operation income (SDOI) for operational risk, liquid and 
cash equivalent to total assets (LA) for liquidity risk, and the inverse ratio of the equity to 
total assets to SDROAA (INZscore2) for insolvency risk. According to the results presented 
in column 4 of each table, consistent findings were found for all these measures. 
 
Third, following Wintoki et al. (2012), we employed GMM as another statistical test to 
control for endogeneity problems. Column 5 in our Tables 4.5-4.9 presents the retesting 
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results for the risk governance-risk-taking relationship using the GMM specification model. It 
has shown that the results still hold consistently across all our risk perspectives using this 
alternative method. The validity tests confirm that our GMM estimators are valid. We report 
the first-order serial correlation (AR(1)), which shows a significant result (p-value < 5%) 
across all our risk perspectives. This means that the null hypothesis can be rejected, and hence 
confirms that the residuals in the first differences are correlated. We also present the second-
order correlation (AR(2)) and Hansen tests of over-identification in all our risk perspectives 
(Tables 4.5-4.9). The AR(2) tests yield a p-values of 0.41, 0.50, 0.12, 0.13, and 0.97 for 
market, credit, operational, liquidity, and insolvency risks, respectively. This means that there 
is no sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation of second 
differences. Furthermore, the Hansen results show that we cannot reject the hypothesis that 
our instruments are valid. Moreover, Tables 4-8 reveal the exogeneity tests of a subset of our 
instruments. The results of these tests declare that the additional subset of instruments (as 
lagged differences) is exogenous. 
 
Fourth, to capture a full picture of the relationship between risk governance mechanisms and 
banks’ risk-taking, we construct an index containing all of our risk perspectives, using the 
factor analysis approach.49 Table 4.11 provides the results for regressing the overall risk index 
(OVERRISK) on the RGI. Column 1 in the table shows the regression specification, including 
only the banks’ financial and governance characteristics. The regression specification results 
in column 2 include the country fixed effect, in addition to the variables that have already 
been included in column 1. Column 3 additionally includes the country characteristics and 
year fixed effect in our regression for more sensitivity tests, and columns 4 is for more 
robustness checks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
49 Our index includes all risk perspectives, these are: market, credit, operational, liquidity, and insolvency risks. 
We try to make all the measures with the same directions so we take the invers ratio of the CAT (1/CTA). 
  
136 
 
 
 
Table 4.11 Regression results on banks' risk governance and banks’ overall risk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Baseline estimation Robustness check 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES OVERRISK OVERRISK OVERRISK GMM 
     
OVERRISK_lag    0.501*** 
    (0.061) 
RGI -0.092*** -0.064*** -0.060** -0.073** 
 (0.021) (0.023) (0.025) (0.035) 
RGI_IB -0.013 -0.042 -0.039 0.092 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.034) (0.064) 
BODSIZE -0.074*** -0.036* -0.066*** -0.001 
 (0.020) (0.019) (0.018) (0.029) 
BODIND 0.186** 0.394*** 0.174* 0.154 
 (0.094) (0.110) (0.092) (0.179) 
CEO-Duality 0.116 0.015 0.111 -0.244 
 (0.078) (0.099) (0.083) (0.618) 
INSTOWN 0.177 0.202 0.174 0.188 
 (0.133) (0.137) (0.130) (0.260) 
LOGTA -0.143*** -0.149*** -0.140*** -0.012 
 (0.035) (0.042) (0.042) (0.117) 
AGE 0.003 0.005** 0.004 -0.003 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
ROAA -0.111*** -0.151*** -0.116*** -0.052 
 (0.037) (0.039) (0.038) (0.038) 
DEPOTA -0.690** -0.367 -0.566 0.588 
 (0.325) (0.376) (0.354) (0.578) 
TIER1 -0.024*** -0.027*** -0.021*** -0.015* 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009) 
LEV 0.022** 0.031*** 0.019** 0.023** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
NONINT 0.783*** 0.838*** 0.879*** 0.284 
 (0.254) (0.286) (0.284) (0.454) 
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 Baseline estimation Robustness  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES OVERRISK OVERRISK OVERRISK GMM 
     
GROWTHOPP 0.271 0.418 0.311 0.416 
 (0.292) (0.315) (0.301) (0.444) 
ISLAMIC 0.376*** 0.437*** 0.417*** -0.226 
 (0.076) (0.080) (0.074) (0.200) 
GDPGROWTH   0.010 0.002 
   (0.006) (0.007) 
G-Index   0.115 0.041 
   (0.111) (0.256) 
DIR   -0.003 -0.007 
   (0.031) (0.056) 
HHI   -0.833 -1.951 
   (0.581) (1.730) 
LEGAL   -0.134 -0.131 
   (0.111) (0.212) 
Constant 2.728*** 1.942*** 2.750*** -0.208 
 (0.618) (0.698) (0.773) (1.887) 
     
YEAR EFFECTS NO NO YES YES 
COUNTRY EFFECTS NO YES NO NO 
Observations 211 211 211 188 
R-squared 0.588 0.679 0.633  
AR (1) test (p-value)    0.005 
AR (2) test (p-value)    0.183 
Hansen test of over-identification (p-value)    0.963 
Diff-in- Hansen test of exogeneity (p-
value) 
   0.301 
Notes: The table presents regression results for banks’ risk governance index and overall risk for all samples for the period 2009-2015. OVERRISK is factor 
analysis eigenvalue obtained from five risks aspects that tested before. RGI is risk governance index measured using the first principal component of the risk 
committee and chief risk officer characteristics. RGI_IB is the interaction between risk governance index and Islamic bank. BODSIZE is the total number of BOD 
members. BODIND is % independent non-executive directors in the BOD. CEO-Duality is dummy variable takes value of 1 if the CEO and the chairman of the 
board is the same person, and 0 otherwise. INSTOWN is the institutional ownership measured by % shares held by institutions firms to total shares. LOGTA is the 
bank’s size measured by natural logarithm of total assets. AGE is the difference between the sample year and the year in which the bank was established. ROAA 
is return on average assets. DEPOTA is total deposit to total assets. TIER 1 is banks’ capital ratio measured by Core capital / Risk weighted assets. LEV is leverage 
ratio measured by total equity to total assets. NONIT is non-interest income to total income. GROWTHOPP is Equity MV plus liability BV divided by asset BV. 
ISLAMIC is unity if the bank is Islamic, 0 otherwise. GDPGROWTH is the GDP growth rate. G-Index is country corporate governance quality measured by six 
indicators. DIR is the deposit Interest Rate. HHI is the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index measures bank market concentration. HHI is calculated as the square sum of 
the ratio of total assets of each bank-year to total assets of all banks each year. It has a value between zero and one. Higher HHI shows higher bank concentration. 
LEGAL (legal system) is religiosity proxy which take value of 0 if the country not using Shari’ah law, 1 for countries combing both Shari’ah law and other legal 
system, and 2 for countries with only shari’ah law. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. 
Table 4.11 (Continued) 
 
The results of Table 4.11 show that the coefficients of RGI consistently carry a negative and 
significant association with the banks’ overall risk-taking. This confirms our previous results 
from the main analysis that risk governance mechanisms mitigate risk-taking effectively. 
However, the insignificant interaction variables (RGI_IBs) indicate that the obtained 
mitigation of risk caused by risk governance mechanisms is relatively similar across CBs and 
IBs.  
Fifth, as our sample consist of both banks with a stand-alone board risk committee (treatment 
group) and banks without a stand-alone board risk committee (control group), we use 
propensity score matching to perform matched sample analysis. We estimate our main 
regression based on two classifications. First, we classify banks’ categories based on the RC 
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existing only. Second, we classify the banks in our sample based on the existence of both RC 
and CRO. We use the full sample (2009-2015) to estimate a bank’s propensity to form a 
stand-alone board risk committee and/or to assign CRO based on a number of governance 
characteristics, banks-specific characteristics and country code. For the banks’ governance, 
we include board size, board independence, CEO-Duality and CROPRESENT. For the banks’ 
specific characteristics, we create a set of variables that reflect the banks’ balance sheets and 
income structure. These are; deposit ratio, leverage ratio, loan to assets ratio, and non-interest 
to income ratio. We also control for the bank size, bank type and country code. The R2 
obtained from the first estimation (logistic regression) indicate that the probability of forming 
a stand-alone board risk committee is around 28% and 24% for the other group (forming a 
stand-alone board risk committee and assigning CRO). However, the result for first group 
(only RC existing) shows that there is a significant difference between the two matched 
samples (banks with RC and without RC); that is banks with RC existing have lower overall 
risk-taking activities.50 The same result is found for the second classification. However, we 
also use the matched-sample technique to estimate the association between RGI and risk-
taking. The results from this analysis are presented in Table 4.12 (column 1 for first 
classification and column 2 for second classification), which are consistent with our main 
inferences that stronger RGI is associated with less enterprise- wide risk.  
Finally, we use additional control variables for both models (risk-taking and performance) to 
estimate our regressions. Our main independent variables results are holds across these 
additional tests. These tests are presented in appendices 4 and 5.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
50 We use the weights that generated from the first stage regression (logistics regression for the adoption of RC) 
to match the two groups; these are banks with RC (treatment group) and banks without RC (control group). 
However, the matching process between the outcome of the treatment group and outcome of the control group 
allows us to determine the average treatment effect, which shows a significant difference in the mean value of 
risk-taking between the two groups for each category. The mean value of OVERRISK for banks that have a risk 
committee (treatment group) is -0.17, whereas banks without risk committee (control group) have a mean value 
of 0.588.  
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 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES OVERRISK OVERRISK 
   
RGI -0.060** -0.115*** 
 (0.028) (0.031) 
RGI_IB -0.121*** -0.019 
 (0.032) (0.034) 
BODSIZE -0.106*** -0.061** 
 (0.019) (0.024) 
BODIND 0.137 0.115 
 (0.103) (0.120) 
CEO-Duality 0.092 0.543*** 
 (0.094) (0.168) 
INSTOWN 0.233** 0.259 
 (0.102) (0.180) 
LOGTA -0.163*** -0.147** 
 (0.040) (0.057) 
AGE 0.007*** 0.004 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
ROAA -0.225*** -0.123** 
 (0.032) (0.049) 
DEPOTA -0.205 -1.266*** 
 (0.411) (0.401) 
TIER1 -0.025*** -0.008 
 (0.007) (0.010) 
LEV 0.025** 0.006 
 (0.011) (0.012) 
NONINT 0.686** 0.468 
 (0.298) (0.328) 
GROWTHOPP 0.571 -0.152 
 (0.347) (0.518) 
ISLAMIC 0.512*** 0.371*** 
 (0.083) (0.084) 
GDPGROWTH 0.005 0.020* 
 (0.006) (0.010) 
G-Index 0.285* 0.066 
 (0.146) (0.194) 
DIR 0.023 -0.035 
 (0.034) (0.050) 
HHI -0.493 -0.292 
 (0.823) (1.094) 
LEGAL 0.014 0.131 
 (0.098) (0.151) 
Constant 2.680*** 3.806*** 
 (0.810) (1.062) 
   
YEAR EFFECTS YES YES 
COUNTRY EFFECTS YES YES 
Observations 311 171 
R-squared 0.907 0.750 
Note. See Appendix 2 for variables definitions. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 
0.01. 
Table 4.12 OLS regression using propensity matching score 
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4.5 Conclusions 
Taking a great inspiration from the recent financial crisis over 2007-2008, for which the 
excessive risk-taking of banks has been the most blamed and criticised aspect, the current 
study attempts to learn more about bank’s risk-taking and risk management systems. Notably, 
this study directs the focus on both conventional and Islamic banks. Specifically, the study 
investigates the effect of the recent new format of risk governance, i.e. a dedicated RC and 
CRO, on bank risk-taking and risk management effectiveness, in two different banking 
systems (CBs and IBs). Besides, unlike previous studies that only examined market risk and 
credit risk, this study is the first to consider risk-taking from five different risk perspectives: 
market, credit, liquidity, operational, and insolvency risks, to assure that the risk governance 
mechanisms are effective in managing and monitoring all risk types. 
 
Intriguingly, we found that risk governance has the power to lower all five investigated risk 
types for CBs. This implies the effectiveness and value-added of having a dedicated risk 
committee and chief risk officer enhance risk management practices in banks. The findings 
are consistent with previous literature (e.g. Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013) who find that stronger 
risk governance index decreases market and credit risks. From the institutional theory 
perspectives, banks may create a separate risk committee and assign chief risk officer in order 
to enhance risk management practices in the banks, and monitor the executive management in 
regard to the matching of the banks risk appetite and profile. However, the findings are 
slightly different for IBs such that we did not document any significant effect of risk 
governance on credit risk, whilst the effects on other types of risk are relatively the same as 
those for CBs. One potential underlying reason of this insignificant relationship between risk 
governance and credit risk-taking is the unique and complex characteristic of IBs profit and 
loss sharing contracts. More specifically, members on risk committee and chief risk officer in 
IBs might face some difficulties in managing credit risk from PLS contracts as there are 
restrictions on the use of conventional hedging tools and a lack of approved hedging 
instruments that are compliant with Shari’ah laws. However, these results suggest that banks’ 
risk-taking activities might be constrained by having stronger risk governance mechanisms 
for both CBs and IBs, except from credit risks, which are only applicable to CBs. 
 
Up to this stage, the study has learned about the ability of risk governance to lower the risk-
taking practices of banks. However, this mitigation of risks does not indicate an effective risk 
management. Basically, risk management is deemed to be effective when management 
understand the rationale behind every single risky decision that they make, i.e. the returns 
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associated with risky investments. According to the risk-return trade-off, an effective 
management should only take more risk for higher returns. It is true that risk governance’s 
roles are to oversee and manage the level of risk that banks take. However, if the risk 
governance cannot understand and take into account the returns associated with the 
management’s risky decisions during their monitoring process, this may impose unnecessary 
pressure that forces management to make an erroneous combination of risk-return 
investments. Hence, the effectiveness of risk management is damaged. Therefore, the study 
focus is extended further to this interest. The examination suggests that risk governance 
mechanisms can improve the effectiveness of bank risk management. This indicates that 
effective separate risk committee and chief risk officer can enhance the banks risk 
management effectiveness by taking appropriate decision regarding the risk-taking activities.  
Based on the agency theory, banks might apply stronger risk governance mechanism to 
increase the risk management effectiveness, and hence is more likely to meet and protect the 
shareholders’ interests.  
However, this result can only hold for CBs, not for IBs. Specifically, the risk governance of 
IBs has no influence on their risk management effectiveness. In the case of IBs, risk 
governance mechanisms reduce risk-taking, yet their ability to increase risk management 
effectiveness is not pronounced. Taking decision regarding risk activities without considering 
return levels may lead the management to forgo high-risk-high-return projects. This might be 
the case for IBs, as more pressures derived from Shari’ah law could be the reason of the risk 
governance failure to enhance the risk management effectiveness. Furthermore, it is also 
worthy to note that IBs clients are religious clients, who do not prefer high risk-taking. Thus, 
risk governance mechanisms in IBs might focus more on decreasing the risk, instead of 
increasing the risk management effectiveness.     
 
The research area focusing on the effect of board quality on risk-taking is still limited. 
Previous studies such as (Pathan, 2009; Erkens et al., 2012; Minton et al., 2014; Sila et al., 
2016) obtained mixed results when investigating the relationship between board quality and 
risk-taking. This study added more evidence to the literature by concentrating on the risk 
management-related to corporate governance mechanisms that are released by regulators to 
improve the oversight of risks. To the best of our knowledge, research on the oversight of 
RCs and CROs is rare and no previous studies in this area have paid attention to the Islamic 
banking system. Furthermore, our study also examines the effect of risk governance on the 
effectiveness of bank risk management, which has not been considered before. The 
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implications of our study can be applied for regulators and shareholders as it is associated 
with public policy concern in the financial industry. Also, it shows the possible advantages of 
having strong risk governance. Since the risk management function in IBs is not effective in 
managing risk, it is essential for regulators and policymakers to distinguish between business 
models of both types of banks when designing risk management policies. Furthermore, the 
regulators of Islamic banking should consider other Shari’ah risk management strategies that 
are not impersonator to CBs since both banks types have different aims. 
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Chapter 5. Conclusion 
 
5.1 Introduction  
The importance of firms being able to access domestic and international financial resources 
highlights the need for effective corporate governance for both developing and developed 
economies (Iskander and Chamlou, 2000). However, the corporate governance topic did not 
receive sufficient attention until the 1990s. More importantly, the recent financial crisis in 
2007 increased the pressure to improve corporate governance mechanisms. Specifically, the 
failures of many large banks and other financial firms were recorded during the crisis, and 
corporate governance was mostly blamed for such events. For example, Bernanke (2010) 
argues that the failures of boards of directors to manage the emerging risks were the major 
underlying reason behind this financial crisis. He also stated that the global economy has been 
jeopardised as the crisis damaged the stability and profitability of the financial sector. 
Consequently, stronger corporate governance mechanisms in the financial sector have become 
more important than ever before, in order to ensure the sustainability and durability of the 
entire sector (Erkens et al., 2012).  
Intriguingly, it was noted that Islamic banks (IBs) were not only less affected by the financial 
crisis, but indeed performed even better during that turbulent time. Because of this 
surprisingly resilient performance, scholars (e.g. Hasan and Dridi, 2010; Beck et al., 2013; 
Mollah and Zaman, 2015) started concentrating on this banking system. A few studies have 
investigated corporate governance issues in Islamic banks and how they are related to the 
banks’ financial performance and risk-taking (Mollah and Zaman, 2015; Mollah et al., 2017a; 
Mollah et al., 2017b). 
Furthermore, after the recent financial crisis, regulators introduced many corporate 
governance reforms in order to improve the governance practices of banks. Nevertheless, 
regardless of those reforms, many large banks such as the first NBC bank and the NBC bank 
of New Orleans have recently failed.51 Therefore, banks’ actual efforts to implement an 
effective corporate governance mechanism remain ambiguous and under debate. In this 
regard, the present thesis attempts to better understand the influences of corporate governance 
structure on the financial flexibility and risk management of the banking sector. 
                                                     
51 First NBC bank failed in 2015, while NBC bank of New Orleans failed in 2017.  
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The thesis attempts to achieve three main empirical objectives. The first objective is to 
investigate the influences of board structure and its risk committee on financial flexibility. 
Within the implementation of this objective, the additional governance layer of Islamic banks 
and the Shari’ah supervisory board (SSB) is also examined. The second objective focuses on 
the relationship between risk governance mechanisms and risk-taking behaviours. The last 
objective attempts to explore risk governance reform and its impact on the effectiveness of 
risk management. The whole thesis centres around the context of the banking sector, taking 
into account and comparing both conventional and Islamic banks in the MENA region. To 
gain a better understanding of the main findings of this thesis, the following subsections 
provide more information regarding the empirical studies.  
 
5.2 The main findings of the thesis 
5.2.1 Objective 1 (Chapter 3): Corporate governance structures and financial flexibility – 
A comparison study between conventional and Islamic banks.  
Financial flexibility is one of the main important factors that influence a firm’s ability to 
survive financial distress and take investment opportunities. The acquirement of financial 
flexibility depends on the decision-making process of firms, which is directly influenced by 
the governance mechanism (Forbes and Milliken, 1999). Accordingly, this study investigates 
how corporate governance mechanisms affect banks’ financial flexibility by investigating two 
governance mechanisms for both CBs and IBs: board of directors and risk committee. 
Furthermore, the unique governance layer of IBs, the Shari’ah supervisory board, is included.  
The study shows that in general, effective boards of directors enhance banks’ financial 
flexibility (conservative strategy). However, more attention should be paid to this board-
flexibility association in specific banking systems. As expected, this study reveals a negative 
relationship between board size and financial flexibility for Islamic banks, whilst a positive 
relationship is obtained for conventional banks. These results may be theoretically explained 
by three reasons. These are: lack of board member knowledge about Shari’ah law, lack of 
protection for investment account holders (IAHs of profit-losing sharing accounts) on the 
board, and lower level of complexity for IBs compared to CBs. These three reasons make 
larger board to be costly and not effective for IBs. With a detailed investigation into sub-
committees of the board, this empirical study supports the regulators’ recommendation 
regarding the creation of a dedicated risk committee to manage and monitor the bank’s risks. 
The results show that the existence of a risk committee enhances the bank’s financial 
flexibility, and this evidence is more pronounced for CBs.          
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With regard to Islamic governance, this study further indicates that an effective Shari’ah 
supervisory board improves the IBs’ financial flexibility. In particular, a larger SSB board 
with more expert members (multi-membership positions) enhances IBs’ financial flexibility. 
This supports the argument that acquiring the clients’ trust would enhance IBs’ financial 
resources, as religious investors of banks gain their trust through the bank’s compliance with 
Shari’ah. 
 
Conclusion: For conventional banks, a larger board size and a larger proportion of 
independent board members tend to increase the effectiveness of the board. Therefore, the 
study found that board size positively influences bank financial flexibility. In contrast with 
conventional banks, for Islamic banks, a smaller board size and a smaller proportion of 
independent board members increase the board’s effectiveness. Hence, the study found that 
board size negatively influences the financial flexibility of Islamic banks. Combining the 
results of these two hypotheses suggests that the board effectiveness of banks enhances 
financial flexibility. 
Furthermore, the board of directors of banks often comprises a number of sub-committees 
specialised in the matters to be monitored. The study supports this view by providing evidence 
that creating a specialised risk board-level committee for bank risk matters improves banks’ 
financial flexibility. These findings hold for both CBs and IBs, but are more pronounced for 
CBs. 
Attention is also paid to the Shari’ah supervisory board of Islamic banks. The study found 
that a bigger SSB size and more multi-directorship members can increase banks’ financial 
flexibility.     
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5.2.2 Objectives 2 and 3 (Chapter 4). Do Banks Effectively Manage their Risks? The Role 
of Risk Governance.  
 
The risk-taking behaviour of firms has been a source of debate between academic researchers 
and practitioners. It is claimed that firms with excessive risk-taking behaviour would directly 
influence not only their success but more importantly their survivability. This risk-taking 
behaviour carries much more weight in the banking sector, as proved by the 2007 crisis. 
Banks that are too aggressive in their risk strategies can become insolvent. One bank’s 
collapse would create a domino effect, causing the collapse of the whole financial system. 
Realising this criticality, the relationship between corporate governance and risk-taking 
behaviour received more attention after the recent financial crisis. In particular, banking 
industry regulators have recommended improving corporate governance mechanism-related to 
risk management in banks (e.g. creating a separate risk committee and appointing a chief risk 
officer). Noting the current risk governance reforms, this study is the first to analyse the effect 
of the risk governance on the risk-taking of both bank types. It is also the first to consider 
many different risk aspects of banks rather than just focusing on specific type (e.g. market and 
credit risk), as in previous literature.  
In addition to the investigation of bank risk-taking behaviour, this study is also interested in 
learning whether risk governance effectively improves banks’ risk management. In the event 
of a banking crisis, banks should reduce their risk-taking, following the regulators’ pressure 
on boards of directors to manage risks. However, theoretically, it is hard to conclude how 
much reduction is appropriate, or whether risk reduction is truly a rational decision to make. 
Therefore, putting the objective of risk governance reform into a more general term, it is to 
increase the effectiveness of risk management. 
The results of the second objective reveal that stronger risk governance monitoring may 
mitigate all types of risks for CBs. In contrast, the results are different for IBs. The study did 
not show a significant relationship between risk governance and credit risk, whilst the impacts 
on other types of risk are the same as with those of CBs. Besides testing the five risk aspects 
separately, the study confirms the relationship between risk governance mechanisms and all 
types of risk by constructing a comprehensive risk-taking index that consists of all these 
aspects. The result of the comprehensive risk index is consistent with each individual aspect. 
Furthermore, the investigation reaches the conclusion for the third objective, drawing on the 
findings such that risk governance mechanisms enhance the risk management effectiveness of 
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banks. Basically, the results show that the relationship between risk-taking and performance is 
more positive when the bank has a stronger risk governance. However, this evidence only 
holds for CBs, as the results suggest that IBs’ risk governance does not significantly influence 
the effectiveness of managing IBs’ risks.  
Conclusion: Risk governance mechanisms have been the focus topic in recent years. 
Specifically, creating a dedicated risk committee at the board level and assigning a chief risk 
officer tend to mitigate the risk-taking behaviour and increase the effectiveness of risk 
management. However, the study found that risk governance index is negatively associated 
with all risk perspectives (market, credit, operational liquidity, and insolvency risks) for 
conventional banks and Islamic banks; however, this relationship is positive with credit risk 
for Islamic banks. Combining the results of this study suggests that the risk governance index, 
which consists of RC and CRO, may mitigate the risk-taking behaviour of both CBs and IBs. 
Furthermore, risk governance mechanisms are assumed to not just mitigate risk-taking, but to 
increase the effectiveness of risk management. The study supports this view by providing 
evidence that developing strong risk governance monitoring enhances the positive 
relationship between risk-taking and performance. These findings hold only for CBs, and are 
not pronounced for IBs.  
 
5.3 Critical reflection 
To achieve the main aims and objectives of the thesis, the implementation process of the 
thesis inevitably involves many difficulties and challenges. From the initial draft of research 
aims of objectives, research design, study samples, data collection, methodologies, to the final 
findings, countless of choices and trade-offs were required to be made with careful thought 
and consideration, together with many lengthy discussions with the supervisory team. The 
data collection of this thesis can be deemed to be the most challenging process, because 
corporate governance data required in this thesis, e.g., board of directors and board risk 
committee, for both conventional banks and Islamic banks can only be obtained manually 
through reading the banks’ annual reports. Nevertheless, since this stage is the key to a valid 
and good research, it has been carried out with utmost attention and precaution. Overall, the 
implementation of the data collection process was considered highly successful. A 
combination of a good data and highly considerate statistical methods can facilitate the 
achievement of the overall aim of the study. 
The presented findings and analysis of this thesis found that the relationship between 
corporate governance mechanisms and Islamic banks and conventional banks decision-
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making process regarding their corporate financial and risk management policies is relatively 
unexplored. As observed in the literature, corporate governance mechanisms in the banking 
industry has not been explored very well, specifically for Islamic banking. Most of the 
literature cover this area in relation to the banks performance, and the on-going underlying 
processes (e.g., financial flexibility and risk-taking) that led to the ultimate goal of the firm 
has been relatively ignored. However, even though it is noted that corporate governance 
mechanisms-related to risk management, risk governance, (i.e., creating a dedicated risk 
committee and assigning chief risk officer) have been the focus by number of practitioner and 
academic in recent years (Lundqvist, 2015), studies on relationship between risk governance 
mechanisms and risk-taking is limited, and there is no study investigate the relationship 
between risk governance and risk management effectiveness in Islamic banks context.    
   
Following the increasing attention and awareness on the roles of corporate governance and 
risk governance mechanisms within banking industries after the financial crisis 2008, together 
with a thorough review of the literature and theories within the field, the study has set forth to 
investigate the influences of corporate governance mechanisms on banks’ financial flexibility, 
risk-taking behaviour, and risk management effectiveness in MENA region for both banking 
systems, Conventional and Islamic banks. Overall, the findings obtained indicate that 
effective corporate governance mechanisms can have positive impacts on banks financial 
positions, both conventional and Islamic banks, by increasing banks’ financial flexibility, and 
reducing the currently deem-to-be-excessive risk taking. However, the findings assure the 
important need to develop an effective risk governance and risk management practices in 
Islamic banks as the thesis only shows improving of conventional bank’s risk management 
effectiveness. Supported by the obtained finding, it is important to consider the banks type 
when placing the corporate governance mechanisms, as the IBs have unique characteristics 
(following shari’ah principle and having additional layer of corporate governance-Shari’ah 
supervisory board). In general, the obtained findings implies that IBs have unique corporate 
governance requirements that need to fit to their business model and operating system 
effectively to address the issue concerning effective risk management.  
 
The research was initially built on different theories discussed in Chapter 2. Particularly, 
focusing on the monitoring roles stated in agency theory and the advisory roles emphasized in 
the resource-based theory, corporate governance mechanisms, including board of director 
structure, separate risk committee existence, and Shari’ah supervisory board, affect banks 
  
149 
 
financial flexibility. Furthermore, IBs results show some differences on how board of director 
structure affect financial flexibility. Within IBs, the results also highlight the important role of 
shari’ah supervisory board in enhancing the IBs financial flexibility. This supports the 
argument that IBs follow the agency theory with considering additional sources of conflict 
that is derived from violating Shari’ah principles, and adopt the additional layer of 
governance, as suggested in Islamic corporate governance model in chapter 2. In the second 
empirical study, the focus was paid primarily on institutional theory in supporting the 
relationship between risk governance and risk-taking. The findings obtained are adhered with 
this theory and supports the value-added of effective risk governance that consists of 
dedicated risk committee and chief risk officer in banks. However, the risk governance in IB 
is still suffering from achieving their role effectively, which indicates the important need for 
corporate governance model that considers the risk management issues in IBs. Overall, the 
findings of this thesis emphasize the important to pay more attention to changes and 
innovations of corporate governance codes and the unique corporate governance requirements 
for IBs.  
  
5.4 Implication of the thesis  
The obtained findings of this thesis present theoretical and practical implications for academic 
researchers, banks, and regulators. Although the theories employed in this thesis are among 
the most popular and applicable theories within the corporate governance topic, they remains 
quite general and can be malleable by different researchers with different understanding and 
interpretations. Therefore, based on the findings of this thesis, more explicit theoretical 
framework which can explain the impacts of different compositions and responsibilities of 
corporate governance mechanisms on a number of key financial constructs of banks can be 
constructed. For example, a different model of corporate governance practices that solves the 
conventional and unique agency issues of IBs may help to overcome the need to meet other 
stakeholder interests (e.g., Investment account holders) and preserving the Shari’ah law. The 
extension of the field in future research can be more proficiently built on such specific 
conceptual framework.  
 
In addition to the theoretical implication, the findings of this thesis also provide strong 
implications to academic researchers to pay more attention to changes and innovations of 
corporate governance codes and their influences in the practical outsets, as well as to 
practitioners to employ and target corporate governance as a means to improve the financial 
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performances and management of banks. The findings of this thesis also provide several 
important implications for banks and regulators in practice. For banks in general, it is 
recommended to assign an optimal board structure to ensure effective monitoring and 
managing roles. In particular, the findings of the first empirical study documented a positive 
relationship between board size and financial flexibility for CBs and a negative relationship 
for IBs. This implies that the interests of shareholders and other stakeholders are more likely 
to be met if the board size is larger for CBs, but smaller for IBs. This conflicting finding 
indicates the importance of bank types in assigning board structure. Furthermore, the findings 
also suggest that both banks should consider creating a dedicated risk committee that 
exclusively oversees bank risks, to enhance the bank’s financial flexibility level. In IBs 
specifically, further attention should be paid to the Shari’ah supervisory board. The results 
suggest that IBs’ financial flexibility might be stronger if they have effective SSBs that ensure 
the stakeholders’ trust in the bank’s compliance with Shari’ah principles. 
Justifying the recent recommendations by regulators regarding risk governance, this thesis 
supports the idea that improvements in risk governance through the different characteristics of 
risk committees and chief risk officer may mitigate banks’ comprehensive risk-taking and 
improve their risk management effectiveness. Particularly, banks should consider a bigger 
risk-committee size, higher committee independence, more frequent meetings, more experts 
in the field of risk, and members’ qualifications. Furthermore, they should also improve the 
roles of the CRO by making the CRO responsible for comprehensive risk, appointing the 
CRO to top executive management and to the risk committee, and requiring them to report 
directly to the board of directors.  
Specific implications for regulators and policymakers in the MENA region are provided in 
this thesis. Particularly, similar to regulators in developed countries, regulators in the MENA 
region should impose more emphasis on the role of the board of directors in managing and 
monitoring risks and firms’ financial reserves, especially after the recent financial crisis. 
Furthermore, regulators of banks should consider the type of bank when placing corporate 
governance codes regarding board structure. In addition, the studies also support the recent 
regulators’ recommendation regarding the creation of risk committees. Therefore, the findings 
of this thesis might be useful for the regulators and agency authorities of Islamic Institutions, 
e.g. IFSB, to modify or develop the governance recommendations for board structure and risk 
governance. The findings also suggest that SSBs enhance stakeholders’ trust and IBs’ 
reputation. Therefore, this thesis also suggests that Islamic authorities should place their focus 
on SSBs if they aim to improve the banks’ financial flexibility. 
  
151 
 
The thesis also contributes to the on-going efforts on developing and evaluating financial 
resilience measures and indicators of the firms. Number of independent organizations such as 
the International Risk Governance Council (IRGC) provide attention and guidance to build 
financial resilience/flexibility position to respond to unexpected risks. Thus, this thesis 
provides implications for regulators and banks by suggesting a method to measure financial 
resilience for the banks, which will help in triggering interests and funds from decision-
makers. The results of this thesis are also worth considering since it provides insight about the 
effectiveness actions taken by board of directors and risk committee to build financial 
flexibility position.             
 
The findings also provide evidence for shareholders and regulators that applying the 
recommended risk governance mechanisms effectively manages conventional banks’ risk. 
However, this is not the case for IBs, as Islamic institution authorities might need to develop 
and improve Shari’ah compliant tools to make the risk governance system more effective in 
managing IBs’ risks. Importantly, it is worth noting that besides the recent BSBC 
requirements regarding capital and liquidity practices, corporate governance issues can also 
be targeted to enhance the resilience and risk management of the banking sector. 
 
5.5 Limitations and future research 
Following the discussion of the thesis’s findings and implications, this final section aims at 
discussing its limitations, based on which the identifications of future directions and research 
opportunities within the field are developed.  
Similar to most of previous research, this thesis encounters a number of limitations. The main 
limitation is related to the employed data. Corporate governance mechanisms are generally 
challenging data to collect especially in developing countries such as MENA region. Together 
with recent updates of corporate governance structures including the dedicated board risk 
committee and chief risk officer, the data required in this thesis is not available on database. 
As a result, all data employed were collected manually, which can potentially expose to some 
problems. Firstly, due to the time constraints of a PhD study, the manual data collection 
process can limit the coverage of the study in terms of the numbers of corporate governance 
perspectives. Also, missing data is another issue that results in the omission of a number of 
banks and countries within the investigated region. Particularly, a criteria was set for the 
sample is to include only banks with at least two consecutive years of data. However, overall, 
the implementation of the data collection process was considered highly successful. Another 
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limitation of this thesis is that the scope of the study is limited by focusing on Islamic 
corporate governance practices in MENA region. Specifically, the findings of the research 
cannot be generalized to other Islamic governance system practised by other jurisdictions.  
Based on the above mentioned limitations, number of future research are suggested below. As 
previously mentioned, financial flexibility in banks has not attracted sufficient attention from 
academics thus far, and in particular no studies have been conducted on Islamic banks. Given 
its relevance in practice, this thesis recommends further and more thorough study on this 
financial construct of banks, looking at different corporate governance perspectives. 
Specifically, one potential idea might be an examination of the effect of other board of 
directors characteristics on banks’ financial flexibility. For example, a number of previous 
studies have confirmed the relationship between the financial qualifications of the 
independent members of the board and risk-taking, which in turn might affect the financial 
flexibility of the firm. 
Another opportunity for further research regards the remuneration systems for chief risk 
officers and risk committee members. The remuneration system became the most debated 
issue in financial institutions after the recent financial crisis. The executives’ motivations to 
take excessive risks are increased by the design of the remuneration system. Thus, this was 
considered to be one of the main reasons behind the financial crisis. Therefore, future research 
may consider the bounce and stock ownership of RC members and banks risk-taking. 
Furthermore, this could be accomplished using a comparison study between IBs and CBs. In 
this study, the governance data were collected manually from annual reports, and there was 
not enough time to collect the remuneration data in regards to CRO and RC members due to 
the limited duration of the PhD programme. Furthermore, such information was usually 
missing in the annual reports for the sample of this study in the MENA region, thus this could 
be discovered using a global sample.     
Finally, this thesis employs the MENA region to conduct empirical studies where a number of 
data were missing. The results of the empirical studies might therefore be enhanced and 
supported by re-investigating the targeted corporate governance mechanisms of this thesis on 
both financial flexibility and risk-taking behaviour using a global sample. 
 
 
  
153 
 
Appendices 
Appendix 1: Financial Flexibility Index (FFI) Measures 
 
Financial Flexibility Proxies 
 
 
Measurement 
 
Judgment 
 
 
Stable (Core) Funding to Assets 
(SFA) Ratio 
 
 
SFA = ((Core Deposits *95%) + Core Capital + Debt 
with maturity longer than one year) / Total Assets 
 
Is a bank’s SFA > the 
mean average of the SFA 
for the full sample at 
time t in each country? A 
value of 1 if yes; 0 
otherwise. 
 
 
 
Liquid Assets (LA) Ratio 
 
 
LA = Cash and Cash Equivalent / Total Assets 
 
Is a bank’s LA > the 
mean average of the LA 
for the full sample at 
time t in each country? A 
value of 1 if yes; 0 
otherwise. 
 
 
 
Insolvency Risks (Z-Score) 
 
 
 
 
 
Capital adequacy ratio (Tier1 
ratio)                                      
 
 
 
 
 
Loan losses provision (LLP) 
ratios  
 
 
 
 
The cost to income (Cost) ratio  
  
 
 
 
 
 
Return on Average assets (ROAA) 
ratio    
 
 
 
 
 
The liquid assets to deposits and 
short term funding (LIQR) ratio  
 
 
 
Z-Score = Return on Average Assets + Capital Assets 
Ratio / Standard Deviation of Return of Average Assets 
 
 
 
 
Tier 1 = Tier 1 capital as percentage of risk-weighted 
assets and of off-balance sheet risks 
 
 
 
 
 
LLP = loan losses provision / total loans 
 
 
 
 
 
Cost = the banks costs / total income  
 
 
 
 
 
 
ROAA = net income / average of total assets  
 
 
 
 
 
 
LIQR= liquid assets / total deposit and short-term 
funding  
 
Is a bank’s Z-Score > the 
mean average of the Z-
Score for the full sample 
at time t in each country? 
A value of 1 if yes; 0 
otherwise. 
 
Is a bank’s Tier 1 ratio > 
the mean average of the 
Tier1 for the full sample 
at time t in each country?  
A value of 1 if yes; 0 
otherwise. 
 
Is a bank’s LLP ratio < 
the mean average of the 
LLP for the full sample 
at time t in each country?  
A value of 1 if yes; 0 
otherwise 
 
Is a bank’s Cost ratio < 
the mean average of the 
Cost for the full sample 
at time t in each country?  
A value of 1 if yes; 0 
otherwise 
 
Is a bank’s Cost ratio > 
the mean average of the 
ROAA for the full 
sample at time t in each 
country?  A value of 1 if 
yes; 0 otherwise 
 
Is a bank’s LIQR ratio > 
the mean average of the 
LIQR for the full sample 
at time t in each country?  
A value of 1 if yes; 0 
otherwise 
Note: FFI is only include the first three proxies of financial flexibility. For robustness check, we measure our financial flexibility differently 
by adding the five rest proxies 
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Appendix 2: Variables Definitions of the Whole Thesis 
Name Abbreviation Description 
 Panel A: DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
Financial Flexibility Index                  FFI An ordinary variable, ranging from 0 to 3, indicating different levels of financial 
    
Market risk  TR 
Total risk measured by the standard 
deviation of 60 monthly stock return 
consecutively with a minimum of 36 
months to reflect the market risk 
Credit Risk IMPILOAN 
The impaired loan to total loans to 
measure the credit risk 
Operational Risk SDROAA 
The standard deviation of Return on 
Average Assets to measure operational 
risk. 
Liquidity Risk  CTA 
The cash to total assets to measure the 
liquidity risk 
Insolvency Risk InZscore1 
The invers of the logzscore to measure the 
insolvency 
Overall Risk OVERRISK 
Factor analysis eigenvalue obtained from 
five risks measures mentioned before 
Account Performance  ROAA 
ROAA is return on average assets.   
 
Market Performance TOBINQ 
Equity MV plus liability BV divided by 
asset BV 
Panel B: MAIN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
Board of Directors Size BODSIZE The total number of board of directors’ members. 
Board Independence BODIND Percentage of independent non-executive directors on the board of directors. 
Risk Committee Existing   RCE Dummy variable take value of 1 if the bank has dedicated risk committee and 0 
h i  
Risk Governance Index RGI 
Risk governance index measured using 
the first principal component of the risk 
committee and chief risk officer 
characteristics. 
Shari’ah Supervisory Board Size SSBSIZE The total numbers of Shari’ah advisors on the board. 
Shari’ah Supervisory Board Qualification SSBQUAL Percentage of Shari’ah advisors with financial qualifications on the SSB. 
Shari’ah Supervisory Board Multi‐directorships SSBMULTI 
multi‐memberships, calculated as 
number of Shari’ah advisors serving on 
two or more additional (outside) firms 
divided by the number of Shari’ah 
advisors on the board. 
Panel C: BANK and COUNTRY LEVEL CHARACTERISTICS 
CEO-Duality CEO-Duality 
Dummy variable takes value of 1 if the 
CEO and the chairman of the board is the 
same person, and 0 otherwise 
Insider Ownership MANOWN Percentage of shares held by executive directors to total number of shares 
Institutional Ownership INSTOWN 
the institutional ownership measured by 
% shares held by institutions firms to 
total shares 
Bank Age AGE The difference between the sample year and the year in which the bank was 
 
Bank Size LOGTA Natural logarithm of total assets of a bank. 
Bank Growth Opportunities GROWTHOPP Tobins’ Q (Equity MV plus liability BV divided by asset BV). 
Performance  ROAA ROAA is return on average assets.    
Bank Tier 1 Capital Ratio TIER1   Core capital / Risk weighted assets 
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Cost of Income  COSTEFF 
The bank cost efficiency measured by 
cost/net income 
Income Diversification NONIN Non-interest income to total income 
Leverage ratio LEV 
leverage ratio measured by total equity to 
total assets 
Deposit ratio DEPOTA Total deposit to total assets 
Loan Ratio  LOANTA Total loan total assets 
Loan Growth 
LOANGROWTH 
loan growth measured by the difference 
between current loan and the previous 
loan divided by previous loans 
Islamic Bank ISLAMIC Dummy variable: 1 if the bank is Islamic, 0 otherwise. 
GDP per capita LOGGDPPC Natural logarithm of Gross Domestic Products (GDP) per capita. 
GDP Growth Rate GDPGROWTH Annual GDP growth rate. 
Country Corporate governance G-Index  country corporate governance quality measured by six indicators 
Inflation Rate INFL Annual rate of inflation. 
Hirschman -Herfindahl Index HHI 
The Hirschman-Herfindahl Index 
measures bank market concentration. 
HHI is calculated as the square sum of the 
ratio of total assets of each bank-year to 
total assets of all banks each year. It has 
a value between zero and one. Higher 
HHI shows higher bank concentration. 
Domestic Interest Rate DIR Deposit Interest Rate provided by the World Bank website; for years and 
     
       
 
Legal System LEGAL 0 for countries not using Shari’ah law to define their legal system, 1 for countries 
bi i  b h h i h l  d h  
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Appendix 3: EMPIRCAL STUDY 1- The Relationship between Corporate Governance 
mechanisms and FF using Ordered Logistic Regression (FFI dependent) 
  Full IBs CBs 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES FFI FFI FFI FFI 
     
BODSIZE 0.211*** -0.323* -0.317** 0.356*** 
 (0.081) (0.168) (0.155) (0.109) 
BODIND -0.019 -1.301 -0.347 0.068 
 (0.481) (1.079) (0.956) (1.033) 
RCE 1.072*** 1.570** 1.676** 1.223** 
 (0.378) (0.747) (0.727) (0.585) 
SSBSIZE  0.613*   
  (0.335)   
SSBQUAL  -1.832   
  (1.318)   
SSBMULTI  2.372**   
  (1.130)   
SSB-Effectiveness   0.652*  
   (0.391)  
CEO-Duality 1.012**    
 (0.512)    
MANOWN -0.358 0.840 0.428 -1.480 
 (1.462) (3.019) (3.146) (2.667) 
AGE 0.005 -0.071*** -0.043** 0.022 
 (0.009) (0.023) (0.019) (0.014) 
LOGTA 0.154 -0.622 -0.653* 0.039 
 (0.163) (0.404) (0.374) (0.284) 
GROWTHOPP 3.131*** 2.626 2.889 7.612** 
 (1.103) (2.078) (1.758) (3.643) 
ROAA -0.233 -1.313*** -1.353*** 0.337 
 (0.230) (0.343) (0.337) (0.406) 
RISK -1.145*** -1.389*** -1.194*** -3.909*** 
 (0.230) (0.410) (0.369) (0.867) 
TIER1 0.066*** 0.139*** 0.136*** -0.016 
 (0.023) (0.045) (0.041) (0.037) 
COSTEFF -0.015 -0.131*** -0.132*** -0.005 
 (0.015) (0.025) (0.023) (0.021) 
ISLAMIC 0.925***    
 (0.292)    
LOGGDPPC -0.798*** -2.001*** -1.457*** -0.394 
 (0.253) (0.606) (0.484) (0.385) 
GDPGROWTH 0.039 0.051 0.042 -0.057 
 (0.042) (0.078) (0.077) (0.071) 
GOVERMENT-E 0.888** 1.374** 1.221* 1.538** 
 (0.410) (0.699) (0.698) (0.688) 
INFL -0.053 0.016 0.004 -0.077 
 (0.052) (0.145) (0.143) (0.081) 
HHI -8.542*** -16.94** -12.66** -4.614 
 (2.119) (6.760) (5.975) (3.347) 
DIR -0.634*** -0.732*** -0.584** -0.375* 
 (0.132) (0.276) (0.253) (0.225) 
LEGAL -1.659*** -0.437 0.481 -2.869** 
 (0.535) (1.223) (1.052) (1.128) 
     
Year Effects YES YES YES YES 
Observations 317 126 126 191 
R2 0.159 0.318 0.299 0.296 
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Appendix 4: EMPIRCAL STUDY 2- The Relationship between Risk Governance and 
Risk-taking using Additional Controlling Variables  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Market risk Credit risk Operational 
risk 
Liquidity 
risk  
Insolvency 
risk 
Overall 
Risk 
       
RGI -0.003* -2.048*** -0.089** 0.991** -0.028** -0.061** 
 (0.002) (0.587) (0.039) (0.415) (0.011) (0.024) 
RGI_IB 0.001 1.719** 0.0182 -0.045 -0.002 -0.035 
 (0.003) (0.740) (0.065) (0.566) (0.024) (0.038) 
BODSIZE 0.001 -1.301*** -0.117*** 0.498* -0.036*** -0.055*** 
 (0.002) (0.393) (0.031) (0.257) (0.011) (0.018) 
BODIND 0.026*** 7.502*** 0.0195 3.608*** 0.024 0.222** 
 (0.008) (2.416) (0.174) (1.234) (0.048) (0.093) 
CEO-Duality 0.0001 4.628 0.164 -6.183*** 0.144 0.119 
 (0.010) (3.673) (0.187) (2.033) (0.091) (0.109) 
INSTOWN -0.008 3.183* 0.320* 4.818*** 0.071 0.243* 
 (0.010) (1.762) (0.190) (1.733) (0.048) (0.136) 
MANOWN -0.033 -0.514 0.295 17.09*** -0.095 -0.154 
 (0.028) (5.602) (0.589) (4.845) (0.154) (0.364) 
LOGTA -0.012*** -3.095*** -0.269*** 1.655*** -0.070*** -0.168*** 
 (0.003) (0.717) (0.064) (0.604) (0.020) (0.048) 
AGE -0.004 0.151*** 0.0063 -0.045 0.002*** 0.005* 
 (0.001) (0.045) (0.004) (0.034) (0.001) (0.002) 
ROAA 0.001 -1.662* -0.150* -2.211*** -0.065** -0.080* 
 (0.003) (0.866) (0.088) (0.696) (0.025) (0.047) 
DEPOTA -0.055 -20.23*** 0.071 -0.023 -0.006 -0.360 
 (0.040) (6.655) (0.556) (4.689) (0.176) (0.382) 
TIER1 -0.002*** -0.775*** -0.038*** 0.263** -0.012*** -0.026*** 
 (0.001) (0.163) (0.011) (0.116) (0.002) (0.007) 
LEV 0.001 0.732*** 0.076*** -0.348** 0.009*** 0.024** 
 (0.001) (0.230) (0.016) (0.162) (0.003) (0.010) 
NONINT 0.040* 22.30*** 0.998* 9.678*** 0.262* 0.801*** 
 (0.022) (7.511) (0.584) (3.301) (0.134) (0.297) 
GROWTHOPP -0.007 5.834 1.103** -12.24** 0.424*** 0.364 
 (0.025) (5.184) (0.537) (4.867) (0.160) (0.357) 
LOANTA  -10.75**     
  (4.737)     
LOANGROW  -0.036     
  (0.025)     
COSTEFF 0.002 -0.090* 0.004 -0.152*** 0.001 0.004 
 (0.0002) (0.053) (0.004) (0.036) (0.001) (0.002) 
ISLAMIC 0.019*** 5.856*** 0.407*** 2.237** 0.112*** 0.393*** 
 (0.005) (1.406) (0.104) (0.940) (0.028) (0.075) 
LOGGDPPC 0.014*** -3.335*** -0.0194 -3.469*** -0.020 0.0912 
 (0.005) (1.044) (0.095) (1.022) (0.028) (0.069) 
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Appendix 4 (continue) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Market risk Credit risk Operational 
risk 
Liquidity 
risk  
Insolvency 
risk 
Overall 
Risk 
       
GDPGROWTH 0.001* -0.059 0.010 0.075 0.001 0.011 
 (0.001) (0.129) (0.012) (0.127) (0.003) (0.007) 
G-Index 0.0133 4.494** 0.166 3.608 0.125** 0.155 
 (0.010) (2.166) (0.210) (2.490) (0.060) (0.163) 
INFL 0.002** -0.183 0.004 -0.303 -0.005 0.029** 
 (0.001) (0.260) (0.018) (0.193) (0.005) (0.012) 
DIR 0.010*** -0.330 -0.0393 1.695*** -0.005 0.0187 
 (0.004) (0.643) (0.055) (0.589) (0.015) (0.036) 
HHI -0.196*** -8.623 -1.447* -2.521 -0.268 -1.114* 
 (0.048) (13.96) (0.871) (9.962) (0.203) (0.670) 
LEGAL 0.0162 -1.443 -0.248 2.041 0.022 -0.122 
 (0.011) (2.617) (0.195) (1.972) (0.058) (0.127) 
Constant 0.170** 105.8*** 4.584*** 24.80* 1.400*** 1.660* 
 (0.072) (18.88) (1.489) (13.38) (0.399) (0.976) 
       
Year Effects  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 223 202 222 206 221 209 
R-squared 0.575 0.748 0.649 0.650 0.570 0.652 
Notes: The table presents regression results for banks’ risk governance index and credit risk for all samples for the period 2009-2015. 
IMPILOAN is the impaired loan to total loans to measure the credit risk. LLR is loan losses reserve to gross loans. RGI is risk governance 
index measured using the first principal component of the risk committee and chief risk officer characteristics. RGI_IB is the interaction 
between risk governance index and Islamic bank. BODSIZE is the total number of BOD members. BODIND is % independent non-executive 
directors in the BOD. CEO-Duality is dummy variable takes value of 1 if the CEO and the chairman of the board is the same person, and 0 
otherwise. INSTOWN is the institutional ownership measured by % shares held by institutions firms to total shares. MANOWN is the insider 
ownership measured by % shares held by executive directors to total shares. LOGTA is the bank’s size measured by natural logarithm of total 
assets. AGE is the difference between the sample year and the year in which the bank was established. ROAA is return on average assets. 
DEPOTA is total deposit to total assets. TIER 1 is banks’ capital ratio measured by Core capital / Risk weighted assets. LEV is leverage ratio 
measured by total equity to total assets. NONIT is non-interest income to total income. GROWTHOPP is Equity MV plus liability BV divided 
by asset BV. LOANTA is total loan total assets. LOANGROWTH is loan growth measured by the difference between current loan and the 
previous loan divided by previous loans. COSTEFF is the bank cost efficiency measured by cost/net income. ISLAMIC is unity if the bank is 
Islamic, 0 otherwise. LOGGDPPC is the country GDP per capita measured by Natural logarithm of GDP per capita. GDPGROWTH is the 
GDP growth rate. G-Index is country corporate governance quality measured by six indicators. INFL is the annual rate of inflation DIR is the 
deposit Interest Rate. HHI is the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index measures bank market concentration. HHI is calculated as the square sum of the 
ratio of total assets of each bank-year to total assets of all banks each year. It has a value between zero and one. Higher HHI shows higher bank 
concentration. LEGAL (legal system) is religiosity proxy which take value of 0 if the country not using Shari’ah law, 1 for countries combing 
both Shari’ah law and other legal system, and 2 for countries with only shari’ah law. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. 
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Appendix 5: EMPIRCAL STUDY 2- The Relationship between Risk Governance and 
Risk management effectiveness using Additional Controlling Variables  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES ROAA ROAE TOBINQ MTB 
     
RGI 0.089 0.157 -0.004 -0.025 
 (0.074) (0.575) (0.006) (0.052) 
RGI IB 0.029 0.622 -0.003 -0.057 
 (0.085) (0.613) (0.007) (0.069) 
RGI OVERRISK 0.310* 2.657** 0.038** 0.441*** 
 (0.165) (1.314) (0.014) (0.123) 
RGI OVERRISK
 
-0.310* -2.594* -0.034** -0.423*** 
 (0.195) (1.444) (0.016) (0.134) 
OVERRISK -0.221 -2.275 -0.023 -0.057 
 (0.235) (1.936) (0.023) (0.188) 
OVERRISK IB 0.015 1.755 0.019 -0.071 
 (0.254) (1.989) (0.024) (0.207) 
BODSIZE 0.120*** 0.615** -0.001 -0.042* 
 (0.034) (0.248) (0.002) (0.025) 
BODIND -0.346 -2.348 -0.024 -0.134 
 (0.215) (1.532) (0.018) (0.149) 
CEO-Duality 0.181 1.781 0.065*** 0.615*** 
 (0.190) (1.551) (0.017) (0.137) 
INSTOWN -0.343 -2.788 0.019 0.319* 
 (0.224) (1.708) (0.025) (0.180) 
AGE -0.006 -0.056** -0.001** -0.003 
 (0.003) (0.027) (0.001) (0.003) 
LOGTA -0.050 -0.596 0.017*** 0.103** 
 (0.056) (0.407) (0.006) (0.047) 
DEPOTA -0.054 1.027 -0.052 -0.821* 
 (0.884) (5.413) (0.070) (0.466) 
TIER1 -0.003 -0.006 0.003** 0.016 
 (0.014) (0.095) (0.001) (0.010) 
LEV 0.039** -0.048 -0.006*** -0.045*** 
 (0.017) (0.118) (0.002) (0.014) 
NONINT 0.947 6.514* 0.012 0.188 
 (0.608) (3.768) (0.052) (0.388) 
LOANTA 1.128* 12.23*** 0.085 0.919** 
 (0.596) (4.236) (0.051) (0.407) 
COSTEFF -0.045*** -0.264*** -0.002*** -0.016*** 
 (0.005) (0.031) (0.001) (0.002) 
ISLAMIC -0.137 -2.020** 0.051*** 0.496*** 
 (0.114) (0.872) (0.012) (0.112) 
GDPGROWTH 0.031*** 0.217*** 0.002*** 0.017** 
 (0.010) (0.076) (0.001) (0.007) 
G-Index 0.255 0.580 -0.053** -0.556*** 
 (0.214) (1.570) (0.024) (0.186) 
HHI -2.728** -23.66** 0.428*** 3.290*** 
 (1.374) (10.03) (0.125) (1.075) 
DIR 0.139*** 1.055*** -0.006 -0.065* 
 (0.049) (0.389) (0.004) (0.037) 
LEGAL 0.591*** 3.201** 0.046** 0.247 
 (0.191) (1.471) (0.018) (0.154) 
Constant 1.348 17.23* 0.806*** 0.425 
 (1.364) (9.455) (0.128) (1.005) 
     
YEAR EFFECTS YES YES YES YES 
Observations 228 228 219 224 
R-squared 0.775 0.725 0.677 0.631 
See Appendix 2 for variables definition. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; 
***p < 0.01. 
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